structions, of which I transmit a copy. The detachment started at daylight on the 31st March. It was not then known that the Kumassis and their friends, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, had armed themselves and had proceeded to the very district into which the detachment was being sent, the rendezvous of the Kumassis being the village of Atchiassi, near Nkwanta. It was known on Sunday, and an endeavour was made to get a letter of warning delivered to Captain Armitage. The messenger failed to get through.

The detachment reached Bali without any knowledge of the position of affairs. They were attacked there, and had practically to fight their way back to Kumassi.

This is the first occasion since Sir Garnet Wolseley's expedition that there has been an engagement between the Ashantis and the forces of the Government. The casualties among the Hausas-which I very greatly deplore-were very heavy, but those among the Kumassis must have been much heavier (reports brought in say so), and the Ashantis have seen that, although in overwhelming force, they are unable to successfully cope with even a small detachment of Government Hausas.

The Hausas fought splendidly, and were well and coolly led, and it was due to Captain Armitage's pluck and courage and to the coolness under fire of AssistantInspector Leggett and Sergeant-Major Amadu Fulani that the detachment managed to get back to Kumassi.

Negotiations were opened by Sir F. Hodgson with the Ashanti chiefs, but these were fruitless. The Ashantis rose in revolt and besieged Kumassi. The situation there on June 4th is disclosed in a telegram from Colonel Willcocks (now Sir James), who had been given command of a relief column, to Mr. Chamberlain :

Letter just received from Governor of Gold Coast, Kumassi, 4th June. As briefly as possible following is substance. On several occasions unsuccessful attempts have been made to get off letters. He informs me that enclosed in letter sent copy of another letter, 4th May, but this not yet received. Kumassi garrisoned by 700 native troops under the command of Morris, Commissionerand Commandant of the Northern Territories, who succeeded in entering from the north. Europeans and all the troops on half rations; they can hold out till the 11th June; necessary for reinforcements to arrive that date with food supply and supplies of ammunition. States that supplies of ammunition [in] Kumassi will not be sufficient to allow offensive measures, and must be husbanded in case of reinforcements not arriving. March for relief Kumassi will be met by great numbers of rebel forces who have constructed stockades, put impediments in way, such as trees, and also there are stockades surrounding Kumassi offering to

rebel forces good shelter for troops, and they will be defended [with] unflinching determination. Rebel forces have places built up in the trees to be used to open fire from. State of health Kumassi good, but the 3,000 native community actually in state of destitution, and immediate assistance required. In addition to above letter I have received another, dated 16th May, but its contents known to you with exception of following message. Two hundred and thirty constabulary, under the command of Morris, arrived at Kumassi from the Northern Territories, 15th May. Nkoranzas behaved well [and] gave every assistance. Morris severely wounded, progressing satisfactorily; twelve native soldiers wounded. He was accompanied by Digan, Parmeter, Maguire, Berthon, Garland, Graham. Read convalescent. Remainder of letter of no importance, referring to previous correspondence. Governor of Gold Coast regrets to report that Assistant-Inspector Maguire killed in action 29th May, gallant British officer, much regretted. No further news. Colonel Willcocks, by almost superhuman exertions, pushed up country, and there was continuous fighting. When at Tumsu on July 4th he received a letter from Governor Hodgson saying that with 600 native soldiers under the command of Morris he had managed to leave Kumassi, leaving there 100 native soldiers under Captain Bishop, with rations up to July 15th. Colonel Willcocks undertook to relieve the place by that date, and did so after very severe fighting. Sir F. Hodgson returned to England, and was appointed Governor of Barbadoes. In a Despatch written in England on January 29th, 1901, he placed on record what, in his judgment, were the circumstances which led up to the outbreak. There was, he said, nothing in the reports as to the state of Ashanti to lead him to conclude that his visit was either unsafe or inopportune. The whole course of the outbreakthe collection of warlike stores, the siege of Kumassi, the determined resistance to Colonel Sir James Willcocks made it abundantly clear that there was a predetermined outbreak, secret preparations having been spread over a long period.

