various propositions to reconcile the conflicting views, and the quiet interposition of President Harrison, a compromise was effected by a clause incorporated in the revenue act of October 1, 1890, known as the McKinley Tariff, which placed sugar and a number of other tropical products on the free list, but authorized the President in his discretion to impose duties on those products coming from countries which would not extend similar favors to the products of the United States. The language of the clause was, in part, as follows: "That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries. producing these articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of July, 1892, whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the Government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, hides, raw and uncured, or any such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unjust, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country, as follows, namely:" During the controversy in Congress, I had been frequently consulted by Mr. McKinley and by members of the Senate Committee on Finance, they recognizing that my experience in reciprocity matters and my familiarity with SpanishAmerican affairs placed me in a position to be of some service to them in reaching a satisfactory conclusion of the muchvexed question. When it became apparent that the Senate would force the House to conform substantially to Mr. Blaine's wishes, the latter directed his private secretary to write me as follows: "The Secretary directs me to say that while he does not feel authorized to make a positive arrangement without first consulting the President, you are by all odds the best man in the country to undertake such a work [the diplomatic negotiations to grow out of the law cited], and he should wish to place it in your hands unless the President objected, which he thought was scarcely probable.' The law containing the reciprocity clause was passed on October 1, and on the next day I met Secretary Blaine by his request at his residence, and he then tendered me the employment to take charge of the reciprocity negotiations. His reasons for doing so were because he was already burdened with very important state matters, his health was not good, the negotiations would require much statistical research and would embrace many governments, and there was no official in his department to whom he chose to commit the task. The employment commended itself to me because its duties could be discharged mainly at Washington, so that I should not have to give up my other professional engagements, it was in line with my tastes and past study, and would afford me an opportunity to render my country a service of some importance. From that day the reciprocity negotiations under the law of October 1, 1890, were placed entirely in my hands, except so far as Secretary Blaine's signature was necessary to initiate negotiations or to perfect those arranged by me. For the next twelve months I was in constant personal intercourse with Mr. Blaine and often with the President, informing them of the progress of the negotiations and seeking their advice or direction on controverted or difficult matters. The first step taken to initiate negotiations with the countries with whom it was desired that reciprocity arrangements should be effected was a note from the Secretary of State addressed to the diplomatic representative of such countries in Washington, bringing to their attention the law enacted by Congress, and asking to be advised of the changes which their respective governments would be willing to make in their system of tariff duties, in response to the changes proposed in the tariff of the United States which were favorable to their countries. The opponents of the measure in Congress and in the press had predicted that foreign governments could not be induced by what they termed this policy of coercion to enter into reciprocity; and much general interest was manifested, and, by the friends of reciprocity, some anxiety, as to the manner in which the sugar and coffee producing countries would entertain the invitation of the Secretary of State. Fortunately the Minister of Brazil at Washington, Senhor Salvador de Mendonca, was not only very friendly to the United States, but had been, in the International Conference, a strong advocate of reciprocity. Besides, his country was regarded as one of those with which reciprocity was most desired. He responded promptly to the invitation, and after the necessary delay in agreeing upon a schedule of American articles to be admitted free or with reduced duties in Brazil and in fixing other details, the terms of the arrangement were forwarded to Rio de Janeiro for examination and ratification. It was to be the test case of success or failure, and we awaited the result not without some misgivings. In due time Mr. Mendonca came to me bringing the intelligence that his Government had ratified the arrangement. He had first seen Mr. Blaine, who sent by him the following hasty and laconic note: MY DEAR MR. FOSTER, 17 MADISON PLACE, WASHINGTON, 28 Jany. '91. Mr. Mendonca will give you good news. Pray call in the morning by 10 or 9.40. Sincerely, JAMES G. BLAINE. In my conference with Mr. Blaine at his residence the next morning we congratulated ourselves that our work was auspiciously begun, but we had one more step to take before we could be assured of full success. Until we could bring the large sugar-producing island of Cuba into the arrangement, we could hardly expect the other sugar-exporting countries to accede to our terms for commercial reciprocity. But Spain was sullen and resentful over the failure to ratify the commercial treaty of 1884, and her Government was in no temper to venture again upon reciprocity with us. I felt, however, that the agreement with Brazil would make the sugar-planters of Cuba the more anxious to preserve a free market in the United States for their production, and that if we could bring about a strong demonstration from them to the Home Government, a change of feeling there might be secured, as the Spanish rulers could not afford to aggravate the situation in Cuba by displeasing the commercial and industrial elements of the island. It was agreed that my next objective point was, not Madrid, but Havana. The only credentials I took with me or instructions sent to the Consulate-General in that city were the following letter in the handwriting of the Secretary himself: Confidential RAMON O. WILLIAMS, ESQ., CONSUL-GENERAL, ETC. MY DEAR SIR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, Feby. 6, 1891. This note will be delivered to you by Hon. John W. Foster. He goes to you officially with the fullest credit and confidence of the State Department. Please respond to any and all requests he may make. I give no specific directions. Mr. Foster is accredited carte blanche. Very sincerely, JAMES G. BLAINE. |