Sec. 72. Damage by suction and displacement-waves.An overtaking and passing vessel is bound not only to avoid colliding with the vessel passed, but is bound to pass at such a distance that no harm will result to the other from the suction produced by her passage through the water or from her displacement wave; and she is bound to know the effect takes; and the fact that the overtaking vessel does not alter her course, although signaled to do so, does not excuse the one overtaking for the collision. The Cephalonia, 29 Fed. R. 332; The Sylvan Grove, 29 Fed. R. 336. Where the signals of the vessel intending to pass are not understood or are not responded to, and there is a possibility of collision if passing is insisted upon, it is the duty of the vessel following to wait until the danger is past, and, if necessary, to slacken speed and change its course. The Pegassus, 15 Fed. R. 921; Greenwood v. The William Fletcher, 38 Fed. R. 156. The signal of the vessel intending to pass must be repeated if not responded to, in situations where the consent of the leading vessels is first to be obtained. Ibid. Where a tug was overtaken by a steamer which passed at so short a distance that the tug was caused to give a sudden sheer caused by the suction of the passing steamer, it was held that the steamer was responsible for not having kept off to a greater distance in passing. The City of Brocton, 37 Fed. R. 897. An overtaking vessel continues to be an overtaking vessel until it has entirely passed the other, and until all danger of collision is past. The fact that the overtaking ves sel is at the moment of collision slightly in advance does not relieve it of the character of being an overtaking vessel. The Jesse Spalding, 50 Fed. R. 583. 1 The New York, 34 Fed. R. 757; The New Brunswick, 43 Fed. R. 174; The City of Brocton, 37 Fed. R. 897; The Columbia, 61 Fed. R. 220; 55 Fed. R. 766; Boyer v. The Connecticut, 45 Fed. R. 374; The Monmouth and The Raritan, 44 Fed. 809. The Drew, 22 Fed. R. 852. In this case a barge had grounded on the eastern bank of the Hudson and could not be liberated. A steamer coming down observed the barge's signals and slowed down, but did not keep off, as she might have done, and when abreast of the barge resumed her former speed. The suction and swell from her passage caused the barge to pound upon the rocky bottom and a hole was punctured through the vessel. Held, that the steamer was liable. The Charley A. Reed, 19 Fed. R. 111. Where in a narrow channel a steamer passed a tug with a number of boats in tow, which were driven into collision with each other by the swell created by the steamer by reason of her passing too near and at a high rate of speed, it was held that the steamer of her swell, and to pass at a distance sufficient to avoid danger therefrom, or to reduce her speed to such a degree that a displacement-wave will be avoided. It is the duty of steam-vessels passing near docks or other mooring places to pass at such a rate of speed that no danger will result from her swell.' In navigating rivers and harbors where small boats are accustomed to ply and may reasonably be expected, steamers are bound to navigate with the utmost caution and at a rate of speed sufficiently slow to avoid damage from her attending swell. It is negligence in a large and powerful steamer to work her wheel in a narrow and crowded slip, whereby a current is produced sufficient to injure other craft lawfully there; nor may she leave a crowded slip was bound to know the depth of water and whether her swell would injure the tow, and was liable in damages. The C. H. Northam, 13 Blatch. 31. In the case of Nelson v. The Majestic, 48 Fed. R. 730, 1 U. S. App. 16, the court held that where an ocean steamer overtook and passed a tug with a heavily laden canalboat lashed to either side, and a displacement-wave produced by the steamship struck the tug with such force as to damage the tow, the steamship was liable for the injuries done; and that it was no defense that her displacementwave did not render navigation more perilous than would a high wind, and that she was navigated at a rate of speed usual with steamers of her class. 1 The Morrisonia, 13 Blatch. 512. In this case a sailing-vessel was properly fastened to a pier, and a steamer passed with such speed that she created a swell throwing the vessel against another and in flicting damages. The steamer was held liable. 2 Netherlands Steamboat Co. v. Styles, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 19; The Massachusetts, 10 Ben. 177; The Southfield, 19 Fed. R. 841; The Rhode Island, 24 Fed. R. 295; The New York, 34 Fed. R. 757; De Lelle v. The Atlanta, 34 Fed. R. 918. The steamers D. and F. with the schooners M. and N. in tow were passing to the starboard of each other in a narrow channel. The force of suction gave the D. a sheer to starboard and across the course of the M. The speed of the F. and her tow was at least seven miles an hour. Held, that the collision was caused by the negligence of the F. in running at an excessive rate of speed, and to that of the M. in not anticipating the result of the suction of the D. Chisholm v. The Alex. Folsom, 44 Fed. R. 932; reversed, 52 Fed. R. 403. without taking the utmost care to prevent a disturbance of the water by her propeller and by suction of her own displacement.1 Sec. 73. Holding course.-The international rules of 1890 and the rules for the Great Lakes provide that "where by any of these rules one of two vessels is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed." The new rules are different from the old ones of 1885 in this particular: that the vessel whose duty it is to hold her course is also required to keep her speed. 3 The duty imposed by the statute upon vessels under certain conditions to keep out of the way of another is correlative with the duty of the other to hold her course and speed. Their duties are reciprocal; the rule being as imperative that the one shall hold her course and speed as that the other shall avoid doing her injury. The vessel whose duty it is to keep out of the way must in all instances shape her course 1 The Nevada, 17 Blatch. 