Lauenburg neither taxes could be imposed nor laws enacted without the express consent of the representatives of those Duchies; (2) that the Constitution of 1855, not having been accepted by the Duchies, was inoperative in Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig; and (3) that Denmark can legislate for herself, and impose taxes to be levied on her own people, without the consent of Holstein, Lauenburg, or Schleswig.

Two questions of great importance remain. The first regards the Duchy of Schleswig; the second, the common constitution of the Monarchy.

Schleswig was formerly in a position altogether anomalous. Unconnected with the German Confederation, it was yet connected with Holstein, which formed part of that confederation. Later arrangements have dissolved this inconvenient tie. . . .

There are, however, relations between Germany and Denmark in respect to Schleswig, which have given rise to the present controversy.

The obligations of honour contracted by Denmark towards Schleswig, and imparted to the German Confederation as such by the King of Denmark in 1852, chiefly regard two points. The first of these is the royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated with Denmark. The second is, in substance, an engagement that the Germans in Schleswig shall be treated on an equal footing with persons of Danish or any other nationality.

After reciting the grievances of which Germany complained under each of these heads, Lord Russell went on

The best mode of remedying these evils for the present, and of preventing complaints for the future, is to grant a complete autonomy to Schleswig, allow the Diet of Schleswig fairly to treat, and independently to decide upon, questions affecting their university, their churches and schools, the language to be used where the Danish population prevails, where the Germans preponderate, and where the races are mixed.

I come lastly to the question of the constitution, the most entangled and the most embarrassing question of all those in discussion.

Treaties, protocols, and despatches afford us little light upon this subject, and the glimmering rays which they do afford tend rather to lead us astray than to guide us right.

For what could be more destructive of all union, all efficiency,

all strength, and, indeed, of all independence, than to lay down as an absolute rule that no law should be passed and no budget sanctioned unless the four States of the Monarchy all concurred? What would Austria say if she were asked to accept a constitution which should paralyse the action of the Reichsrath at Vienna till separate Diets in Hungary, in Galicia, and in Venetia should have adopted the same law or sanctioned the same budget? How would Prussia herself bear an absolute veto on the proceedings of her Parliament given to the Diet of Posen?

To obviate these difficulties Lord Russell suggested that each portion of the constitution might have its due independent movement;' that each portion of the Monarchy might bear its allotted share of the national expenses; that the normal budget might be voted for a fixed period of ten years, and confided to a Council of State, composed of two-thirds Danes and one-third Germans; and that extraordinary expenses might be voted by the Kingdom and three Duchies separately. He concluded

The suggestions I have made may be summed up in a few words:

1. Holstein and Lauenburg to have all that the German Confederation asks for them.

2. Schleswig to have the power of self-government, and not to be represented in the Rigsraad.

3. A normal budget to be agreed upon by Denmark, Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

4. Any extraordinary expenses to be submitted to the Rigsraad, and to the separate Diets of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

The two great German powers, Austria and Prussia, agreed to accept this despatch as the basis of negotiation. Sweden, on the contrary, naturally leaning to the Scandinavian cause, declared the proposal impracticable. Encouraged possibly by the moral support of Sweden, hoping for its active assistance, and not deterred by Lord Russell's advice, the Danish Government proceeded to carry out its policy. During the autumn of 1862 and the winter of 1863 it occupied itself in completing the arrangements for the autonomy of Holstein; and finally, on March 30, 1863, a few days after the marriage of the

Prince of Wales brought this country into closer connection with Denmark, Frederick VII. brought the matter to a crisis by declaring that the Diet had interfered in the internal affairs of his Kingdom, and had made demands which were neither justified by the federal laws nor compatible with the rights of those of his dominions which do not belong to the confederation. He declared that Holstein with its army and its finance should be entirely excluded from the rest of the Monarchy; and he announced that 'directions for the settlement of the position of the Duchy would be laid before the Estates for their acceptance.'

