perior facilities for its acting. It is not only required to do all a ship sailing with the wind free can do, but as much more as its ability to act freely is superior to the hampered movements of the other. There is nothing it may leave undone consistent with its own safety and within its ability.1 Nor does it afford any justification for negligent conduct or violation of the rules that the other has also been guilty of misconduct. A steamer must, notwithstanding the previous faults of a sailing-vessel, pursue with promptness and diligence all means reasonably within its power to avoid it; in default of which it is liable.2

When duty begins: The rule becomes operative the moment the vessels are within such distance of each other that collision may ensue if the steamer pursues its course and fails to keep away, and imposes upon the steamer the duty of observing with the greatest care the movements of the other from the time it is first sighted, and continues until all danger of collision is passed; and for any omission to act with promptitude and intelligence it is liable in damages.3 The rule is general in its terms, and prescribes no particular method of keeping out of the way, leaving the steamer free to adopt such maneuvers as are least dangerous, and best adapted to the end sought; the means of accomplishing this being left to the discretion of the steamer at the time when necessity of precaution begins. Everything prior to that is immaterial, except so far as it may give to the steamer knowledge of the other's approach. The rule is applied more strictly at sea and in open waters than in narrow channels and crowded harbors, where the movements of each must depend largely upon the circumstances of the moment.' A sailing-vessel in mid-ocean may pursue its course and with

1 Inman v. Reck, The City of Ant- The Beta, 40 Fed. R. 899; The Car werp, 37 L. J. Adm. 25. roll, 8 Wall. 302; The Thomas P.

2 McWilliams v. The Vim, 12 Fed. Way, 22 Fed. R. 739; The Iron R. 906. Chief, 63 Fed. R. 289.

3 The Alhambra, 2 Ben. 158; The City of Springfield, 29 Fed. R. 923;

4 The I. C. Harris, 29 Fed. R. 926

propriety rely upon an approaching steamer to keep out of the way; but in a crowded harbor the circumstances may be such as to relieve the steamer from the burden of acting, and cast upon the other the responsibility of doing so. The circumstances may be such that for a large and cumbrous ship to attempt to sail to her moorings in a crowded harbor of limited proportion, when her movements must necessarily be obstructed, is of itself negligence. In the navigation of narrow and difficult passages, a steamer has a right to act upon the presumption that the other will not intentionally run into a dangerous situation, whereby its maneuvers will be embarrassed by reason of the natural difficulties of the situation. But if these dangers are not reasonably certain, the steamer has no right to anticipate that the sailing-vessel will vary from its course, and is bound to regulate its conduct so as to give the other plenty of space in which to maneuver. In case of doubt as to what will be the course of a sailing-vessel navigating in the direction of known or probable danger, the law imposes an additional obligation on a steamer to take timely measures not to embarrass the other, nor to add to the difficulties of the situation by thwarting her movements by dilatoriness in keeping out of the way.1

Sec. 87. Giving wide berth. The rule requiring a steamer to keep out of the way of a sailing-vessel requires it to do more than merely shape its course so as to pass without striking. It must allow sufficient margin for safety, taking into consideration all the contingencies of navigation. Where a steamer permits itself to be brought dangerously near a sailing-vessel, one of the risks assumed is that those in charge of it are liable to lose their presence of mind or adopt a mistaken policy as to what their line of conduct should be. It is an unwarrantable risk for a passing vessel,

1 The Washington Irving, Abb. Adm. 336; Height v. Bird, 26 Fed. R. 539; The Iron Chief, 63 Fed. R. 289.

2 The Columbia, 9 Ben. 254; The Fred Jansen, 49 Fed. R. 254.

either steam or sail, to navigate so close to another that a momentary mistake, misapprehension of an order, slight error on the part of either, or unexpected deflection of course, would involve collision. While the rule requires a sailingvessel to hold its course, it does not require it to do so with mathematical precision. The effect of wind, tide and sea upon sailing-vessels is so uncertain that another approaching so close as to be exposed to the vicissitudes attending the navigation of a ship does so at its peril. Even with the most skilful handling, the movements of a sailing-vessel are not to be absolutely relied on; and a steamer approaching must make sufficient allowance for these contingencies or suffer the consequences. It is negligence for a steamer to approach a sailing-vessel so near that its presence is calculated to cause alarm and confusion among seamen of ordinary skill and courage, and it is held to strict accountability for permitting so near an approach. Having the ability to keep away, the fault of permitting a dangerously near approach out balances any error of management the sailingvessel may make while trying to escape from a situation of peril imposed upon it by the negligent conduct of the other.2