But there were other causes for revolt. The Kumassis, the dominant Ashanti tribe, were, I was to discover, smarting under the loss of their king-Prempehwithout having struck a blow in his defence. For Prempeh was their tribal king, besides being King Paramount over the whole of Ashanti. He had been taken from them without a hand having been lifted to save him. The whole incident was a stigma upon the valour of the Kumassi warriors-a stigma which, by native custom and native tradition, blood alone-the blood of the offending white man-could wipe out.

All

Again, the whole system of the country had been changed with the establishment of British rule within their midst. their savage modes of government had been abolished. They were unable to be the proprietors of slaves, they could no longer glory in human sacrifices; they had to provide labour for public works, and they found their country overrun without molestation by strangers engaged in trade and other peaceful occupations. Further, for disobedience they were fined by the Resident, and I learnt after my arrival in Ashanti that this was a cause of dissatisfaction.

The abolition of slavery and human sacrifices was a matter of course upon the occupation of Ashanti, but it was inevitable that there would be discontent in consequence. The West African native holds very tenaciously to ancient customs, and the inability of the Ashantis to obtain slaves seriously interfered with their means of livelihood. They found themselves unable to obtain a sufficient number of labourers to work in the native gold pits and to carry on their farming operations, and further they were, at the same time, called upon by their chiefs, under application from the British Resident, to supply labourers for public purposes, as for example the construction of roads, and the conveyance of Government stores.

The imposition of fines is necessary in connection with the maintenance of authority, and I could not find that the exercise of this system had in any way been abused. The responsibility of fining rests entirely with the Resident, who has not been required to report to the Governor this exercise of power on his part. I became aware of the fact that there was discontent arising from this cause when, on my way to Kumassi, the King of Adansi having made it a matter of complaint when I met him at Kwisa. It was also mentioned to me by Opoku Mensa, the senior member of the Kumassi Native Committee. But for the sudden outbreak of the revolt it was a matter which I should have carefully looked into.

In order to show that the Ashantis had been secretly preparing for revolt, I may mention that Kofi Yami, one of the King of Bekwai's linguists, told me that towards the end of 1898 the Abodoms went to Kumassi to drink fetish with the Kumassi chiefs to fight against the white man. Kofi Yami's remarks, which were made to me during the siege of Kumassi, led me to question the loyal native kings and chiefs who were with me in the fort, and were safely brought down to Accra. I enclose copies of the statements made by the Kings of Mampon, Juabin and Aguna, and by Chiefs Kobina Kokofu and Kobina, Toto.

I will refer to the Golden Stool, about which so much has been said in the newspapers. Very few people seem to realise the political value of a tribal

stool. They regard it as the throne of the reigning chief for the time being and nothing more. But, as a matter of fact, the stool is of far more importance to a tribe than the king or chief who occupies it. To deprive a tribe of its stool is to deprive a king or chief of all power. He cannot enforce his decree or judgments, for he has no stool to sit upon when he delivers them. To deprive a tribe of its stool is a far more severe punishment than to deprive it of its king or head chief, because there is always a person who is known as "next to the chief"-what we should call a deputy chief-who in the absence of the head chief through illness or from any other cause takes his place. The stool is there for the deputy to sit upon, and everything goes forward as usual. So with the golden stool of Ashanti; so long as it remains in the hands of the Ashantis, so long does the power of the kingwhether the king exists or not - remain with them. Mr. Ramseyer, whose knowledge of Ashanti and the Ashantis is perhaps unique, writes about it as follows:

-"Concerning the Golden Stool, your Excellency is right in believing that it would be of the greatest importance to the British Government to get hold of it. . . . the whole history of Ashanti is attached to it, and only the possessor of it is acknowledged as Head or Master of the Ashantis." The Golden Stool is, therefore, a valuable asset to the Colonial Government, and it is a matter for regret that its delivery was not insisted upon in 1896.

