Sec. 3. Exclusive jurisdiction. Actions in rem: The fact that a cause may be promoted in admiralty does not imply that it must necessarily be prosecuted there, even if that court offers the most direct method of relief, unless the procedure invoked is of such a nature that only admiralty courts have authority to act.1 that is 3 Under the clause of the judiciary act of 1789, "saving the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," any suitor may proceed in personam in admiralty, or bring an action in any common-law court open to him, where the subject is of a maritime nature. The constitution does not give admiralty courts exclusive jurisdiction over those causes where the jurisdiction was concurrent with the common-law courts at the time of its adoption, as it was in a large class of cases. But where the vessel or thing itself is proceeded against by an action. in rem, the jurisdiction of admiralty is exclusive. The distinguishing feature between those cases over which admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction, and those over which its jurisdiction is concurrent with the common-law courts, is that in actions in rem the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the real defendant in the regardless of ownership, and is itself considered an action actor, regardless of the liability of those interested in it.1 Where process is not directed to the thing itself but against the owner, although the vessel or thing is attached by collateral proceedings, the jurisdiction of admiralty is concurrent with the courts of common law, even though the subject of the action is of a maritime nature. In the latter class of cases the liability of the owner is sought to be enforced rather than the liability of the thing attached. State courts: No state court can exercise jurisdiction in rem upon any maritime contract or tort even if the right to the process has been conferred by the state statute, such ac 1 Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 3 Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583. Wall. 522. tions being exclusively within the jurisdiction of admiralty.' Over contracts not strictly maritime in their nature, as contracts for ship-building, state statutes may confer a species of jurisdiction practically amounting in effect to jurisdiction in rem.2 The jurisdiction of the federal courts over maritime contracts and torts does not prevent suits in personam and attachments on vessels in collateral proceedings in the state courts, the suitors in such cases being confined to the remedies the common law or state law afford.3 Sec. 4. State laws.- It may be stated to be a general rule that the creation of maritime rights in admiralty, is wholly without the power of any state. That neither state nor federal statutes can make that a maritime contract or tort, which is not so by the general maritime law as adopted and administered by the courts of this country; nor can they take away from either its maritime character, nor confer a right to which the party would not be entitled under the general maritime law. There are apparently a few exceptions made to the general rule somewhat anomalous in character, but which have been adopted by the courts and may now be considered as well-established exceptions to this rule. In the case of liens upon domestic vessels for supplies and repairs furnished in their home port the general maritime law gives no lien. Our courts hold, however, that where the state statute provides for a lien for such supplies or repairs, the lien will be recognized and enforced by the admiralty courts. Again, it has been repeatedly held that the admiralty courts in this country will recognize and enforce liens against vessels created by state laws for negligently causing the 1 The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; Weston v. Morse, 40 Wis. 455; Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103. 2 Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Scull v. Shakespeare, 75 Pa. St. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555. 1 death of a human being upon navigable waters. These may be considered exceptions to the general rule, but their adoption into the system of our admiralty jurisprudence is too well established to be questioned. With a few exceptions, rights created by statute, unless identical with maritime rights, cannot be made the basis of an action in rem in admiralty.? The jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by the constitution does not abridge or restrict the courts of a state in seizing and selling on execution, attaching or acting under a state statute where jurisdiction in rem is not as sumed.3 In possessory actions where the title to a ship is in question, the fact that the defendant derives title through or under a marshal's deed does not prevent a state court from entertaining jurisdiction in an action of replevin for the possession of the vessel. On the other hand, the pendency of a replevin suit in the state court, or other possessory action therein, does not oust the jurisdiction of admiralty. The exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts prevents any foreign power, any state court, or any other federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over actions in rem, although it has been held that territorial courts may by the authority of the local legislature exercise this jurisdiction. When a Istate law attempts to give its courts jurisdiction over a vessel without joining, and independent of, its owners, or attempts to invest its courts with powers partaking of the essential features of an admiralty procedure in rem, such attempt to confer jurisdiction is void under the federal constitution. A state statute creating a lien for all injuries done by vessels to persons or property cannot give jurisdic The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199; Welsh v. The North Cambria, 40 Fed. R. 655; The Alaska, 130 U. S. