when we came back, Fox Maule, as the organ of the Government, promised Reform in the next session. Accordingly, at the beginning of the session of 1852, it was announced in the Queen's Speech. So much as to the past.

The necessity for Reform now exists not in any declarations of mine, but in the existence of abuses and defects which it becomes our duty to remedy. I am sure I need not remind you of what Mr. Burke says of early reformations. The capitulations made with the Catholic Association and the Anti-Corn Law League are not to me inviting examples to follow.

Next, are there these abuses?

You admit the inadequacy of the electoral body in very small places, but object to a Schedule B. You do so, however, on a ground which I do not think can be maintained—that, taking the general nature and effect of the plan, it tends without necessity to produce a great derangement of legislative and political power to the injury of land, and the advantage of the manufacturing, commercial, and working classes. If you will consider the plan further, I think you will see

First, that, like the Reform Bill, it takes away power from individuals or classes who are weak and odious, and gives it to large bodies of the same class who are strong and popular. Thus Wilton, Harwich, Honiton, &c., lose their power, but it is transferred to Kent, Devonshire, Lincolnshire, &c., agricultural counties rich and populous, where the privilege once placed can be maintained. Secondly, in giving more members to Manchester and Leeds, we should not give members of the same class. The Conservative minority of these towns would for the first time have representatives. Thirdly, the proposition to give all the surrendered seats to counties would excite violent and natural opposition. The precedent of the Reform Bill is much safer, more constitutional, and would practically produce greater harmony. The object should be not to set town against county, but to blend and unite them. As to the franchise for the educated classes, I am quite ready to adopt it, in any shape in which it can be made workable. But, if the freemen are to be disfranchised, I think a large extension to householders indispensable. I am quite ready to discuss Graham's plan, or the £6 rating, or the £7 value in lieu of the £10 value. I lean at present to the municipal franchise.

As we shall have an opportunity of discussing the whole matter on Friday, I will say no more but that I remain yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston's objections to Reform were not removed by Lord John's arguments. But, at the same time, it was soon plain to Lord Palmerston that, with the single exception of Lord Lansdowne, he had no supporter either in the committee of the Cabinet or the Cabinet itself. Early in December he communicated his objections to Lord Aberdeen. A few days afterwards he wrote a letter to Lord Lansdowne in which he stated that he could not agree to the extent of disfranchisement, the extent of enfranchisement, and the addition of the municipal franchise in boroughs to the £10 household franchise. He added that he doubted whether the measure could pass through the two Houses, that he did not choose to be a party to a contest between them, or to be dragged through the dirt by John Russell. Though he thought his presence in the Cabinet useful in modifying the system of foreign policy which, injuriously to the interests and dignity of the country, there was a disposition in other quarters to pursue, he could not consent to stand forward as one of the authors and supporters of John Russell's sweeping alteration.

On the 10th he forwarded a copy of this letter and of Lord Lansdowne's answer to the Prime Minister, who at once showed them to Sir James Graham. Sir James, on the 11th, communicated their substance to Lord John, adding—

It is clear that his [Lord Palmerston's] part is taken; and that he hopes by raising the war cry to drown the demand for an extension of the suffrage. This is the game which has been played before, and, as you wisely foresee, is about to be played again. But there is a nobler and a better one quite open, and be it yours.

Propose a sound, but popular, measure of Parliamentary Reform; and, without making any undue concessions to Russia, cement the union of the four powers, maintain the integrity of Turkey, and preserve the peace of Europe.

Cordial concord and co-operation between you and Lord Aberdeen may secure both objects, to the great advantage of the nation and to your own immortal honour.

But cordial concord is necessary; and those who agree on Reform must not quarrel on the Eastern question.

You should see Lord Aberdeen as early as possible to-morrow, and I am quite sure that a perfect agreement between you is not only practicable but easy; and present circumstances, to say nothing of the past, absolutely demand it.

Accordingly on the following day (December 12) Lord Aberdeen and Lord John met. Probably no record exists of their conversation: but its purport may easily be inferred; for, on the 13th, Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord Palmerston and told him that no material alterations could be made in the Reform Bill; and on the same day he wrote to Lord John

I cannot say that my conscience is perfectly at ease in consequence of sacrifices I have made to the opinions of others;1 but I am so fully aware of the necessity of removing every shade of difference that I have made every effort to meet your views. My great hope and ground of confidence is that you have assured me your policy is a policy of peace. This, honestly and conscientiously carried out, excludes the possibility of any material difference.

