of 1852 to annul; and Count Bismarck, notwithstanding the treaty, declared the claim to be good. The embarrassment of a disputed succession, against which it had been the special object of diplomacy to provide, was thus superadded to the difficulties arising from the pretensions of Germany and the refusal of Denmark.

Such being the state of the case, Lord Russell decided on a new step of much significance. With the approval of the Cabinet, he sent Lord Wodehouse, who had been his UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office from 1859 to 1861, on a special mission to Copenhagen, nominally to congratulate the new King on his accession, but in reality to endeavour, in concert. with Sir A. Paget, to arrange the dispute. Lord Wodehouse. was instructed—

The Treaty of 1852 is open to no question, and is clearly a part of the public law of Europe.

It has been contended, indeed, in Germany, that some anterior arrangements concluded by the exchange of diplomatic notes between Austria and Prussia on the one hand, and Denmark on the other, in 1851-52, must be read in connection with the treaty. ... The correctness of this last assertion her Majesty's Government cannot admit. They could not consent to make the validity of a positive and plain treaty depend on the execution of arrangements made at some other time by means of diplomatic despatches.

But when, taking a different ground, the Cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna allege that the Government of the late and of the present King of Denmark have not kept faith with the German powers, and that all the engagements of Denmark towards Germany ought to be faithfully executed, her Majesty's Govern. ment declare themselves ready to examine that question fairly and impartially. Let Prussia and Austria prove that Denmark has failed, and does still fail, in her obligations towards them, and in such case her Majesty's Government will use all their influence at Copenhagen to induce the King of Denmark to comply faithfully with all the engagements of his crown.

Lord Russell explained the objects of the mission more concisely in a private note to Lord Wodehouse :

December 2, 1863.

MY DEAR WODEHOUSE,-I have to propose to you in the name of the Queen a very important special mission. It is in name to congratulate the King of Denmark on his accession; but in fact to endeavour with Russia and with France to reconcile Denmark with Austria and Prussia, and if possible prevent a war.

You must be ready to start in a very few days.

I should like to see you to-morrow if possible at the Foreign Office, and you will have an audience of the Queen before you go.

Your stay at Copenhagen will not, I think, exceed three weeks. -I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Lord Wodehouse, on arriving at Copenhagen, urged, in concert with the representatives of Russia and France, the repeal of the Constitution of November; and suggested, in accordance with Lord Russell's views, that the King might be saved from the unpopularity of its repeal if the Rigsraad could be induced to take the initiative.

But the Danish Ministry would Russell thus announced to Sir A. its obstinacy:-

not give way; and Lord Paget the consequence of

PEMBROKE] LODGE]: December 22, 1863.

MY DEAR PAGET,-I don't feel sure that Wodehouse will be at Copenhagen when this letter arrives; but it is to him as well as to you if he is still there.

The refusal of the King to accept our proposition, involving as it did a loss of popularity and a change of Ministry, is not surprising.

But we cannot give active support to a Government which puts itself so manifestly in the wrong.

We must remain with our pockets buttoned and our arms piled till Germany puts herself still more in the wrong than Denmark. The Germans are so hot in the matter that they may set aside all prudential motives and give up German unity for ever. Yours truly, RUSSELL.

Thus, till the close of 1863, Lord Russell, labouring for peace, was striving, though unsuccessfully, to induce Denmark to remove every grievance which Germany had against her. In the meanwhile, federal execution was taking place in

Holstein; the Danes, to avoid collision with German troops, were retiring from the province; and Prince Frederick of Augustenburg was assuming the dukedom. Thenceforward Lord Russell laboured to separate the Holstein question from the other questions affecting Schleswig. As he wrote to Lord Wodehouse on December 29—

At present I fear the Germans are going on in their old way, mixing federal right in Holstein, international promises in Schleswig, a common constitution, and the succession to the Crown all in one hash. They must be brought to specify their demands.

Or, as Lord Palmerston wrote to him on December 26—

I quite concur in the views you state, in your letter of yesterday, of the matters to which it relates.

Holstein is part of the German Confederation; and, if the Germans determine to commit therein an act of gross injustice and of diplomatic perfidy, we should content ourselves with a strong and indignant protest. But Schleswig is no part of Germany, and its invasion by German troops would be an act of war against Denmark, which would in my clear opinion entitle Denmark to our active military and naval support. But you and I could not announce such a determination without the concurrence of the Cabinet and the consent of the Queen.1

It was, however, the double misfortune of Denmark in 1864 that, while self-appointed envoys undertook to assure her of British support in her extremity, Prussia and Austria had their own reasons for knowing that the armed interference of England was, in the last degree, improbable. Accordingly, on January 16, 1864, they issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Constitution of November within two days. It was in vain that the Danish Foreign Minister replied that, as the Rigsraad was not in session, it was impossible for

1 In this letter Lord Palmerston went on to speculate on the chances of a war, and he added, 'The Prussians are brave and make good soldiers; but all military men who have seen the Prussian army at its annual reviews of late years have unequivocally declared their opinion that the French would walk over it and get without difficulty to Berlin, so old-fashioned is it in organisation and formation and manoeuvre.'