122. Where the pilot in charge of a tug and tow sees a large vessel rapidly approaching, and observes that her displacement-wave will be dangerous to his tow, it is his duty to turn the tow so as to take the waves end on; and he will be held in fault for failing to do so. The Nelson, The Majestic, The Nannie Lamberton, 44 Fed. R. 813. A steamer going at full speed in a narrow part of the Delaware river met a barge in tow with three other barges. The steamer's swell was sufficiently great to cause the barges to collide. Held, that the steamer, having failed to slow down as was her duty when meeting tows of this sort, was liable for the injury. The Ellen Heron, 55 Fed. R. 766. Where a steamer was running at a moderate rate of speed, and met a tug with a barge in tow loaded with a deck-load of iron, and it appeared by the evidence that the displacement-waves of the steamer were not large enough to cause apprehension of danger on the part of those having the tug and tow in charge, the steamer was held not liable. The Pilgrim, 57 Fed. R. 670. 226 U. S. Stat. at L. 320, art. 21; Rules for the Great Lakes, rule 20; The I. C. Harris, 29 Fed. R. 926; The Nacoochee, 22 Fed. R. 855; The Columbia, 25 Fed. R. 844; The Brittania, 34 Fed. R. 546; The Scotts Greys v. The Santiago de Cuba, 5 Fed. R. 369; McWilliams v. The Vim, 12 Fed. R. 906; The John L. Hasbrouck, 93 U. S. 405. 323 U. S. Stat. at L. 442, art. 22. with reference to the speed and direction of the other, and the latter, after the other's maneuvers are known, has no right to change her course or speed, to the other's injury, while sufficient maneuvers are being executed to keep out of the other's way, unless special and imperative reasons exist therefor. This rule, like all others, is to be construed together with all the other rules for the prevention of collisions, and is to be applied so as to avoid them; and where a strict observance of the rule would only invite instead of prevent accident, a departure is justifiable. As Judge Blatchford, in the case of The Columbia,' says: "The duty of one vessel to keep her course is not intended by the rules as a privilege conferred, but as an obligation imposed, in order to enable the other vessel with certainty to keep out of the way." In order to warrant a vessel to either change her course or speed, there must be reasonable certainty that the other is not doing her duty, and that the situation imperatively demands a departure from the rules. It is the duty of the vessel required to keep out of the way to give an early and intelligible expression of her intentions to do so; and while there is any doubt as to what her actions will be, the vessel required to hold her course may presume that the other will act intelligently and lawfully, and she should hold her course until the contrary appears. It is no excuse for The Britannia, 34 Fed. R. 546; The rule requiring a vessel to hold her course must give way to the general rule applicable in all cases, that regard must be had to all dangers of navigation and to any special circumstances which may render a departure necessary; and in the presence of immediate danger a vessel is not required to adhere to the rule so strictly as to run into danger when by departing from her course she may prevent it. The Warren, 18 Fed. R. 559. 3 The Britannic, 34 Fed. R. 516. 4 The B. C. Terry, 30 Fed. R. 711; Conover v. The City of Chester, 24 Fed. R. 91; The Hudson, 14 Fed. R. 489; The John H. Dillon, 30 Fed. R. 285; Kirman v. The Leonard Richards, 38 Fed. R. 767. Where two steamers were approaching each other on courses not involving collision, and one of a vessel taking a course forbidden by law that the unlawful course was the best one. In taking a course in violation of the statutory rule she does so at her peril.1 Sec. 74. Change of course.- The general rule where two steamers are crossing courses is that the one having the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way, and that the latter shall hold her course; and where collision occurs by reason of a failure on the part of the latter to do so, the obligation rests upon her to show sufficient cause warranting a departure from the rule. It is the duty of a steamer navigating in the known or probable presence of other vessels to pursue a steady and consistent course, and to avoid a sudden change of direction whereby the other's safety is prejudiced. Where a steamer changes her course suddenly and attempts to cross the course of another, she takes the risk of her own conduct. Where a steamer by her own original signal expresses a desire to take a particular course, and the same is consented to by the other, the latter has a right to rely upon an adherence to the course selected. And where the former deviates from the same, without reasonable necessity, and without giving sufficient previous notice of her disposition to do so, she is liable for them changed her course so as to involve collision, without having given sufficient time for the other to accommodate her actions to the changed situation, it was held that the vessel changing her course was at fault. The Bermuda, 11 Fed. R. 913; The Negaunee, 20 Fed. R. 918. ferry-boat, and continued to swing until collision followed, the court held that the collision was the fault of the tug in not holding her course. The Transfer No. 4, 44 Fed. R. 303. 2 The Corsica, 9 Wall. 630; Case v. The Susquehanna, 35 Fed. R. 325; The Hudson, 14 Fed. R. 489; 1 Clare v. P. & S. S. Co., 20 Fed. The Transfer No. 4, 44 Fed. R. 303; R. 535. Where a tug having the right of way whistled to a ferry-boat on a crossing course that she would cross her bows, but instead changed her wheel to swing away from the The Farragut, 35 Fed. R. 617. 3 The Wolverton, 28 Fed. R. 381; The Britannia, 42 Fed. R. 67; 34 Fed. R. 546; The Jay Gould, 19 Fed. R. 765. |