It may be added that, at the interview which thus took place, Lord Aberdeen and Lord John considered what measures on the part of Russia should constitute a cause of war, and what acts should lead to coercive measures without a declaration of war; and they determined that the passage of the Danube by a Russian army should lead to coercive measures, and involve the interception by the English fleet of Russian vessels in the Black Sea. Lord John desired, though he did not insist, that this decision should be communicated to the Russian Court.

Within forty-eight hours of this important conversation two things of the highest importance happened: (1) Definite news reached England of the destruction of a Turkish fleet by a Russian squadron at Sinope; and (2) Lord Palmerston, replying to Lord Aberdeen's letter, resigned office. Lord Aberdeen, on receiving Lord Palmerston's resignation, at once asked Lord John to take the Home Office. Lord John refused, and urged that the appointment should be given to Sir

1 i.e. on the question of the war, not on the question of Reform.

George Grey. Lord Aberdeen reluctantly deferred to Lord John's wishes, and Sir George Grey, who was in Northumberland, was summoned to London. Lord Aberdeen hoped that the Cabinet had been reconstituted by this slight change. Perhaps Lord John thought so too, for he wrote to Lord Lansdowne

PEMBROKE LODGE, Dec. 15, 1853.

MY DEAR LANSDOWNE,-On going over with Lord Aberdeen Palmerston's letter to him with his letter to you enclosed, it seemed to us that he differed so entirely in all the elements of our Reform Bill that there was no chance of an agreement. The same thing appeared to Sir James Graham, and on Palmerston being told so by Lord Aberdeen he has resigned. Indeed he will probably tell you so to-day if the weather does not prevent his journey to Bowood.

I feel with you that the Government is much weakened by this secession. But I see no reason why we should not continue our consultations, both on the Reform Bill and on the Eastern question, and submit ourselves to the judgment of the House of Com mons and of the country.

There is to be a Cabinet, I believe, on Saturday, which I hope you will be able to attend. We shall be ready to go to Bowood on the day in next week which you may fix. -Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Lansdowne's reply undeceived Lord John :—

BOWOOD, December 16.

MY DEAR J. RUSSELL, .. Had a full Cabinet been summoned-as, to say the truth, I think there should have beenbefore it [? was told Palmerston] in the name of three members of the Cabinet (very important members, doubtless) that his suggestions could not even be taken into consideration, I should instantly have gone to attend it at any inconvenience to myself. But I cannot, though I shall not at present withdraw formally from the Cabinet, see any advantage in my going there till I have had an opportunity of talking fully to you in private, and ascertaining how far there is any chance of those who are making themselves responsible for the whole measure consenting to any modification of its provisions. . . .-Ever yours truly, LANSDOWNE.

Thus when the Cabinet met on Saturday the 17th they had not merely to confront the secession of Lord Palmerston,

but to realise that the retirement of Lord Lansdowne could, in all probability, be only averted by concessions which could not be otherwise than distasteful to Lord John. And these concessions he was at once urged to make both by Sir J. Graham and the Duke of Argyll. Probably, indeed, Lord John would more willingly have sacrificed his own opinions to Lord Lansdowne than to any other man alive. Lord Lansdowne was his oldest and closest political friend, with whom he had long been in the habit of consulting, and to whom he had constantly deferred. And the very Cabinet which Lord John was attending showed him how ill he could spare Lord Lansdowne's presence. For, while Lord John was insisting that the massacre of Sinope demanded energetic measures, the Cabinet decided to wait, before doing anything, for news from Constantinople; and it even refrained from adopting the conditions on which Lord Clarendon and Lord Aberdeen had agreed that the passage of the Danube by the Russians should be made the ground for naval movements in the Black Sea. Lord John left the Cabinet deeply dissatisfied, and employed his Sunday in writing a letter of reproach to Sir James Graham, in which he indicated plainly that he could not go on. His feeling in the circumstances was only natural; and, though the publication hereafter of Lord Aberdeen's correspondence or of Sir J. Graham's memoirs, by any writer who has access to Sir James's papers, will show that Sir James thought that Lord John should not have insisted on the appointment of Sir George Grey on the 14th if he contemplated breaking up the Government within four days, it is fair to recollect that the threatened resignation of Lord Lansdowne, and the refusal of the Cabinet to accept conclusions on the Eastern question to which Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon had agreed, had in the interval altered the whole conditions.

Lord John's annoyance was, at any rate, fruitful in results. Sir James Graham wrote to him that, 'in deference to his opinion and wishes, a despatch had been written to the French Government which, it was trusted, would be satisfactory to