2. The original ground of his mistake lies in taking it for granted, that mere externals, which are the natural expressions of the heart, are of a moral nature. Accordingly he says, (page 11) "That duty or sin consists, in some degree, in the performance or omission of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end." But, this every one must see, who can examine things, is deeply erroneous. For, it proves that hypocrisy is a duty; because hypocrisy consists only in performing those external actions with a bad heart, which are the genuine expressions of a good heart. Agreeably, while God requires sacrifices and offerings, as expressions of love, he utterly forbids and rejects them when destitue of love. But, the following narration will perhaps display the mistake to advantage. "A noted vintager, at a proper time, directed his servants to go to his distant vineyard and gather grapes. They attended to his command with apparent obedience only: for, they had no intention to comply with it. A went a mile, B two miles, and C three miles, toward the vineyard. But, gladly meeting with their vicious companions, spent the day with them in idleness, and never went into the vineyard. At night they all returned, and the master asked them whether they had done their duty? they unitedly pled that they had done part of their duty. What part have you done, said the master? I went a mile toward the vineyard, said A, I went two miles, said B : and C pled three miles of duty. But, the master called them idle villains, and told them, up

F

on ascertaining their motives, that they had done no part of their duty in the least degree. Query, were not the servants acquainted with Mr. T.'s theory either by nature or education? and did not C. perform three times as much duty as A.?" For duty, says our theorist, consists in some degree, in the performance of external commanded action, distinct from the mo tive or end."

From this view of Mr. T.'s reply, it appears quite needless to vindicate those particular il lustrations, which were improved against it in the first part of the dialogue. He pleads that they are not pertinent: but, when the reader remembers that they were intended to expose the notion of external duty, abstractly from motive, for which Mr. T. so often and ernestly contends, the pertinency of them will be allowed in the face of his liberal exceptions. He says, they are calculated to catch and impose on vulgar minds, and has laboured hard to expose them; but, I can cheerfully submit them, when restored to the connexion in which they were used, to discerning minds. For, the morality of actions is nothing more nor less than the morality of the agent's motives, or the morality of his volitions. Moral actions, motives, ends and volitions, are the same: and these are good or bad, not according to the rule sof appearance, but accordingly as they are conă formed or opposed to the law of God.

bei

SECTION VII.

Containing several other Strictures on the Defence of his First Argument.

The next thing which merits attention is, the dilemma to which he is evidently reduced, by discarding, and yet retaining his darling position, that a man may sin from a holy principle. This position he has made the very basis of his first argument. For, he pleads, "Though a person should exercise a good principle, in the neglect of any external action which God has commanded, his neglect would still be sinful." Then he concludes thus: "Now if the omission of external actions, commanded by God, be in itself sinful, it necessarily follows, that the doing of them is a duty." This is his method of proving, that there is a right and wrong in_action as well as in temper and principle. But, the fallacy of this reasoning was detected in the dialogue, by shewing the impossibility of a man's sinning from good principles. For, all sin consists in a bad principle or temper, and not in a good one. And, to set the matter in a clear light, the following cases were put, the pertinency of which he has frankly allowed. Mendicus is a real beggar, and consequently a proper object of charity: and Generosus is a man of fortune, who loves to help the needy. But, though Mendicus appears to others to be an object of charity, he does not appear in this light to Generosus. He does not therefore impart his favours to Mendicus, because he thinks it wrong to encourage needless beggars. Now,

the question is not this; whether Generosus is faulty not in seeing that Mendicus is a real object of charity? For, according to the supposition, Mendicus is a real beggar, and exhibits ample evidence to others of his distressing poverty. But, this is the case of conscience; whether it is the duty of Generosus to bestow his charity upon one, who he conscientiously thinks, does not need it? And, it is easy to see, that it is not his duty: for it is certainly wrong for a man to act contrary to the present light and voice of conscience. In this given case, then, Generosus does not neglect his duty, from a good principle. It is not his duty to violate conscience. For, whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. The other case which I put was of this nature. A certain express is obliged to cross the wilderness in so many hours, to deliver a packet to an officer whose detachment is in the greatest danger of being cut off by the enemy. The general directs him to go twenty miles to the parting of the way, and then to take the right hand, and not the left hand path. But, in consequence of criminal inattention to his seasonable instructions, he really thinks, when he comes to the parting of the way, that he was directed to take the left hand and not the right. Now, what is his duty at the divis ion of the way, while he really thinks he was directed to take the left hand? shall he take the left hand, according to his present judg ment, or shall he take the right hand, contrary to it? the case is obvious; and there is no dilemma. The least child, as well as the most

present cirIn this givFor, he acts But, in not seasonable in

able casuist, says, it is his duty in cumstances to take the left hand. en case, then, he is not faulty. according to his best judgment. paying proper attention to his structions, he was very faulty.

But, let us now attend to Mr. T.'s reply. For, he must either approve this reasoning or disapprove it, or approve and disapprove it both, and, make the best he can of a most intolerable dilemma. He says (page 12) with his usual freedom, "I shall just observe, that all your reasoning is easily answered by only distinguishing between those practical errors of the judgment which are invincible, and therefore innocent; and those which are voluntary and criminal. If a person is invincibly ignorant of the rule of duty in any given case, it does not reach him in that case; it is to him no law, and therefore no transgression. With respect, then, to the cases you put, if a real object of charity exhibit evidence of his being so, you are bound by the law of God to treat him as such. Nor is your obligation cancelled by want of full evidence, that he is such an object. For you had sufficient means of instruction presented. And yet, if you help him in contradiction to your present erroneous judgment, you sin, because you do it not conscientiously."

But, where is our Theorist now? If I mistake not, he both sees and feels the force of a dilemma. For, must Generosus sin in giving to Mendicus, and sin in not giving too, amid the same circumstances? if he act according to his conscience, he sins, and if he act con