tainly 1, for one, do,) and yet contend that it positively and actually avails nothing at all as respects the great point at issue.

That nasa is often rendered as you say, is unquestionably true; but just as true it is that if there be any word in Hebrew or Greek that imports or could import bearing sin as a burthen, a load, and suffering under it and for it, or as a punishment; these are the words that can and do express it.

I need not inform one of your learning that nasa is found hundreds of times in the Hebrew Bible; and that, in the judgment of our most learned biblical critics and lexicographers, it is found in more than twenty-five different acceptations. Nay, you know that it is one of the most extensive roots in the Hebrew language. If I were to go into the detail, I shall engage to produce numerous and clear instances of its denoting to impose heavy burdens, to load beasts, to impose grievances, taxes, and usury, to bear sin in a vicarious manner, to bear punishment, &c. &c.; and from these facts, which can be fully substantiated from the Hebrew Bible, of what value is the induction which you have been at pains to collect? Anaphero, too, is only found ten times in the Greek Testament, and in half of these, at least, it is incapable of the translation you give it. Please consider Heb. vii 27., where it occurs twice, and cannot signify to bear away; and also xiii. 21.; as well as 1 Peter ii. 5. and 25. Consult also James ii. 21. I will not, unless compelled by the high regard I have for your learning and your virtues, go into these inductions; for surely our numerous readers would not thank us for our pains.

I will only add, after requesting you to brush the dust off your Parkhurst Hebrew Lexicon, and if you choose to refresh your memory, you may look into Roys, (not a work of high authority, except as a concordance,) and you may find from one to two hundred occurrences of this interesting word, diverse from those you have given I sey, I will only add that your reasonings and inductions on nasa leave Isaiah lii. 4, 11, 12, as it was. If, indeed, this whole chapter do not teach that the Messiah did suffer for us, the just for the unjust-that he both bore our sins, and bore them away-that he was wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our iniquities, stricken of God, and afflicted for our offendings-that it pleased Jehovah to bruise him, to put him to grief, and to make his soul an offering for sin-it can prove, it does prove, nothing at all.

Speculators aud system-mongers, unable to make these scriptures tally with their notions of justice and expediency, have contended against the language of Apostles and Prophets as figurative and farfetched, and sought to substitute for the doctrine of the Spirit a voeabulory of their own, more agreeable to their respective theories. I fear some may imagine a squinting of this sort in some remarks of yours, as the following:-"Does law or justice admit of such substituted punishment?" What law, or what justice? In return I ask, Does law or justice admit of the punishment by death of an innocent perBon? My dear sir, we have many very imperfect logicians among system-makers as well as in other classes of society. They dash on Scylla while steering from Charybdis. We see the divine law impinged when something impinges our theory of God's justice; but we do not see that while we are protecting the law we are dishonoring

the character of God by imputing to him the sacrifice of his Son most unjustly and cruelly. For, mark what I say, if the Messiah, God's Son, did not die under the imputation of sin, as a sin-offering, and for us sinners, all the logicians in America will not convince me that it was just to suffer him to die at all. And who allowed his death! Was he not delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God? He asked to be spared; but God could not spare him and save man; and therefore he submitted, saying, "Not as I will, but as thou wilt.” "He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all.”— "Awake," said Jehovah, "O sword, against my Shepherd-against the man that is my fellow-smite the Shepherd, and let the sheep be scattered." We know who has applied this to the Father and the Son.

I have weighed the above italicised proposition, and am sorry to discover that it does not seem to have impressed its momentous weight upon your mind. Why, my dear sir, if God's only and well beloved Son could be murdered according to prophecy, by his counsel and foreknowledge, by his own immutable will, without any sin done by him or imputed to him, who could feel safe in the universe of God, though innocent as Jesus, and pure as the throne of Jehovah? When, then, you ask, “Does law or justice admit of such substituted punishment!" remember what the denial of it implies and involves. I ask, Do law and justice admit of the punishment by death of an innocent person! Nay, what moral law justifies the suffering of an innocent person? Every demurrer against the imputation of sin with whom I have debated, is stricken dumb just at this point. Any one that can show me the justice and the law of reason that sanctions the death of those dear innocents whom Herod slew, whom God has slain in the deluge, in Sodom, Egypt, and Jerusalem, that he slays every day by the scythe of death, I will in return show to him the justice of substitution and imputation-I will justify the death of the Messiah as a sin-offering by all the facts, documents, and reasons by which he justifies events innumerable, occurring still in the fortunes of every family in the observation of every man of sense and reflection.