Early in December, 1899, the Secretary to the King of Accra, an educated man and a native of repute in Accra, informed me that he had a very important communication to make to me. I gave him an interview, and he brought with him an Ashanti lad-a slave-who, he said, had come to him to see the Governor. The lad's story was that he had been sent by the custodians of the stool to say that they were tired of the work entrusted to them, and would deliver up the stool if a white officer and some Hausas were sent secretly to them on condition that their own lives, which would thus become jeopardised, were protected, and they received a portion of the treasure kept with it. The King's Secretary vouched for the accuracy of the story and showed his belief in it by offering to accompany any detachment of Hausas I might send. The Acting Resident was at this time absent from Kumassi, and I was unable to consult him. Moreover, it did not appear to be necessary to do so, as strict secrecy was essential to success. After careful consideration I decided to make the attempt, and on the 15th January sent a detachment of Hausas, under the command of my private secretary, Captain Armitage. The King's Secretary accompanied it. The attempt failed, as I have already informed you, through the

lad having become frightened and refusing to take the party to the precise spot where the stool was kept. There was no disturbance of any kind, and the party returned to Accra as quietly as it had left. Captain Armitage on his return reported that he had seen quantities of warlike stores in the Kumassi bush villages he had passed through in the Atchima country, and I determined to look further into this matter after my arrival at Kumassi, because it appeared to me that the existence of such stores was a menace to our position in Ashanti. This is the incident to which I referred in paragraph 6 of this letter. Accordingly, on the 29th March, the day after the public palaver with the Ashanti Kings and Chiefs at Kumassi, I despatched a small force under Captains Armitage and Leggett to march through the principal Atchima villages, and to examine into the state of affairs, and to make a full report to me. The instructions I gave are in your (Mr. Chamberlain's) hands, and they include a direction that if the opportunity occurred of obtaining the Golden Stool that opportunity was to be taken, for the force was being sent into the district in which the stool was, by common report, kept. took this step after consultation with the Acting Resident, who saw no objection to it. I learnt later that the Atchima people had only a few days previously not properly received Mr. David, the mining prospector of the Ashanti Company. I enclose a copy of a letter from Mr. David, dated the 17th June, in which he states that he was in the Atchima country from the 20th March (five days before my arrival at Kumassi) to the 27th March, and that at Nkawi the people were so hostile that he dared not stay there. Had I been made aware of this state of things I should assuredly have paused before sending an armed force among people in an excited state, as to do so was to invite conflict. As it was, a conflict occurred which proved to be the commencement of the rebellion.

I

It remains only to add that the Correspondence contains despatches from Colonel Sir James Willcocks and others descriptive of the military operations, and that the Golden Stool has not been given up and that its whereabouts are unknown.

The Report on the Gold Coast for 1900 shows that the Revenue, including that from Ashanti and the Northern Territories, was £333,283, the highest ever raised. Imports were valued at £1,294,963, and the exports at £885,445. There was steady decline in the gold exports, coincident with much activity in prospecting. In the late autumn the Colonial Office issued a public warning that a traffic in bogus concessions was being carried on at the Gold Coast.

Morocco (Tangier) [2,723].-The feature of this Report for 1900 lies in certain remarks by Mr. Vice-Consul MacLeod, of Fez, upon the effects of the French advance to Tuat and Igli:

During the past year political events in Eastern and South-Eastern Morocco have attracted public attention so generally that it may be opportune to touch upon the trade of that district and particularly the date cultivation of Tafilet, which is so important a factor in it, and the probable effect commercially of these events.

Trade with the Tafilet region hitherto has almost wholly been done through Fez. The imports consist almost entirely of cottons from the United Kingdom and French India, sugar from France and Belgium, green tea and candles and a little hardware from the United Kingdom, and, to a very small extent, fine cloth and glassware from Germany, and a trifling amount of silk goods from France.

There is also some trade in Fez local products, such as silk goods, made up cotton garments, native saddlery, and ironware.

The exports consist chiefly of dates, goat-skins, tanned leather, and, to a small extent, slaves. The advent of the French to Tuat and Igli will probably, by curtailing the supply, still further diminish this latter trade.

In my last year's report I indicated in detail the great difficulties and charges to which the above European goods were subjected in reaching Fez. I propose to do the same now in regard to Tafilet trade.

At Fez a sort of "likin" tax of from 5 to 10 per cent. ad valorem is levied on merchandise for Tafilet, and, indeed, for all districts south and south-east of Fez. Transport by mules (the only animals which can carry goods over the 170 miles of rocky road between Fez and Tafilet) costs about 7s. 6d. per cwt., to which has usually to be added about 3s. per cwt. for "satat," a sort of blackmail safe conduct money exacted by the tribes on the road through the failure of the Moorish Government to keep the roads safe.

