Sec. 167. Collision with rafts.-The early authorities held that admiralty had no jurisdiction over actions in rem against rafts; the reason given being that they were not ships within the meaning of that term. It would seem that the objection was more fanciful than real; that no substantial reason can be given why a maritime right of action cannot with as much propriety be maintained against a raft, for the negligent conduct of those in charge of it, as against a barge or other species of craft for the negligence of those in control. No species of water-craft has such inherent independence of action as to be guilty of tort, irrespective of the negligence of those under whose control it is. A ship is guilty of tortious conduct because those in charge of it are negligent. To say that a raft of any description is without the pale of admiralty jurisdiction because it is of different construction than a ship, or because not provided with motive power of its own, is indeed a reason so devoid of reason that the later decisions have not followed the lead of those above referred to. In cases of salvage it has been held that rafts are within admiralty jurisdiction. And in the recent case of Seabrook against A Raft of Railroad Ties,3 Judge Simonton, of the district court of South Carolina, has carefully collected the authorities bearing on this question,

during a fog on a canal, to select the berme bank, and that if it ties up to the tow-path side the burden of proof is upon it to show that it took sufficient precaution to warn approaching boats of its situation. The Milwaukee, 14 Fed. R. 365.

Where a steam canal-boat attempted to pass a canal-boat towed by horses, and by the displacement wave and suction of its propeller, caused by its passage through the water, caused the boat being passed to collide with another canal-boat approaching, the steam-boat was held at fault for attempting to pass

while the other two were approaching and so near together. The Charley A. Reed, 19 Fed. R. 111.

1 Tome v. Four Cribs of Lumber, Taney, 533; Jones v. The Coal Barges, 3 Wall. Jr. 53; Gastrel v. A Cypress Raft, 2 Woods, 213.

2 Muntz v. A Raft of Timber, 15 Fed. R. 555, 557; Fifty Thousand Feet of Timber, 2 Low. 64; A Raft of Spars, 1 Abb. Adm. 485.

340 Fed. R. 596. See, also, United States v. One Raft of Timber, 13 Fed. R. 796; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall, 213.

and with much learning held the raft liable in rem for collision with a vessel on navigable waters. So that while the question has not been decided by the higher courts, the weight of the recent decisions, together with the enlarged views our courts are taking on questions of admiralty jurisdiction, is in favor of the rule that admiralty has jurisdiction over rafts, when navigating waters of the United States, in all matters of tort. Although the early decisions denied jurisdiction in rem over rafts, it has never been questioned but that an action in personam will lie in admiralty for the negligence of those in charge of a raft, or in rem against a vessel towing or having a raft in charge.1

Sec. 168. Collision with wrecks.- The maritime law creates no liability on the part of the owner of a vessel for abandoning it, in navigable waters, in the ordinary course

1 The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. R. 511; Benham v. The Niagara, 44 Fed. R. 775.

Where a raft about twelve hundred feet long and two hundred and fifty feet wide, containing loose logs in a sack boom, consisting of logs fastened together end to end, with cross-cables to prevent spreading, in charge of two tugs stationed at either end, attempted to pass a long and narrow channel of the Sault Ste. Marie river, where the current is rapid, without having given sufficient warning to vessels approaching from below, and met an ascending vessel in a situation where there was great danger of the vessel being crowded onto the rocks, and the latter, being unable to pass without colliding with the raft, went through it, end on, by which the raft was destroyed, held, that the ascending vessel was not at fault, it appearing that it was a matter of

self-preservation that it pursued this course. Reid Towing & Wrecking Co. v. The Athabasca, 45 Fed. R. 651.

Where a tug towed a raft down the St. Clair river in such condition that it spread out and occupied the larger part of the navigable channel, it was held liable for damages inflicted upon an ascending vessel in tow of a tug, struck by the raft, the raft tug having failed to notify the ascending tug and tow of the dangerous character of the raft, and having given it a signal to pass on the side where the collision occurred. Benham v. The Niagara, 44 Fed. R. 775.

Where a boom was rightfully in place, in a situation where navigation was not obstructed, and was run into by a vessel knowing its situation, the latter was held liable for the injury done. The John Spry Lumber Co. v. The C. H. Green, 76 Mich. 320.

of navigation; nor on the part of the wreck itself for collision with it. Where a navigable stream is used for the location of submerged obstructions, which turn the natural current of the stream in such a manner as to be dangerous to navigation, such use carries with it the liability for damages resulting therefrom.?

