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favour of the Austrian plan, but I suppose he has now made up his mind against it.—I remain, yours truly,

Lord Clarendon replied

J. RUSSELL.

G[ROSVENOR] C[RESCENT]: May 7, 1855.

MY DEAR LORD JOHN,- . . . I am very sorry you did not come in just now, as I wanted most particularly to see you. I now write this earnestly to entreat that you will say nothing to anybody at present about your intended resignation. The public interests and your own position are so involved in the question, and so much harm of every kind may be done by a hasty decision, however honourable and high-minded the motives may be, that I do beg of you well to weigh all the points of the case; and let me frankly add that you will not act with fairness, and as I am sure you must wish to act, towards your colleagues, if you do not hear what some of them may have to say.

As you allowed me to do as I pleased about informing Palmerston, I did not think it right to leave him in the dark upon a matter which seems to me of vital importance. I need not tell you that your intention causes him the deepest regret, and he feels as I do how essential it is that nothing should be known of it at present. We are not even in possession of the facts that led to Drouyn's resignation. Yours sincerely, CLARENDON.

Moved by this appeal, and by Lord Palmerston's personal entreaties, thrice repeated, Lord John withdrew his resignation. Its withdrawal, however convenient it may have seemed to the Government at the time, was one of the most unfortunate circumstances in Lord John's political career. It directly led to misunderstandings and to obloquy, such as few public men have ever encountered.

It was obvious, in fact, that Lord John could only continue in the Cabinet by surrendering his own opinions. As he himself wrote

I was ready to incur the responsibility of advising the acceptance of the terms proposed in conjunction with the French Government. But I was not prepared to advise that we should depart from or even hazard our alliance with France for the chance of a peace on terms which I could not consider entirely satisfactory. . . . Moreover, it was impossible for me to know the full weight of the motives which might have swayed the Emperor. The immediate result of our

acceptance of the Austrian terms might have been the instant acquiescence of Russia, and the consequent evacuation of the Crimea. How would the French army have borne a retreat from before Sebastopol, relinquishing a siege which had cost so much blood and so much suffering? Might not the discontent of the army have disturbed the internal tranquillity of France, and even menaced the throne of the Emperor?

The Emperor of the French had been to us the most faithful ally who had ever wielded the sceptre or ruled the destinies of France. Was it possible for the English Government to leave the Emperor of the French to fight unaided the battle of Europe, or to force him to join us in a peace which would have sunk his reputation with his army and his people?

This consideration struck me with such conviction that I ceased at once from urging Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon or the Cabinet to accept the Austrian terms. Lord Clarendon's reply rejecting those conditions was agreed to and despatched.

Though Lord John does not say so in this memorandum, it is evident that he must have become acquainted through Lord Cowley with the famous answer which Marshal Vaillant had given to the Emperor in Lord Cowley's presence :

I am not a politician [said Vaillant], but I know the feelings of the army. I am sure that if, after having spent months in the siege of Sebastopol, we return unsuccessful, the army will not be satisfied.1

Thenceforward Lord John ceased to press on his colleagues a policy which-if Marshal Vaillant was right-might have led to the disaffection of the army on which the Emperor's throne was dependent. He felt that, anxious as he had been at Vienna for terms which would have ranged Austria with the allies, he could not purchase the help of Austria by breaking up the alliance with France. In his own words

From that moment it appeared to me that, unless Austria should offer terms more acceptable to the Emperor of the French ... we had no course left but to pursue the war with the utmost vigour.

The decision at which Lord John had thus arrived was perfectly intelligible to those who had all the facts before 1 Kinglake's Crimea, viii. 348.

them. But it had the fatal defect that it could not be defended without a complete knowledge of the surrounding circumstances: and that the chief of these circumstances—the reluctance of the Emperor of the French to risk the discontent of his army-could not by any possibility be explained to a popular assembly. And this impossibility, which Lord John ought undoubtedly to have foreseen, when, in an unfortunate hour for himself, he yielded to Lord Clarendon's and Lord Palmerston's counsels and withdrew his resignation, soon involved him in an inextricable dilemma. On May 24, Mr. Disraeli brought forward a resolution condemning both the language and the conduct of the Government, and pledging the House to the prosecution of the war. A large portion of his speech was occupied in commenting, with all the power of sarcasm at his command, on the conduct of Lord John both as Minister and Plenipotentiary; and, at the close of the evening, Lord John himself rose to defend his own action and the policy of the Government. He stated, as he was perfectly entitled to state, the reasons for the securities which the allies had demanded. He omitted-he could not have avoided omitting all reference to the proposal which he had himself brought home from Austria, and which had not been disclosed; and he argued strongly for curbing the power of Russia, and going on with the war. The speech made a great effect in London, and is said to have swelled the majority by which Mr. Disraeli was defeated on the succeeding evening; and the House adjourned for a short Whitsuntide recess, relying on the warlike policy of the Government, and on the vigorous language of Lord John.