How little Lord Palmerston knew of the new forces which were rising in the Europe of his old age!

VOL. II.

2 C

Denmark to comply with this demand. It was in vain that Lord Russell himself proposed that the representatives of the five great powers in London, as well as those of Sweden and Denmark, should sign a protocol, which should declare that the Danish Government should summon the Rigsraad at once,' and that every endeavour should be made by the Danish Ministry to induce the Rigsraad to repeal the constitution. Austria and Prussia would listen to no argument for delay, and on February 1 Marshal Wrangel crossed the frontier, and entered Schleswig.

This action on the part of the great German powers altered the position of affairs. Hitherto Lord Russell, to use his own expression in writing to Sir A. Paget, 'had a twinge or feeling that Germany had much right on her side, and that Denmark was not a little wrong.' Thenceforward he thought Denmark in the right, and Germany utterly in the wrong.

It thus became a grave question for Lord Palmerston's Cabinet whether they should advise the Queen to offer to the King of Denmark naval and military aid for his defence.

The Cabinet, after much deliberation, decided that, in the case supposed, they should offer to assist Denmark by force only in case France would join in an alliance for that purpose.

Although somewhat reluctant at the time to insist upon that condition, I am fully persuaded that it was a condition not only wise but absolutely essential. Lord Palmerston was convinced that it would be inexcusable to rush into a war against the whole of Germany inflamed and excited, without the security of a substantial alliance.1

1 That Lord Russell did not exaggerate his own wishes and Lord Palmerston's objections may be seen from the following memorandum which he forwarded to the Prime Minister early in February 1864 :

Proposals to be made to France, February 1864.

1. That France and Great Britain should offer their mediation to Austria, Prussia, and Denmark.

2. That, if Denmark should refuse the mediation, the war should be allowed to go on without interference of France and Great Britain.

3. That, if Austria and Prussia refuse mediation, the measures indicated below should be taken.

4. That the bases of the mediation should be the integrity of the Danish

With France cold, with Russia indifferent, with this country unwilling to move, Austria and Prussia had no difficulty in working their will. Before the end of February Schleswig was almost entirely occupied by German troops; the Danish army had retired before then; and Denmark had appealed in vain to the signatories of the Treaty of 1852.

In the meanwhile Lord Russell was strenuously endeavouring to settle the matter by negotiation, and he at last succeeded in obtaining acceptance to his proposal for a conference at London. But, before the conference met, he sent Lord Clarendon to Paris to see whether he could arrive at some understanding with Napoleon III. Lord Clarendon reached Monarchy and the engagements of 1851-52 as regards the Duchies of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

5. That, if Austria and Prussia refuse mediation, declinę to accept the bases proposed, or insist upon terins which are, in the opinion of France and England, inconsistent with the integrity and independence of Denmark, Great Britain will at once despatch a strong squadron to Copenhagen, and France will place a strong corps of troops on the frontiers of the Rhine Provinces of Prussia. 6. Further measures to be the subject of concert between the two Governments of France and Great Britain.

Lord Palmerston wrote of this memorandum

94 PICCADILLY: February 13, 1864.

MY DEAR RUSSELL,I rather doubt the expediency of taking at the present moment the step you propose. The French Government would probably decline it, unless tempted by the suggestion that they should place an armed force on the Rhenish frontier in the event of a refusal by Austria and Prussia, which refusal we ought to reckon upon as nearly certain.

The objections which might be urged against the measures which you suggest may be stated to be-First, that we could not for many weeks to come send a squadron to the Baltic, and that such a step would not have much effect upon the Germans unless it were understood to be a first step towards something more, and I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference. Secondly, though it is very useful to remind the Austrians and the Prussians privately of the dangers they are running at home-Austria in Italy, Hungary, and Galicia; Prussia in her Rhenish Provinces-yet it might not be advisable, nor for our own interest, to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory. It would serve Prussia right if such an attack were made, and if Prussia remains in the wrong we could not take part with her against France. But the conquest of that territory by France would be an evil for us, and would seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium. On the whole, I should say it would be best for us to wait a while before taking any strong steps in these matters.Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.