known. It is evident that children and idiots have no apprehension or thought of them; and it seems a contradiction to say that truths are imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not; for imprinting, if it means any thing, is making certain truths to be perceived. If children and idiots have minds with those impressions on them, they must perceive them; but it is evident that they do not; therefore there are none such. If it be said that a notion may be imprinted on the mind, which it was never yet conscious of, it may be also said that every proposition that the mind is capable of assenting to, is imprinted and innate, and that many truths are imprinted which the mind never did and never shall know, for a man may die in ignorance of much that he was capable of knowing. So that if a capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all that a man ever comes to know will be considered innate; and this, though an improper way of speaking, asserts nothing which any one denies. If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, there can be no difference in the original of any truths, for all must be innate or adventitious. To be in the understanding, is to be understood; so that to assert that any thing is in the understanding, and not understood, is to say that any thing is and is not in the understanding. If therefore the two propositions, Whatever is, is,' and 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' are innate, children cannot be ignorant of them.

To avoid this, it is answered that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason, which signifies, either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these inscriptions come to be known, or that reason assists in the discovery of them. If it be meant that by the use of reason men discover them, and that this proves them to be innate, then it follows that whatever truths reason can discover to us are in

nate, and, of consequence, all the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems deduced from them, must be innate, being all discoveries made by reason.

But how can reason be necessary to discover innate principles, when reason itself is but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from known principles? We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or its exercise, to make our -understanding see what is originally imprinted in it. So that to make reason discover those truths is to make it discover what a man knew before; and if men have those impressed truths originally, but are ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is to say that men know them and know them not at the same time.

It will perhaps be said that mathematical truths are not assented to as soon as they are proposed, but have need of reasonings and proofs to gain our assent; while the other, or innate truths, are assented to as soon as they are understood. But this reply contradicts the assertion that the use of reason is necessary to discover them; and they who thus answer will not affirm that a knowlege of the maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' is a deduction of reason. For reason is search, and requires pains and application; and how can it be supposed that what was imprinted by nature as the guide of reason should need the use of reason to discover it?

Those who will attend to the operations of the understanding will find that a ready assent to some truths depends not on native inscription or the use of reason, but on a distinct faculty of the mind. If, therefore, by saying that men assent to these when they come to the use of reason, be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowlege of them, it is false; and if true, would not prove them to be in

nate.

If by assenting to them when we come to the use of reason,' be meant that then they are first noticed, and that children assent to them as soon as they come to the use of reason, this is also false; for children have the use of reason long before they know any thing of the maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be;' and many persons pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking of it. I allow a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason before they get a knowlege of these general truths, but deny that coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery. So that the saying, that men assent to these maxims when they come to the use of reason,' amounts to no more than this; that they are not known before the use of reason, and may be assented to after; and so may all other truths as well as these, which are not thus distinguishable from others.

But were it true that the time of their being known were when men come to the use of reason, that would not prove them to be innate. For how can it appear that any notion is imprinted on the mind in its first constitution, because it is first assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? It would be as good proof that they were innate, to say that men assent to them when they come to the use of speech. All that can be meant by the proposition, that men assent to them when they come to reason,' is, that, forming general ideas, and understanding general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty and growing up with it, children do not acquire these ideas, or learn names of them, till, having exercised their minds with particular ideas, they become capable of rational conversation.

The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and as the mind grows fami

nate, and, of consequence, all the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems deduced from them, must be innate, being all discoveries made by reason.

But how can reason be necessary to discover innate principles, when reason itself is but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from known principles? We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or its exercise, to make our -understanding see what is originally imprinted in it. So that to make reason discover those truths is to >make it discover what a man knew before; and if men have those impressed truths originally, but are ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is to say that men know them and know them not at the same time.

It will perhaps be said that mathematical truths are not assented to as soon as they are proposed, but have need of reasonings and proofs to gain our assent; while the other, or innate truths, are assented to as soon as they are understood. But this reply contradicts the assertion that the use of reason is necessary to discover them; and they who thus answer will not affirm that a knowlege of the maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' is a deduction of reason. For reason is search, and requires pains and application; and how can it be posed that what was imprinted by nature as the guide of reason should need the use of reason to discover it.?

sup

Those who will attend to the operations of the understanding will find that a ready assent to some truths depends not on native inscription or the use of reason, but on a distinct faculty of the mind. If, therefore, by saying that men assent to these when they come to the use of reason, be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowlege of them, it is false; and if true, would not prove them to be in

nate.

If by assenting to them when we come to the use of reason,' be meant that then they are first noticed, and that children assent to them as soon as they come to the use of reason, this is also false; for children have the use of reason long before they know any thing of the maxim,' that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be;' and many persons pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking of it. I allow a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason before they get a knowlege of these general truths, but deny that coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery. So that the saying, that men assent to these maxims when they come to the use of reason,' amounts to no more than this; that they are not known before the use of reason, and may be assented to after; and so may all other truths as well as these, which are not thus distinguishable from others.

But were it true that the time of their being known were when men come to the use of reason, that would not prove them to be innate. For how can it appear that any notion is imprinted on the mind in its first constitution, because it is first assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? It would be as good proof that they were innate, to say that men assent to them when they come to the use of speech. All that can be meant by the proposition, that men assent to them when they come to reason,' is, that, forming general ideas, and understanding general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty and growing up with it, children do not acquire these ideas, or learn names of them, till, having exercised their minds with particular ideas, they become capable of rational conversation.

The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and as the mind grows fami