The speech, however, made a very different impression at Vienna. Count Buol determined to give his own version of the story, and, of course, in doing so was free from the considerations respecting the French Emperor which had influenced Lord John. He issued a circular to the representatives of Austria at foreign Courts, in which he disclosed for the first time the proposals which he had himself made for the termination of the dispute, and added-.

The Ministers of France and England, in confidential interviews, showed themselves decidedly inclined towards our proposals, and undertook to recommend the same to their Governments with all their influence.

The publication of this despatch raised a storm of obloquy such as few public men have ever encountered. How, it was asked, could Lord John reconcile his conduct at Vienna with his language in Parliament? If it were true that Lord John thought that the terms of Austria were reasonable, why had he not redeemed his promise and advocated them in the Cabinet? Why, at any rate, was he still a member of the Government which had refused them? and why was he urging the vigorous prosecution of a war which he had himself thought ought to have been concluded? Lord John had never been the favourite of the newspaper press. In the preceding February he had increased the animosity of journalists by expressing, in strong and indiscreet language, his 'disgust' at the attacks which had been made on Lord Raglan 'by a ribald press.' The 'ribald' press had now the opportunity of avenging itself on its censor. It fell on him with a fury which was both unprecedented and unrestrained. And the attack was not confined to the newspapers. On June 29, Lord John was asked in the House whether Count Buol's statements in his circular were accurate, and admitted that they were so. On July 6, Mr. Milner Gibson raised the whole issue in the House of Commons. But the debate, though it afforded Lord John an opportunity for explanation, only increased his difficulties and accentuated his embarrassment. For while, on the one hand, he could not avoid speaking, he could not, on the other, give the true reasons whieh had influenced him. Even for the sake of saving his own character, he could not say that the Emperor of the French was afraid that the acceptance of the Austrian terms would lead to the disaffection of his army, and the disaffection of his army to the fall of his dynasty, and that a generous nation could not force on a faithful ally terms involving such a sacrifice. He was forced, therefore, to leave unsaid the words which were necessary for

his own defence. Thus his explanation fell flat and inadequate on his audience. And then, as if the embarrassment were not sufficient, Lord John's own unrivalled reputation as a debater rose up and bore witness against him. For this tame and ineffective apology was not emanating from an unpractised orator, but from the man of whom it had been truly said, 'He always spoke well when a good speech was required of him.' Bad, indeed-so it was concluded-the case must be, if this was all that the most practised debater of the century could urge in support of his own character.

Thus the storm of calumny, which had already burst on Lord John's head, was renewed with redoubled fury; and Sir E. Lytton Bulwer gave notice of a motion that Lord John's conduct at Vienna had shaken the confidence of the House in the Ministry. This notice gave rise to one of the most painful incidents in Lord John's career. For, while his colleagues in the Cabinet, who were acquainted with the facts of the case, were ready to stand by him, the subordinate members of the Government, who were ignorant of the circumstances which had influenced Lord John, refused to support him. It was to these men that Lord John, in the subsequent debate, applied the quotation

Those you make friends

And give your hearts to, when they once perceive
The least rub in your fortunes, fall away

Like water from ye, never found again

But when they mean to sink ye.

Contrary to his own opinion, Lord John had remained in office for the sake of imparting strength to the Administration; he would not remain another hour when he found that his presence in the Cabinet had become a cause of weakness to it. On July 12, he told Lord Palmerston that he must retire; and on the 13th sent in his written resignation in the following terms :—

CHESHAM PLACE: July 13, 1855.

MY DEAR PALMERSTON,-After our conversation last night you will not be surprised at receiving from me a request that you will

VOL. II.

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