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555. Dailey v. Doe, 3 Fed. R. 903. 51 Peters, 511; Glass v. The Bet 201; The Sylvian Glen, 9 Fed. R. sey, 3 Dall. 6; The Hine v. Trevor, 335; The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335. 'The Manhassett, 18 Fed. R. 918. 4 Wall. 555. 6 The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555. tion in admiralty for injuries the consummation and substance of which are on land.1 Notwithstanding the fact that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings in rem in all matters of maritime cognizance, in suits in personam, where the common-law liability only of the owner is sought, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce personal liability.' Municipal ordinances have no force in admiralty courts other than as police regulations, which the courts usually observe. Thus the local authorities of a port have a right to prescribe at what wharf a vessel may lie, what anchorage grounds she may occupy in a harbor, how long it may lie there, what kind of lights she shall display while in the harbor, and regulations of a similar nature, which if not in conflict with any law of congress on the subject will be enforced by admiralty courts as police regulations of the municipality by which they are enacted. When, however, municipal or state regulations on the subject of navigation are repugnant to and inconsistent with the laws of congress, the former must give way." Thus, state statutes requiring the exhibition of particular lights under certain circumstances, although valid as internal police regulations, are not applicable to vessels engaged in general commerce; and a foreign vessel exhibiting lights within the requirements of the international sailing regulations is not at fault for not showing a light conformable to local statutes of a state. 1 City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, The Camden and The Welcome, 37 Fed. R. 707. While the general right to con 244; People v. Renselaer, etc. R. R. Co., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 113, 114. When a vessel is in the lawful 2 Shoonmaker v. Gilman, 12 Otto, possession of a state court at the 118. 3 The Palmetto, 1 Biss. 140. 4 The James Grey v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184. 5 Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 275; Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. time a libel is filed against it in admiralty, it is not subject to seizure thereunder until released from the state court. The Ironsides, 4 Biss. 518; The Redwing, 14 Fed. R. 869; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. 414. 6 The New York v. Rea, 18 How. 223; Snow v. Hill, 20 How. 543; trol and regulate the public uses of navigable waters of a state is in the state, it is subject to the restrictions imposed by congress under its power to regulate commerce. The fact that the waters of a state are navigable and are used by foreign and interstate commerce does not exclude state legislation governing their use, if such legislation does not conflict with the laws of congress, or if there is no law of congress on the subject.' While the right to regulate commerce on the navigable waters of the United States is exclusive of state authority until action is taken by congress and regulations prescribed, the states may enact regulations concerning the same. When, however, congress prescribes regulations, they supersede state laws upon the same subject, but do not repeal them; and when the law of congress is repealed, or so modified as to permit the operation of the state law, it becomes again in force.3 The right of the states to regulate the speed and general conduct of ships upon its navigable waters is as much within the power of the state as it is to prescribe laws governing the use of highways within its borders, subject to the restriction that such regulations must not in any way conflict. with the regulations which congress may have enacted respecting their use. Over those waters exclusively within a state and not used for interstate commerce, the state laws are exclusive, and the regulations prescribed by the acts of congress are not applicable; but where such waters extend beyond the limits of the state, it has no power to prescribe regulations beyond its borders." Railway Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 568. 1 Aldrich v. The W. H. Beaman, 41 Fed. R. 603. 2 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. St. 399; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush (Ky.), 447; Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728. 4 The W. H. Beaman, 45 Fed. R. 125. 5 Laws may be enacted regulating the running and rafting of logs coming from one state and passing through to another state. 129 Mass. 580; 38 Am. R. 387. The statutes of New York provide that the East river between 3 Joseph Henderson v. Paul N. the Battery and Blackwell's Island Spofford, 59 N. Y. 131. shall be navigated as nearly as pos |