I say, is more from our custom of using them, than the different evidence of the things.

One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiss to observe, concerning those general maxims, that they do not prove the existence of things without us; neither of these two self-evident principles,-viz. What is is, and The same thing cannot be, and be,-will serve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies do exist for that we are left to our senses, to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal and self-evident principles can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind; they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowlege of the nature of substances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on experience.

So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our ideas are clear and distinct, there is little or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this proposition, that Two are equal to two, or that White is not black, will also have need of a proof to make him admit that What is is, or that It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.

And as these maxims are of little use, where we have clear and distinct ideas; so they are of dangerous use, where our ideas are confused, and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct ideas; but to such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another idea, from which follows mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propositions wherein the terms stand for

confused and uncertain ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of trifling Propositions.

There are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowlege: such

are,

1. All purely identical propositions. These, at first blush, appear to contain no instruction in them: for when we affirm the same term of itself, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us.

2. Another sort of trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition, of the word defined, as, Lead is a metal-man an animal. These carry no information at all, to those who know the complex ideas, the names lead and man stand for indeed to a man that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead, by saying it is a metal, than by enumerating the simple ideas one by one, which make up the complex idea of metal.

Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, All gold is fusible; for fusibility being one of the simple ideas, that goes to the making up the complex one, the sound gold stands for; what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? What instruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is supposed to know before? for I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me.

The general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain; and such as we have no knowlege of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For names of substantial beings, as well as others, having settled significations affixed to them, may with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their definitions make them fit to be so joined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may with the same clearness be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this without any knowlege of the nature of reality of things existing without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them, viz. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without any knowlege at all of what the soul really is. And of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some part of natural philosophy; and after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.

3. The worst sort of trifling is, to use words loosely and uncertainly, which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowlege we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occasions this, is, that men may find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy, under the obscurity or perplexedness of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom does in many men much contribute.

To conclude, barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks.

1. All propositions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other, but itself; when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name; or that these two names signify the same idea.

2. All propositions, wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term stands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal: and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive terms called genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal. When by these two rules we examine the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books; we shall perhaps find, that a greater part of them than is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs.

CHAPTER IX.

Of our Knowlege of Existence.

Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things, which, being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, give us no knowlege of existence at all. We proceed now to inquire concerning our knowlege of the existence of things, and how we come by it.

I say then, that we have the knowlege of our own existence, by intuition; of the existence of God, by demonstration; and of other things, by sensation.

As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. I think, I reason; I feel pleasure and pain :-can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence?

If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a perception of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowlege of our own existence; and an internal infallible perception In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being, and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty.

that we are.

CHAPTER X.

Of our Knowlege of the Existence of a God.

Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without a witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us: nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, yet it requires thought and attention and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it, from some part of our intuitive knowlege; or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, being certain, that there is a God; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowlege we have of our own existence.

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear

Locke.

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