As I have not now room for a full exposition of my views on this subject, I must defer till another moon. Meantime, my dear sir, I will send you this, in proof, a month before the number appears, that you may have time to explain yourself before the next number be due. Come up to the points now elicited, and leave the Westminster Di vines and your orthodox opponents to themselves. We have the Bible, and that is enough. Our brethren are anxious for the full examination of this whole subject.

CHARITY-TRUE AND FALSE.

JAMESTOWN, Ohio, December 16, 1840. Dear brother Campbell-FAULT-FINDERS are, of all visiters, the most unwelcome: nevertheless, among this class are found true philanthropists: true charity is often met with in the person of a fault-finder;

but it is rarely met with in the person of a flatterer. But, by a strange misnomer, the flatterer is said to be the charitable man, and the faultfinder the uncharitable one; at least this obtains in religion. The man that speaks well of all religions is said to be a very charitable man; but he that finds fault with thein, or any of them, is said to be uncharitable in proportion to the number of faults he finds out; and the man's Christianity is measured by his charity, with this sense attached to the word. Perhaps no word has been perverted to a greater extent than the word charity, when figuratively used. Literally it means the giving of alms, and figuratively it means the enlightening of minds or understandings; but it never did mean praise or flattery; or, at least, that is not the scriptural meaning of the word. The conferring of benefits on others is what I understand by the word charity; and the pointing out of faults for the purpose of amending them, is certainly within the range of the true meaning of that word. But if the approbation of error or bad actions be the meaning of that word in any degree, I have always been ignorant of its meaning. It does seem to me that charity requires the pointing out of faults, where amendments may be made; but where no amendment can be made, as in the case of bodily deformity, and shall I add mental deformity-yes, I will; for I believe there are deformed minds as well as bodies-it would be of no use to point out the deformities.

But some man will say, 'If you find fault with all religions but your own, you will certainly be very uncharitable. You ought to allow other people's religion to be as good as your own.'

To such a man I would say, If you can point out faults in my religion, and will not do it, you are no friend of mine, for error may lead me to destruction; and if you make no effort to save me, you have no charity, or love, for me. If I am in ignorance, and you see me there, and make no effort to extricate me, what better are you than the Priest and Levite were, who found a man among thieves, and took no care of him?

Never mind my faults in husbandry, or economy, or in my fortunes, or in my dress, while you see a fault in my religion; for, above all things, I desire to be right in religion. But that you may really mend my faults, I desire that you will not caricature my religion, and then go to finding fault with the ugly picture you have made. Do not make a hump where there is none, and then point your finger at it; but, above all, I beg of you not to give my religion some unpopular name, and then find fault with it because of the name. Look at it as it really exists, and then find all the fault you can; but be sure that you measure by the rule made by the Apostles, for that is the only rule that is of the right length-all others have been sprung or warped by hard straining.

These thoughts are not very well clothed; but they will do for a friend to look at by the fireside, if not to go among strangers. M. WINANS:

Affectionately yours,

GREAT LIBRARY The largest library in the world is said to be the one in the British Museum. It contains more than half a million of printed books, and a hundred and twenty thousand manuscripts. The next largest is the Royal Library of Paris, in which there are over four hundred thousand books, and eighty thousand munuscripts.

Equator.

From the Equator.

THE TRUTH OF GOD.

TRUTH is either logical or moral. The opposite of logical truth is error; of moral, a lie. Or, to explain the distinction more familiarly, when a person makes a declaration not according to the real state of the case; at the same time honestly believing it himself, he declares what is logically false, yet morally true. On the other hand, were a person to make a statement which is really in conformity with the nature of things; at the same time not believing it himself, his statement would be logically true, yet morally false.

