they had been made to suffer; that, if the Sicilians refused to acknowledge the Bourbon dynasty, revolution might involve the throne of Naples and might even extend to the Roman States; that a dream of an Italian Kingdom might become a reality; and that United Italy might join in an attack on Venetia, which might lead to the armed resistance of the German Powers. France, however, Lord John was firmly persuaded, could prevent such a catastrophe, since Sardinian statesmen, without the expectation of French co-operation, would hesitate to throw themselves against the fortresses of Austria. France and England, therefore, so Lord John concluded, should labour to conciliate (? reconcile) the pretensions of Sardinia and Naples in respect to Sicily; should discourage any aggression on Venetia; and, should they fail to accomplish the first of these two objects, should agree to leave the people of Southern Italy free to manage their own internal affairs.

Events, however, were again marching more rapidly than Lord John had foreseen, General Garibaldi, finding his work in Sicily accomplished, was already preparing to cross the straits to Naples; and M. Thouvenel, on the part of France, suggested that France and England should stop his passage. The Cabinet, on Lord John's recommendation, declined to accede to this view.

The force of Garibaldi was not in itself sufficient to overthrow the Neapolitan monarchy.

If the navy, army, and people of Naples were attached to the King, Garibaldi would be defeated; if, on the contrary, they were disposed to welcome Garibaldi, our interference would be an intervention in the internal affairs of the Neapolitan kingdom.

Lord John therefore declined to stand between the King and the revolution which was threatening him; and revolution, thus suffered to run its course, made rapid progress. On August 21, General Garibaldi landed in Calabria. The army opposed to him melted away at his approach. Naples, on September 7, welcomed the liberator, who at once announced

his intention of marching on Rome; and Count Cavour, pleading as an excuse the necessity for preserving order among an excitable and excited population, occupied the territory of the Pope with a Sardinian army. At the beginning of October he asked the Sardinian Parliament for full power to annex the provinces of Central and Southern Italy. Before the end of October, liberator and king had met near Teano, and General Garibaldi had saluted Victor Emanuel as King of Italy.

Lord John, during these events, had done his utmost to prevent the extension of the quarrel beyond the confines of Italy. A fresh attack on Venice would bring France into the field, and afford Napoleon an excuse for accomplishing those fresh redistributions of territory which rumour insisted on repeating that he was contemplating. To the annoyance of many Liberals Lord John told Piedmont that an attack on Venice would be an infraction of the Treaty of Zurich, which the King of Sardinia had no excuse for violating. But, if he had hitherto promoted a policy of prudence, he threw in his lot with Sardinia in the hour of difficulty. Despotic Europe hastened to express its disapproval of Count Cavour's policy. France and Spain withdrew their Ministers from Turin ; Russia and Prussia expressed their indignation and displeasure; Russia also withdrew mission and Minister; and Lord John conceived

After these diplomatic acts, it would scarcely be just to Italy, or respectful to the other great powers of Europe, were the Government of her Majesty any longer to withhold the expression of their opinion.

And so Lord John sat down and wrote the famous despatch of the 27th of October 1860, which a French critic has called 'le monument le plus curieux d'une littérature diplomatique tout à fait nouvelle.'

In this despatch Lord John said

There appear to have been two motives which have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States to have joined willingly in the subversion of their Governments. The first of these

was that the Governments of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty, and the general welfare of the people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition.

The second motive was that a conviction had spread, since the year 1848, that the only manner in which the Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong Government for the whole of Italy. . . .

Looking at the question in this view, her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.

That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says, 'The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberations of the States-General, but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice; for, when a people from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.'

Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their Government for good reasons?

Upon this grave matter her Majesty's Government hold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance to their former Governments. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, cannot pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them.

It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of the ties which bind together a sovereign and his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become confused; the succession of the throne is disputed; adverse parties threaten the peace of society; rights and pretensions are opposed to each other, and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance.

Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient grounds for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia.

Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe.—I am, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

Baron Brunnow said of this despatch, 'Ce n'est pas de la diplomatie, c'est de la polissonnerie;' while Count Vitzthum declared that it was unique in the annals of diplomacy.' On the other hand, it has been lately stated that 'it contradicts most remarkably all its author's earlier verbal and written declarations;' and it has accordingly been suggested that it was composed by Lord Palmerston. Whatever may be thought of the first of these charges, any one acquainted with Lord John's opinions can only smile at the second of them. Perhaps there is no document which he ever wrote that bears on its face more distinctly the impress of his style or the colour of his opinions. Probably no other statesman but Lord John would have rested the defence of General Garibaldi and Count Cavour on the Revolution of 1688; and, so far from this being new ground, Lord John had distinctly taken it nearly eight weeks before.1 He wrote to Lord Bloomfield at Berlin

I wish to put in a caveat against the indiscriminate use of the words 'revolution' and 'revolutionary.'

A revolution may be the greatest of calamities; it may be the highest of blessings. In England the phrases 'the Revolution,' 'from the time of the Revolution,' 'the Government which has prevailed from the period of the Revolution,' are terms which are applied to the change from subserviency to France, and the arbitrary tyranny of our pensioned Stuarts, to national independence and the rule of law and liberty, which began to prevail under William III. and the House of Hanover.

In France the term 'Revolution' is generally applied to the democratic anarchy of the Jacobin convention.

1 Punch understood Lord John much more clearly than his later critics. Well said, Johnny Russell. That latest despatch

You have sent to Turin is exactly the Thing;

And again, my dear John, you come up to the scratch
With a pluck that does credit to you and the Ring, &c.

VOL. II.

Y

The servile parties on the Continent are apt to use the term indiscriminately, and the advocates of absolutism speak with as much abhorrence of a change from the worst despotism to the prevalence of the law of order, as of a change from a mild Government to democratic license. Thus the change from government maintained by torture to a free and regular government is called a 'Revolution;' but such a change, by whatever name it may be called, is a blessing and not a calamity.

It is true that Lord John, on August 31, had placed strong pressure on Count Cavour to abstain from an attack on Venice. But only those who blind themselves to the facts will find anything inconsistent between his advice on this occasion and his approval of revolution in Naples. For an attack upon Venice, Lord John thought, was certain to bring France into the field. The aid of France, so he was assured from all quarters, would inevitably lead to fresh cessions of Italian territory; and the statesman, who wanted Italy for the Italians and not for the French, naturally thought it his duty to counsel moderation.

If other continental powers were alarmed at Lord John's language, in Piedmont and throughout Italy it was read with delight. Count Cavour wrote at once to express his acknowledgments of the 'immense service' which Lord John had rendered to Italy. Mr. H. Elliot wrote from Naples—

For the last week Naples, and I believe all Italy, have been more occupied about your despatch to Hudson than about anything else; and, though you must have been in great measure prepared for it, you can hardly quite have expected the immense sensation it has made. Villamarina's first exclamation was that it was worth more than 100,c0o men; and King Victor Emanuel appears to have spoken to Admiral Mundy in terms almost as strong. Garibaldi, on his way out of the harbour, called upon Admiral Mundy, and was loud in his gratitude to the English nation, her Majesty's Government, and above all to you, which last he repeated more than once, to the surprise of the Admiral, who had not at that time heard of the despatch, and did not understand what it all meant.

Mr. Odo Russell wrote