He shows that the cost of sending dates worth 5s. 6d. from Tafilet to London viâ Morocoo is £1 4s. 8d.

It would seem in the ordinary nature of things that with the occupation of Iglifour days' easy travelling from Tafilet as against ten days' hard journey from Fezand the extension of the Algerian Sahara Railway to that point, which will probably be effected within a year or two, that trade with Tafilet and the Trans-Atlas region generally must inevitably be diverted from Morocco unless the Moorish Government cope with the danger by removing the crushing burdens shown in the foregoing tables, and affording facilities equal to those on the French side.

With high preferential tariffs barring it at Algerian ports on the one hand and all the obstacles alluded to hindering it through Morocco on the other, the prospects of British trade, or indeed any trade except French, with those regions are obviously not at all encouraging, which is the more regrettable seeing that the natives are likely to be considerably enriched by the increase of sale and greater share in the proceeds which the French cheap transport to Europe will afford to their produce.

The saving in cost of transport to Tafilet from, say Oran, as compared with Laraiche or Tangier, and vice versâ, should be about 10s. 6d. per cwt., or, say, 9 per cent. on the first cost of rough cottons imported, and 191 per cent. on the first cost of dates exported.

The French authorities can also, of course, still further enhance the attraction of their trade route by imposing dues far below the 17 per cent. now levied on cottons imported, and 83 per cent. on dates exported, through Morooco. So it is to be hoped that the Moorish Government will, before it is too late, do everything possible to avert such a lapse of trade from its own subjects, and those of all Europe, save France.

Nigeria (Northern). - No Report has been issued on this Protectorate up to the time of going to press with this section; but if one is issued later it will, if possible, be inserted at the end of the book.

The

The general condition of the Protectorate, both as regards finances and prospects of future development, may be considered very satisfactory. In a climate like this, where for more than half the year any real efforts towards opening up country are defeated by the heavy rains, progress must necessarily be slow, although it is probably very sure. very low type of native which inhabits the greater part of the Protectorate is also a factor which has to be considered when taking account of the actual progress made. The natives of the Protectorate, without exception, are conservative to a degree, especially among the older chiefs, and it is with the greatest diffi

culty that improvements of any kind can be introduced amongst them, and the only way by which this has been achieved has been by the use of the greatest patience, energy, and tact. It is needless to say that from time to time punitive action has had to be taken in order to put down wholesale massacres, cannibalism, and closing of trade routes, but such punitive means are never resorted to unless all efforts of a pacific nature have utterly failed. This factor, the conservatism of the people, must also be considered when the work which has been performed in this Protectorate during the nine years of its existence is looked into. The work of opening up inland* from the coast has been slow, and must always be so, for if done in a hurry and with no thought for the welfare and improvement of the people, it would take a very short time for the country to fall back again into its former state.

Ogaden Risings-Murder of Sub-Commissioner Jenner-Somaliland-Expedition against the Mullah, Muhammed Abdullah [Cd. 591; Cd. 597].-On November 25th, 1900, Mr. Acting-Commissioner Ternan reported by telegraph that on 13th November a party of Ogadens had made a night attack on Mr. Sub-Commissioner Jenner, who was engaged on a tour of inspection in Jubaland, and that the escort was cut up and Mr. Jenner himself killed. Lord Lansdowne replied that it was clearly necessary that the offenders must be punished, and offered a contingent of Indian troops from Aden. It appeared that practically all the Ogaden tribe-6,000 fighting men -were in revolt. Colonel Ternan recommended that Kismayu be held, Gobwen and Yonte occupied, and 600 men sent into the interior, 100 to be left at Kumbi, where a supply depôt was to be established, and the remainder sent to attack Afmadu, twentyfive miles further inland, which was the main stronghold of the Ogadens. While arrangements were being made information was obtained of the manner in which Mr. Jenner met his death. Here is the statement of one Hassan Koshen, goat driver:

I was engaged by Mr. Jenner to drive goats on his expedition. There had been no trouble, and we suspected no danger. On Friday, the 16th, at dawn, we were all asleep. Many men rushed into the camp; one man seized me. I saw Mr. Jenner run out of his tent; he was dressed in a large towel which he wore like a loin

* With reference to the expedition against the Aro people in the latter part of 1901 some information about this tribe is given in the POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK of 1899, pp. 8 and 9.