There is no definite limit of distance prescribed, determining what is a safe distance within which vessels may approach each other. Circumstances would modify any specific rule that could be adopted. The courts have, in some instances, held that the distance the colored lights of a vessel are required to be visible at night-two miles - should be adopted as the limit within which a vessel approaches at its

1 The Laura v. Rose, 28 Fed. R. 104; The Aurania, 29 Fed. R. 98; Wells v. Armstrong, 29 Fed. R. 216; The Jesse W. Knight, 45 Fed. R. 590; Sanders v. The Santee, 48 Fed. R. 126; The George Murray, 22 Fed. R. 117; The Chatham, 44 Fed. R. 384; The William Young, Olc. 38; The Norman, 52 Fed. R. 237.

2 The Schmidt v. The Reading, 43 Fed. R. 398; The Chatham, 52 Fed. R. 396; The Carroll, 8 Wall. 302.

Where a tug met a sloop tacking near the shore, and passed so near that the sloop collided with it in coming about on another tack, the tug was held in fault for passing so close as to involve dan

peril. It must, however, depend largely upon the situation. of the vessels. At sea with plenty of room, it may be negligence for a steamer to permit a nearer approach than two miles, while in narrow passages, harbors or waters rendered dangerous by natural obstructions, a much shorter distance must be allowed from the very nature of things. In all cases, however, it must be such a distance that the vessel charged with the duty of keeping away may with certainty and safety discharge the duty imposed upon it by law. It is that distance within which the other vessel is not permitted to change its course.1

Sec. 88. Stopping, slackening speed and reversing. The statutory duty imposed on a steamer to keep out of the way of a sailing-vessel requires it to do so by invoking any means consistent with its own and the other's safety; and where the approach is sufficiently near to involve risk of collision, it becomes the duty of the steamer to stop and reverse.1 Where the proximity of the sailing-vessel is unknown, or there is any uncertainty in the situation of either, ordinary prudence requires the steamer to stop until its own and the other's situation is known. That the steamer may comply with the rule it must know the position and course of the other; and where its movements are uncertain and fluctuating, prudence requires that the steamer should, if near enough to involve risk, slacken its speed or stop until the position, movements and course of the other are ascertained." The fact that the steamer conformed to the rules and the sailing-vessel did not is not of itself sufficient to relieve the steamer from liability; it must appear that such failure on the part of the sailing-vessel produced or contributed to the collision, and not any want of care on the steamer's part.3

force of the suction created by the overtaking steamer, held, that the steamer was at fault for not keeping away a sufficient distance. The City of Brocton, 37 Fed. R. 897.

Where a steamer has voluntarily placed itself in a dangerous situation, it is not sufficient to relieve it from liability that it did everything that good seamanship would suggest after danger of collision arose. The City of Paris, 1 Ben. 174.

91; The R. R. Kir and, 48 Fed. R. 760.

3 Ward v. The Fashion, 1 Newb. 8; The Brinton, 59 Fed. R. 714.

The steamship S., bound for the port of San Francisco, sighted at night the sailing-vessel P. about two miles off her starboard bow. There being no lights visible on the sailing-vessel, the master of the steamer supposed the courses of the two vessels to be parallel and continued on his course at the same speed. Instead of being on

1 See Stopping and Reversing, a parallel course the sailing-vessel

page 135.

2 The Jesse W. Knight v. Wm. R. McCabe, 45 Fed. R. 590; The Schmidt v. The Reading, 43 Fed. R. 815; Haven v. The Westover, 2 Fed. R.

was on a course nearly at right angles with the course of the steamer. Collision following, the court held that the steamer was in fault, on sighting the sailing-vessel,