In 1862 science had not bound the United States with England by the compelling force of electricity, and forty anxious days passed before Lord Russell received the answer to his ultimatum. The strain of expectation would, in any circumstances, have been extreme. It so happened, however, that, while Court, Cabinet, and country were anxiously waiting the answer to Lord Russeil's question, Is it peace? the Prince Consort died at Windsor.

The death of the Prince1 greatly affected Lord Russell. Though on many questions of foreign policy he differed from his Royal Highness, he had a high opinion of his character, his motives, his conduct, and his abilities. Long tenure of office had thrown him into such constant communication with the Court that the Prince's death was the loss of a friend. Private sorrow was intensified by a sense of public misfortune. For, though the Queen expressed her determination to act in everything as the Prince would have wished, the weight of her grief justified and enforced a temporary seclusion, which could not otherwise but cause inconvenience to the public service. Lord Russell did not see the Queen for seven weeks after the Prince's death. Twelve months more elapsed before Lord and Lady Russell paid a visit to the Queen at Windsor.

And in the meanwhile the progress of civil strife in America, and other matters to be afterwards mentioned, kept the Foreign Office abnormally active. So far as the dispute

1 Lord Russell wrote after the Prince's death to his daughter Lady V. Villiers, who had recently lost her father-in-law, the Bishop

December 25, 1861.

MY DEAREST Toza,-You will have guessed why I did not write before; and now I have another letter to thank you for. Amidst all the desolation of the Queen, and the public loss to the nation, I feel for Henry and you in the great loss you have sustained since your marriage.

Every day tells us that neither strength, nor vigour of age, nor ease of position, nor virtuous exertion gives any certainty against the unforeseen summons of God. But we know not what is best for us, nor when it is that the threab of life is complete-at twenty, at fifty, at seventy, or later still. We can only bend [?], and endeavour to perform our own part as those who have gone before us have worthily performed theirs. .-Yours affectionately,

RUSSELL.

respecting the Trent was concerned the United States gave way. But during the summer of 1862 the Federal cause seemed to grow more and more gloomy. To quote Lord Russell's own words

Great efforts have been made. An immense army, carefully drilled, and abundantly supplied with stores of ammunition, clothing, and provisions, were advanced by the James River towards Richmond. After a week's severe fighting, this army was driven back to the Potomac, with a diminution of their numbers, it is said, from 140,000 to 60,000 or 70,000 men. Sickness, losses in battle, and captures by the enemy, produced this fearful reduction. General Pope, who endeavoured to make a diversion in front of Richmond, fared no better. His rear was surprised, his baggage cut off, and his whole force, after being defeated in a pitched battle, retired hastily to Washington. The Confederates attempted in their turn an aggression upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. But the invasion likewise failed; and, after the severe and bloody action near Sharpsburg, the Confederate army retired across the Potomac. In these various movements both armies have displayed great courage, and have sustained immense losses. But neither has obtained a decisive superiority, and, as the war is aggressive on the part of the North, and defensive on the part of the South, this result must be considered as favourable to the Southern cause.

In these circumstances, M. Mercier, the French representative at Washington, restated the arguments which he had from the first used in favour of intervention; the Emperor Napoleon adopted the views of his representative; and finally. Lord Palmerston himself wrote to Lord Russell, who was attending the Queen at Gotha

94 PICCADILLY: September 14, 1862. MY DEAR RUSSELL,-The detailed accounts given in the Observer to-day of the battles of August 29 and 30 between the Confederates and the Federals show that the latter got a very complete smashing; and it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates.

If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not

1

address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation? . . . Yours sincerely,

Lord Russell replied

PALMERSTON.

GOTHA: September 17, 1862.

MY DEAR PALMERSTON,-Whether the Federal army is destroyed or not, it is clear that it is driven back to Washington, and has made no progress in subduing the insurgent States. Such being the case, I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting.

We ought then, if we agree on such a step, to propose it first to France, and then, on the part of England and France, to Russia and other powers, as a measure decided upon by us.

We ought to make ourselves safe in Canada, not by sending more troops there, but by concentrating those we have in a few defensible posts before the winter sets in.

I hope to get home on Sunday, but a letter sent to the Foreign Office is sure to reach me.

If Newcastle1 has not set off, you might as well speak to him before he goes.

The Queen is, I think, much the better for the new interest which has opened for her.2—Yours truly, J. RUSSELL.

BROADLANDS: September 23, 1862. MY DEAR RUSSELL,-Your plan of proceedings about the mediation between the Federals and Confederates seems to be excellent. Of course, the offer would be made to both the contending parties at the same time; for, though the offer would be as sure to be accepted by the Southerns as was the proposal of the Prince of Wales by the Danish Princess, yet, in the one case as in the other, there are certain forms which it is decent and proper to go through.

A question would occur whether, if the two parties were to accept the mediation, the fact of our mediating would not of itself be tantamount to an acknowledgment of the Confederates as an independent State.

1 The Duke of Newcastle succeeded Lord Russell, as Minister attending on the Queen, pending Lord Granville's arrival.

The Prince of Wales's approaching marriage.

Might it not be well to ask Russia to join England and France in the offer of mediation? . . .

We should be better without her in the mediation, because she would be too favourable to the North; but on the other hand her participation in the offer might render the North the more willing to accept it.

The after communication to the other European powers would be quite right, although they would be too many for mediation.

As to the time of making the offer, if France and Russia agree -and France, we know, is quite ready, and only waiting for our concurrence-events may be taking place which might render it desirable that the offer should be made before the middle of October.

It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the northwest of Washington, and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow . . .-Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.

In the meanwhile Lord Russell had reached England, while Lord Granville had joined the Queen at Gotha. On his arrival Lord Granville received a message from Lord Russell announcing the probability of the question being brought before the Cabinet. In a very long letter he expressed his conclusion that

It is premature to depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston; and which, notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parliament, the press, and the public.

Lord Russell forwarded Lord Granville's letter to Lord Palmerston, who, writing on October 2, admitted that it contained much for serious consideration.

The condition of things which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be great success of the South against the North. That state of things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has been lately checked; but we do not yet know the real course of recent events, and still less can we foresee

what is about to follow; ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects.

Thus the course of events was already making mediation| more difficult. Eleven days afterwards Lord Russell circulated among his colleagues the confidential memorandum, some of whose opening sentences have already been quoted. In this memorandum he reviewed the condition of affairs in America 'under three aspects, military, political, and social,' concluding

It has now become a question for the great powers of Europe whether, in the face of the present condition of America—military forces equally balanced, and battles equally sanguinary and undecisive; political animosities aggravated instead of being softened; social organisation not improved by a large and benevolent scheme of freedom for four millions of the human race, but embittered by exciting the passions of the slave to aid the destructive progress of armies-it has become a question, in the sight of these afflictions, and the prospect of more and worse, whether it is not a duty for Europe to ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciliatory terms, to agree to a suspension of arms for the purpose of weighing calmly the advantages of peace against the contingent gain of further bloodshed, and the protraction of so calamitous a war.

With this memorandum in their hands the Cabinet assembled from all parts of the country on October 23. But the set of the tide was making against mediation. When mediation was originally suggested by the Prime Minister, and accepted by Lord Russell, the continuous success of the Confederate arms made the partisans of the South confident of victory. But the events of September showed that, if the North had hitherto proved incapable of defeating the South, the South was unable to follow up its own successes. Its victories excited admiration, but they decided nothing. It was gradually becoming plain that success must ultimately reward the side which could hold out the longest; and its population as well as its resources enabled the North to endure and suffer longer than the South. Members of the Cabinet, moreover, doubted the policy of moving, or moving