The issue of this ordinance made a crisis, already grave, intensely acute. Austria and Prussia lodged strong protests against the ordinance; they brought it before the Diet; the Diet referred it to a committee; and the committee recommended that Denmark should be required to withdraw it, and to prepare a homogeneous constitution for the Duchies and the Kingdom in conformity with the promises of 1852 and with Lord Russell's despatch of the previous September. The Diet adopted these recommendations, and finally, on October 1, 1863, demanded the withdrawal of the ordinance before the 27th of that month. If this demand were not complied with, federal execution in Holstein, or the military occupation of the Duchy by German troops, would follow.

At this moment Lord Russell again came forward and counselled moderation. Writing to Sir A. Malet, who represented this country at Frankfort, on September 29, he deprecated the contemplated action of the Diet. He argued that it could not be pretended that 'the constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy could be subject to the jurisdiction of the German Confederation.' He declared that her Majesty' could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy ;' and he entreated the German Diet to pause, and to submit the question in dispute between Germany and Denmark to the mediation of other powers unconcerned in the controversy, but deeply con

cerned in the maintenance of the peace of Europe and the independence of Denmark.

This despatch made an extraordinary sensation among the members of the Diet; and Lord Russell, taking advantage of this circumstance, urged the Danes to withdraw or suspend the ordinance of March. The Danes replied by inquiring whether in that event federal execution would be stopped. Without directly answering this question Lord Russell continued to urge the withdrawal of the ordinance. He communicated to Sir A. Malet, on October 14, the probability of its modification, desiring him to point out to the President of the Diet that federal execution, even if confined to Holstein, would aggravate the difficulty; while, if it extended to Schleswig, 'it must be remembered that Austria and Prussia, as well as Great Britain and France, are bound by the Treaty of 1852 to respect the integrity of Denmark.' And, when the President replied that there was a good deal of jealousy at any interference in German affairs, he directed Sir A. Malet to say that her Majesty's Government consider the constitution of the Danish Monarchy . . . as pre-eminently a Danish and not a German affair. It is precisely the attempt to involve Denmark into [? in] the sphere of German affairs . . . which her Majesty's Government feel bound to resist.'

...

In the midst of this crisis, while Germany was threatening execution, while the Danes were preparing resistance, and Lord Russell was preaching moderation, Frederick VII. died, and Prince Christian of Glücksburg ascended the throne as Christian IX. A change of dynasty had supervened at a moment when the crisis was already so acute that war and only war could apparently terminate it.

If this complicated question of Schleswig-Holstein, whose history has been imperfectly traced, had stood alone, the crisis would have been sufficiently grave to excite anxiety. It was the more grave because it was only the audible and outward expression of an inward movement with which all Germany was seething. German statesmen, German poets, German thinkers, and the German people were sighing for the creation

of a strong Germany. Animated by these ideas, which received fresh impulse from the movements of Italy, neither statesmen nor people could tolerate in silence the absorption of provinces, German in their origin and important from their situation, in a neighbouring and Scandinavian Monarchy. And, to quote the words of the well-informed writer whose statements have already been so freely borrowed,1 Instead of waiting, after their ancient custom, for their Governments to take the initiative, and losing the result in disputing about the end and the manner and the means, the Germans resolutely cast aside all secondary interests and concentrated their activity on one distinct object-to reject the Treaty of London and its obligations for Germany, and to obtain the independence of the Duchies under their native sovereign.'

Thus, in 1863, two great questions were arising for settlement in Central Europe. On both of them a profound feeling was excited in this country. The people sympathised with the efforts which the Poles were making, and they thought that the interests of England were identified with the integrity of Denmark. Corresponding views, it so happened, were held by the French Court and the French nation. The cause of Poland had always been dear at Paris, and the French had watched on previous occasions the abortive risings of the Poles with sorrow and shame. They required little encouragement to embark in a campaign with the object of establishing a new nation, allied with France, on the borders of her chief continental rivals. The cause of Denmark was also associated with French interests. For the establishment of a strong Germany would be a menace to France; and the strength of Germany, it was plain, would be increased if the Scandinavian Kingdom on its flank was in any way weakened.

A community of interests was apparently drawing France and England together; but, at the same time, the different

1 I assume that the article in the Home and Foreign Review for April is by the same hand which penned the article in the January number. Both are equally well informed.