God, who is a being infinitely wise, cannot make a statement logically false; and, as he is infinitely good, he will not make one that is morally so. Neither error nor duplicity can be imputed to an infinitely perfect being, Where futurity is concerned, as in the case of promises and predictions, a species of falsehood, somewhat different from both these already mentioned, may arise from fickleness or a want of power. A person may very sincerely declare his purpose to do a thing to-morrow, and before the time arrives he may change his purpose, either because some obstacle to its execution may arise which he did not foresee; or, upon further deliberation, he may view the matter in a different light. He may also declare his purpose, and attempt to execute it, and yet fail for want of power. Neither of these things are attributable to God. No event can arise that he did not foresee. He gains no new views of things by deliberation; for his knowledge is intuitive. No obstacle can lie in the way of his omnipotence. In the beautiful language of scripture, "He is not a man, that he should lie; nor the son of man, that he should repent. Hath he said it, and shall he not do it? Hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?"

The truth of God, according to the foregoing analysis, is based upon his holiness, his omnipotence, and his omniscience. The last of these Dr. Adam Clarke has denied. The amount of what he says on the subject is, that because the omnipotence of God signifies not that he actually does all things, but only that he can do all things; therefore his omniscience must mean that he can know all things, not that he actually does know all things. This is the greatest piece of nonsense that I recollect ever to have met with in the writings of any great author, and scarcely deserves a refutation. According to this doctrine knowledge means not what a man actually knows, but only what a man can know if he will; making his actual knowledge dependent, like his actions, upon the state of his will. This is to introduce a strange confusion into our thoughts. Knowledge, in its very nature, is independent of power and will. What I know it is impossible for me, by a mere act of will, to not know. I cannot command my knowledge away from my mind. I cannot command myself to know. Between knowledge and ignorance there is no medium. If there is any thing which God does not actually know, he is ignorant of it; and if he is ignorant of any thing, his declarations are not to be depended on. For, wherever there is ignorance there is liability to error; and wherever there is liability to error, there error may sometimes actually exist. All this is self-evident. "Known unto God are all his works: he seeth the end from the beginning."

T.

LITERARY INSTITUTIONS.

UNDER the head of "Review of Addresses delivered by Governor Wallace and President Simpson, at the Indiana Asburry University, September 26, 1840," the following valuable extracts from President Simpson's address are taken from the "Equator," Bloomington, Ind., of the 28th ultimo:—

"Colleges, or high institutions of learning, have always been the precursers of great improyements, whether in government or in the arts of civilized life. In every land remarkable for intellect we find them in existence. Even in the captivity of Babylon the Jews sustained high institutions for that age of the world. Shortly after ConStantine a University was established at Constantinople which served as the depository of eastern literature; but colleges resembling those at present in existence were not established until a much later period. In the 9th century Europe produced two distinguished individualsCharlemagne in France, and Alfred in England. Each used every means to encourage education, and seminaries were founded where were the swelling buds that afterwards unfolded into the Universities of Paris and Oxford. And is it not remarkable that the land of Alfred and Charlemagne, after a lapse of 1000 years, still retains a proud preeminence over the rest of Europe. At what period college honors were devised and degrees conferred it is now difficult to determine; but their origination is by many ascribed to Irnerius, a distinguished jurist of the 12th century, and a Professor of Bologna. Mention of them was made by Robert de Courcon in 1215, and the term Bachelor of Arts occurs in the bull of Pope Gregory XII. in 1281. At this period a new impetus was given to collegiate instruction, and in the same century in addition to the Universities of Paris and Oxford, we find those of Toulouse, Bologna, Naples, Padua, Salamanca, and Cambridge; and in the next two centuries between twenty and thirty additional ones were established. Shall we ask, Was their establishment followed by any remarkable events? History points to those centuries as the time of the awaking of mind and the formation of those very systems now completely developed. That age was a dark one in political relations. Tyranny was absolute and unrelenting. The common people were in a state of abject slavery, attached to the soil, and responsible as goods and chattels, by the power of the nobility. The code of jurisprudence was lamentably defective: but in it the first great change was produced. The Roman law was revived and introduced into the Universities. The youth crowded to the lectures, and by their means correct notions were generally diffused. Trials by single combat, by signs and charms, by the judgments of God,' as they were termed, were gradually abandoned, and order and regularity were established in the courts of judicature. As ideas of justice prevailed, the condition of the peasantry was ameliorated. Princes enfranchised their serfs and exhorted their nobility to do the same.