or dislike, which, by a tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies of men in the world. For though men in society have resigned to the public the disposal of their force, yet they still retain the power. of thinking well or ill of the actions of those whom they live and converse with: and thus they establish among themselves what they will call virtue and vice.

Sunt

That this is the common measure of vice and virtue will appear, when it is considered, that though what passes for virtue in one country may be considered vice in another, yet virtue and praise, vice and blame, always go together. Virtue and praise are so united, that they are often called by the same name. sua præmia laudi, says Virgil: and though, perhaps, by the different temper, education, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praiseworthy in one place was censured in another, yet virtue and vice for the most part kept the same every where for as it is natural to encourage with esteem that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should every where, in a great degree, correspond with the rule of right which the law of God hath established; since nothing so directly secures the good of mankind as obedience to his laws, and nothing breeds so much mischief as neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing their own interest, could not mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side that deserved it not. Those whose practice was otherwise, failed not to approve what was right. In a corruption of manners the boundaries of virtue and vice were preserved; so that the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute : Whatsoever is of good report,' &c.

Phil. iv. 8.

If a any one should imagine that I forget my own notion of a law, when I make men judge of virtue and

vice by the consent of private men who have no power to enforce the law, I think I may say, that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men, seems little skilled in the history of mankind; the greatest part of whom govern themselves by the law of fashion rather than by the laws of God or the magistrate. Few men reflect on the penalties that attend the breach of God's laws; and those who do, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation for their transgressions; and they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity from the laws of the commonwealth: but no man escapes censure who offends against the fashion. To bear up under the constant dislike of his own familiars is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcileable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions. These three; 1. the law of God, 2. the law of society, and, 3. the law of fashion, are those by which men take their measures of moral rectitude.

Whether the rule by which we try our actions be the fashion of the country or the will of a lawmaker, the mind is able to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with it. The rule being nothing but a collection of simple ideas, the conformity is but so ordering the action that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral notions terminate in ideas received from sensation and reflection. For let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder;' and we shall find it a collection of simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection; viz. 1. From reflection we have the ideas of willing, considering, proposing, and malice, and also of life and self motion. 2. From sensation we have the ideas which are to be found in man, and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion; all which ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection

of simple ideas being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, I call the action virtuous or vicious. If I have the will of a supreme invisible law maker for my rule, I call the action sin or duty; if I compare it to the civil law, I call it crime or no crime. So by whatever standard we frame our ideas of virtues and vices, they are made up of collections of simple ideas derived from sensation or reflection.

To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice of them, 1. as they are in themselves. Thus drunkenness or lying signify such a collection of simple ideas which I call mixed modes; and in this sense they are positive absolute ideas. 2. Our actions are good, bad, or indifferent, and in this respect they are relative; it being their conformity to or disagreement with a rule that makes them good or bad. Thus challenging and fighting with a man is called duelling, which, considered in relation to the law of God, deserves the name of sin; to the law of fashion in some countries, valor and virtue; and to some municipal laws, a crime. In this case, where the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may be easily observed.

But when the idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended under one name, then the relation is less taken notice of. Thus taking from another what is his, without his knowlege or allow ance, is called stealing. But that name being under stood to signify the moral pravity of the action, condemn stealing as an ill action and yet the private taking away a sword from a madman, though it properly be denominated stealing, yet by the law of God, it is no sin.

men

It is not to be expected here that I should mention all sorts of relations: those I have mentioned are some of the most considerable, and are such as may serve to

Locke.

M

let us see whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. argument, let me observe,

But before I quit this

1. That all relation is ultimately founded in simple ideas got from sensation or reflection. So that all we have in our thoughts when we speak of relations, is but simple ideas, or some collections of simple ideas, compared one with another. When a man says, Honey is sweeter than wax, his thoughts terminate in the simple idea sweetness: though where they are compounded or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of are seldom noticed. Thus the word friend being taken for a man who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has, 1. the simple ideas comprehended in the word man; 2. the idea of love; 3. the idea of readiness; 4. the idea of action; 5. the idea of good, which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness, and terminates in particular simple ideas: thus all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas.

2. That in relations we have as clear a notion of the relation as we have of those simple ideas wherein it is founded. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have too of equal, or more, or less.

For

3. That in these I call moral relations, I have a true notion of the relation by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. though the rule be erroneous, yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Though, measuring by a wrong rule, I may judge amiss of its moral rectitude, I am not mistaken in the relation which the action bears to the rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

F

CHAPTER XXIX.

Of clear and obscure, distinct and confused Ideas.

Having shown the original of our ideas, and considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex are divided into modes, substances, and relations, it will be thought perhaps that I have dwelt long enough on the examination of ideas: I must yet ask leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are clear, and others obscure; some distinct, and others confused.

The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to sight, we shall best understand what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight. We give the name of obscure to that which is not placed in sufficient light to enable us to see the figure and colors, which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner, our ideas are clear, when they are such as the objects, whence they were taken, might in a well-ordered sensation present them. So far as they want any of that original exactness and first freshness, they are obscure. Complex ideas are clear, when the simple ideas that go to their composition are clear.

The cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be, either dull organs, or slight impressions, or weakness of memory for if the faculties of perception, like hardened wax, will not receive the impression; or, like wax of too soft a temperature, will not hold it; or if the seal be not applied with sufficient force; in any of these cases, the print will be obscure.

As a clear idea is that of which the mind has a full perception, so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all others; and a confused idea is one which is not sufficiently distin