While there is no liability on the part of the owner of a wreck for failure to remove the same from navigable waters, the rule is different in the case of private canals or slips, where vessels are permitted to enter upon payment of fixed charges. Under such circumstances the owner of a vessel, colliding with a wreck or other obstruction negligently left in an exposed situation, without sufficient safeguards about it to prevent collision, may recover for injuries received by reason of such obstructions; there being an implied warranty on the part of the owner that the canal or slip is in fit condition for use.3 There being no liability on the part of the owner for abandoning a wreck, there is no liability on the part of a ship for colliding with it.*

Sec. 169. Collisions with fixed structures - Bridges.As stated in a preceding section," admiralty has no jurisdiction to try the question of injuries to structures fixed permanently to the land, or resting permanently upon it,

1 Ball v. Berwind, 29 Fed. R. 541; The Franconia, 16 Fed. R. 149.

2 Missouri River P. Co. v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 2 Fed. R. 285.

3 Pajewsky v. Carondalet Canal & Nav. Co., 11 Fed. R. 313.

Where a lighter had sunk at a dock, and there was a delay of six days before it was raised, and in the meantime several vessels had occupied the slip, it was held that no recovery could be had for injury to the wreck, as libelant could not clearly show that any particular boat was at fault.

4 The Atlee, 12 Fed. R. 734.

After the sinking of a sloop by collision with a tug in a narrow channel, the tug seeing the floating wreckage made fast to it and towed it several hundred feet, and dragged the hull by means of the wire rigging, causing some injury to it. It was held that the tug was liable for the damages done by such dragging, as it did not appear necessary to remove the wreck from the channel as a public nuisance. The Brenton, 66 Fed. R. 71. Sec. 6, ante.

locality in all matters of maritime torts being the test of jurisdiction. Although admiralty has jurisdiction over actions for injuries to vessels, it has no authority to try actions for damages by vessels to permanent structures upon the land, although they are lawfully situated there.'

The law imposes upon the owners of bridges over navigable waters the duty of maintaining ample facilities for the passage of shipping, and the custodians of such structures are bound to use great care to avoid accidents to vessels passing. The duties owing by the owners of bridges to passing shipping are reciprocal to the duty owed by shipping to such structures. The right of navigating public waters is no greater than the right to bridge the same, when lawful authority is given therefor, both being means of commercial transportation. The use of the one is not paramount to the use of the other. The right of navigation must be exercised with due regard to the interests of others, as must the operation of bridges be conducted with due regard to the rights of shipping.5

The use of navigable waters by the public is subject to the general rules and restrictions applicable to public highways of commerce. And in the operation of bridges over navigable waters the same principles apply. The bridge must be operated in such a manner as to least inconvenience

1 The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transat lantique, 63 Fed. R. 845; The City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, 37 Fed. R. 705; Euberweg v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 35 Fed. R. 428; The Accame, 20 Fed. R. 642; The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. R. 803.

2 Edgerton v. Mayor, 27 Fed. R. 230; Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed. R. 741; Charleston Bridge Co. v. The John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed. R. 536. 3 38 III. 111, 467; 51 Ill. 266.

4 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 729; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 546.

5 Dunes v. Petty, 15 Q. B. 276; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 269.

Where the opening of a railroad bridge over a navigable stream was so unreasonably delayed, after proper signals of passage were given, that a tug with its tow were unable to pass in safety, and the tow was injured, it was held that the bridge owners were liable. Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 59 Fed. R. 192.

navigation, and at the same time subserve the interests of the public to the greatest extent. Under ordinary circumstances the custodians of a bridge should give the right of way to shipping, for the reason that public travel on a bridge is less liable to injury by stoppage than is a vessel approaching, owing to the uncertain elements with which it has to contend. There is no great hardship inflicted on the traveling public approaching a draw-bridge to await the passage of a vessel approaching, while the danger to the latter from a closed bridge is often great, by reason of its inability to control its movements. The right of way, if it may be termed such, is not because of any greater right of passage possessed by shipping, but because of the more dangerous element with which it has to contend.

Under ordinary circumstances it is the duty of a ship in passing through a draw to do so at right angles to it, but failure to do so will not relieve the bridge owners for failure to favor the vessel's passage by any means at hand. It is negligence under any circumstances to approach a bridge at such a rate of speed that the movements of the vessel are not under such command that it can be stopped within the distance that obstructions should be discovered by careful navigators.2 A vessel may not assume that the draw is open or will be open in time to let it through; and if it approaches the bridge so closely that collision cannot be avoided, before ascertaining that the draw is closed, recovery may be had against its owners. It is the business of a vessel to know that a bridge is open before approaching so close that retreat is impossible.3

1 Edgerton v. Mayor, 27 Fed. R. long hawser to attempt to take her 230. tow through the draw of a bridge

2 Jones v. The St. Nicholas, 49 on a course diagonal to the draw. Fed. R. 671. Where a pilot was mistaken in his

3 Gilmour v. Bay of Quinte Bridge position, and attempted the dangerCo., 20 Ont. App. 281.

In the case of Booge v. L'Engle, 57 Fed. R. 306, it was held to be negligence for a tug towing on a

ous passage of a bridge at night at a high rate of speed and without a lookout, the vessel was held liable for collision with a barge