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the different parts together in the unity of one complex idea. Suitable to this, we find, that men speaking of mixed modes seldom take any other for species of them, but such as are set out by name. For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless that they might have names for the convenience of discourse?

Conformable also to what has been said of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we speak of justice or gratitude, our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues; we consider the original patterns as being in the mind; and hence I think it is that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more particular name called notions, as by a peculiar right appertaining to the understanding.

Hence we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural substances; because they being the workmanship of the understanding for its own convenience, it often unites into one abstract idea things that in their nature have no coherence.

Another thing we may observe is, that the names of mixed modes always signify the real essences of their species; for these abstract ideas not being referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name, but barely the complex idea the mind has formed,

This may also show us why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known. What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract idea of glory and ambition before he has heard the names of them? In simple ideas and substances I grant it is otherwise; which being such ideas as have a real existence and union in

nature, the ideas or names are got one before the other, as it happens.

What has been said here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable also to relations, which since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on.

CHAPTER VI.

The Names of Substances.

The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts; that is, denote a common nature in several substances capable of being comprehended in one conception. The measure and boundary of each sort, whereby it is distinguished from others, is what we call its essence; so that every thing contained in that idea is essential to that sort. This I call the nominal essence, to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances on which depend the nominal essence and properties, and which may be called the real essence. The nominal essence of gold is a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed; the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body on which those qualities depend.

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For though voluntary motion, with sense and reason joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex idea of man, yet no one will say that that complex idea is the real essence and source of all those operations which are found in any individual of that sort. we such a knowlege of the constitution of man, as it is possible angels have, and as it is certain his Maker has, we should have quite another idea of his essence than that which is now contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will.

That essence is considered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from hence; that take away the abstract ideas by which

we sort individuals, then the thought of any thing essential to them instantly vanishes. It is necessary

for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me so; but there is nothing I have that is essential to me. A disease may alter my color, a fever may take away my memory or reason, an apoplexy leave neither sense, understanding, nor life. Other creatures

of my shape may be made with better or worse faculties than I have; and others may have reason in a shape different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things. It is in reference to species that this or that quality is said to be essential. If it be asked, whether it be essential to me, or any particular being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential to this paper to have words on it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort man, then reason is essential, as it is essential to this paper to contain words if I will give it the name, Treatise.

Thus, if the idea of body be bare extension, then solidity is not essential to body. That therefore and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name.

I have often mentioned a real essence distinct from a nominal essence. By this real essence I mean the real constitution of a thing, which is the foundation of the properties that coexist with the nominal essence. But essence of this sort supposes a species. Supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of such color and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is the constitution on which these qualities and their union depend.

The next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences are substances determined into species: evidently by the nominal essence; for it is impossible

that any thing should determine the sorts of things which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for; which is that, as has been shown, which we call the nominal

essence.

And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us, and not according to the real essence in them, is plain from hence; that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, have qualities depending on their real constitution, as different from one another, as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically. But if things were distinguished into species by their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species, as it is to find different properties in two circles or two equilateral triangles.

Nor indeed can we sort things by their real essences, because we know them not. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. When we come to examine the stones we tread on or the iron we daily handle, we presently find that we can give no reason of their several qualities. What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and unconceivable real essences of plants or animals, every one knows.

Those therefore who have been taught that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms, and that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera, were led yet farther out of the way by having the mind set on fruitless inquiries after substantial forms wholly unintelligible.

That our ranking substances into species, consists in the nominal, not in the real essences, is farther evident

from our idea of spirits: for the mind can have no other notion of spirit, but by attributing the operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God is but attributing the ideas we have got from reflexion to him, in an unlimited degree. From reflecting on ourselves we have got the ideas of existence, knowlege, power, and pleasure; and joining infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy Being. And though we are told there are different species of angels, yet we know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them; not because the existence of more than one species of spirits is impossible, but because having no more simple ideas applicable to such beings, but those taken from ourselves, we can no otherwise distinguish the several species, but by attributing these powers to them in a lower or higher degree.

There may be many species of spirits diversified from one another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished from one another by qualities which we know. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us than of material below us, is probable from hence, that in all the visible world we see no chasms. All down from us the descent is by easy steps. There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowlege and reason as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you take the lowest of the one and the highest of the other, there will scarcely be perceived any great difference between them; and so on till we come to the lowest and most inorganical parts of matter. We have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath, we being in degrees of perfection much more remote from the infinite being

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