protest to promise that, if the information on which the seizure was made should prove incorrect, full satisfaction should be promptly given to the Government of her Majesty and the parties aggrieved. But, though Mr. Seward so far gave way, the language which he constantly used, and the articles inserted in newspapers avowedly supporting his policy, were characterised by an unfriendly violence: and Lord Lyons reported that, incredible as it might appear, he believed the American Secretary of State really hoped to 'overawe England and France by threatening language.' He added, on June 8, that he had thought it his duty to despatch a message to England that the temper of Congress was such that a sudden. declaration of war against Great Britain appeared by no means impossible.

The Government of the United States was not content with strong language. In July Congress passed an Act authorising the President to close any ports 'whenever it shall, in the judgment of the President, by reason of unlawful combinations of persons in opposition to the United States, become impracticable to execute the revenue laws and collect the duties on imports by the ordinary means in the ordinary way. Lord Russell-for he must henceforward appear under his later title -at once expressed his hope that the President would not avail himself of the powers which were thus entrusted to him. With severe logic he pointed out that, when the President was calling for 400,000 men and for 400,000,000 of dollars,

it seems quite inappropriate to speak of unlawful combinations. The state of things which exists is a state of civil war; and there is, as regards neutral nations, no difference between civil war and foreign war. Acting on these principles, her Majesty's Government has accordingly recognised the state of civil war as existing, and all the rights which belong to a belligerent her Majesty fully acknowledges to reside in the Government of the United States. But her Majesty cannot acknowledge that ports in the complete possession of the (so-called) Confederate States, and which are not blockaded, shall be interdicted to the commerce of her Majesty's subjects by decree of the President of the United States, or by a law passed by their Congress. This would be in

effect to allow the lawfulness of a paper blockade extending over 3000 miles of coast.

Before this despatch reached its destination, or indeed before it was written, events in America had convinced the Northern States that the war on which they had entered was not the easy parade which had been previously supposed. The raw levies of the North were defeated towards the end of July at Bull's Run, and for the next two months no steps of importance were taken to coerce the South. From an historical standpoint, the difficulties which the Federal States were thus encountering helped to illustrate some of the better features of the American character; and thenceforward the statesmen of the North were a little more cautious in their language, and a little more vigorous in their actions. But at the moment the evident inability of the North to subjugate the South strengthened the hands of those who thought the European powers might intervene in the contest. Though the interests of France were less immediately concerned than those of England, the French were from the first less ready to play a neutral part than the English. M. Mercier, a man of ability, who represented the French at Washington, from the outset recommended a more decisive policy. In March he advised his Government to recognise the Confederate States; and in May he expressed a strong opinion in favour of raising the blockade.

On October 17 Lord Russell wrote to Lord Palmerston—

There is much good sense in Mercier's observations. But we must wait. I am persuaded that, if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting, cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts them and if you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you must expect to see us your enemies. France would be quite ready to hold this language with us.

If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it would be the end of the year, or immediately before the meeting of Parliament.

Lord Palmerston, whose answer to this letter has been printed by his biographer, thought that 'our best and true policy [was] to go on as we have begun and to keep quite clear of the conflict.'

In the meanwhile an event was about to occur in the Atlantic which made the question of intervention merely of secondary importance.

The Confederate States appointed two gentlemen, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to proceed to Europe, accredited to the English and French Governments respectively. These gentlemen embarked at Charleston on the Nashville,1 succeeded in running the blockade, and landed in Cuba. It was correctly assumed that they would embark at Havana on the Trent, a West Indian mail steamer, and travel in her to Europe: it Iwas believed that the Government of the United States had issued orders for intercepting the Trent and for capturing the envoys; and it was noticed that a Federal man-of-war had arrived at Falmouth, and after coaling had proceeded to Southampton. Lord Russell laid these facts before the law officers; and was advised that a United States man-of-war, falling in with a British mail steamer, would have the right to board her, open her mail bags, examine their contents, and, if the steamer should prove liable to confiscation for carrying despatches from the enemy, put a prize crew on board and

1 The Nashville, on which Messrs. Slidell and Mason had sailed from Charleston to Cuba, ran the gauntlet of the Federal navy, captured and burnt at sea a Havre United States packet ship, and, placing the crew of the latter on board, arrived at Southampton for coal. Acting on the clear opinion of the law officers of the Crown, Lord Russell decided that the vessel of a power which had been recognised as a belligerent had a right of shelter in British waters, provided she took on board no munitions of war, or committed no other breach of neutrality, But the incident soon afterwards became more complicated from the arrival of a Federal war steamer-the Tuscarora at Southampton, with the evident object of watching and capturing the Nashville. Directions were issued to the Admiralty, on the advice of the law officers, to take vigorous steps to prevent any act of war in British waters by stationing a vessel of superior force at Southampton, and by not allowing one vessel to put to sea until a clear twenty-four hours after the sailing of the other. The commander of the Tuscarora, the stronger ship of the two, endeavoured to evade these orders; but, after weeks of anxious watching and correspondence, both vessels sailed at intervals which accorded with the prescribed arrangement.

carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication. In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion she ought to, disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at some convenient port. But, they added, 'she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage.' A few days before the law officers gave this opinion the San Jacinto, an American war steamer, intercepted the Trent, and did the very thing which the law officers had advised she had no right to do. Without capturing the steamer and carrying her into port for adjudication, she arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell and their two secretaries. The law officers, consulted on these facts, adhered to their previous opinion, and pronounced the conduct of the commander of the San Jacinto illegal and unjustifiable by international law.

These grave facts were naturally at once considered by the Cabinet, and it was decided at a meeting on the last day of November to demand immediate reparation. The despatch which was drawn up by Lord Russell for that purpose has a peculiar interest. It was the last official document ever laid before the Prince Consort, and its language was modified in accordance with his suggestions. In its ultimate shape it declared that the British Government was willing to believe that the United States officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that, if he considered himself so authorised, he greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had received.'

It added

...

The Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honour to pass without due reparation. . . . Her Majesty's Government therefore trust that, when these matters shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British

nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may be again placed under British protection; and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

In a second despatch Lord Lyons was told that—

Should Mr. Seward ask for delay, in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or, if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her Majesty's Government, your Lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London.

In a private note of December 1 Lord Russell told Lord Lyons

My wish would be that, at your first interview with Mr. Seward, you should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, and ask him to settle with the President and the Cabinet what course they would propose.

The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully.

If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.

I think the disposition of the Cabinet is to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners, and to be rather easy about the apology. That is to say, if the commissioners are delivered to you, and allowed to embark in a packet for England, and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams, that might be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the commissioners are not liberated no apology will suffice.

These despatches and letters, if they had been sent alone, would have been sufficiently grave. Their gravity was emphasised by the hurried despatch of the Guards and other troops to Canada, and by the fact that instructions, in consonance with them, were sent to Sir A. Milne, who commanded the British fleet in American waters.