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cloth; he had no pistol, gun, or stick. When Mr. Jenner saw his men being attacked, he tried personally, unarmed as he was, to assist them; he kicked one man, and threw himself on another, bearing him to the ground. Then all the Somalis rushed at him and stabbed him to death. I saw Mr. Jenner's dead body. I saw them carrying his head. They made a great feast, and stayed at that camp all the day. The next morning they divided the stores, and we went to a place I do not know the name of-behind Dereb-I think it is called Jiro. I heard them saying that the number of men who attacked Mr. Jenner was 160. Omar Maghan and Aden Hagel were the chiefs. Omar Maghan had been to see Mr. Jenner while on Safari. I did not see him then, but I heard of it. When we were at Jiro I saw the Sultan Ahamed Maghan. There were many more Ogadens there. The Sultan kept me in that house. The Sultan was not pleased at the men having killed Mr. Jenner.

"Taken down before me at Kismayu, 4th December, 1900. (Signed) WALLACE BLAKE, Her Majesty's Acting Sub-Commissioner. This man's evidence is not absolutely reliable, as through fright, he appears to have lost his senses."

Sir C. Eliot, the Commissioner, having returned to the East African Protectorate, Colonel Ternan was given command of the expedition, and by the end of January had established his headquarters at Yonte. The column occupied Afmadu on February 5th, and on the 7th the Ogaden Sultan surrendered. The enemy retired northward, and the murderers of Mr. Jenner were still

at large. Sir C. Eliot telegraphed from Mombasa on February 21st:

After consultation with Jubaland officials of experience, I recommend that if the murderers are not given up, the Sultan, and also the ten chiefs, should be threatened with deportation, and, perhaps, with death. Question of Sultan's deportation might stand over for consideration if murderers are surrendered.

If there is reason to believe that the Sultan and these chiefs have not sufficient authority to do this themselves, they should be required to guide the expedition, and help it to inflict on the Somalis such damage as will force them, under fear of deportation and death, to surrender the murderers. Sultan will probably act loyally, as will the chiefs.

There is no proof, as far as I know, that Sultan was privy to murder, or that there was any organised revolt; deportation, therefore, I am inclined to think unnecessary. It would please many chiefs, and he may prove a satisfactory ruler, when he has had a good lesson. But he is said to have little authority over his people.

Lord Lansdowne replied on February 22nd:

A report has been received from the Commander of His Majesty's ship Magicienne, according to which the troops are ordered to ration themselves till June. It is desirable that operations should terminate as expeditiously as possible, and the Indian contingent return as soon as it can be dispensed with. His Majesty's Government do not understand, therefore, the motive underlying this order, which appears to imply expectation that expedition will last till then. Reparation in shape of suitable fine or surrender of criminals may be enforced by detention of Sultan and chiefs, or they may be compelled to act as guides. They should not, however, unless they were privy to Jenner's murder, be threatened with death. If there is no early prospect of capturing criminals, Ternan should not continue pursuit, which will certainly be costly, out of proportion to object to be attained, and may be long and fruitless.

Colonel Ternan had followed the Ogadens to a point fifty-seven miles from Afmadu, and there had been sharp fighting-300 of the enemy having been killed or wounded, the British loss being twenty-one killed and sixteen wounded. Colonel Ternan returned to Afmadu and telegraphed following account of the country :

I am unable to report whether further action will be necessary, or whether the heavy losses suffered by the Ogadens will have a decisive result. I propose, in the meantime, to make Afmadu my headquarters.

With regard to the eventual arrangements to be made in connection with the administration of the Jubaland Province, though the permanent occupation of Afmadu would doubtless, for many reasons, have an excellent political effect, the expense incurred by such a course would, perhaps, be out of proportion to the object, besides which there would be very considerable difficulties in maintaining supplies and communication with the coast. A force of 500 men would have to be kept at Afmadu, 200 of whom should be camel corps, and along the lines of communication several posts of not less than one company each would have to be stationed. An almost insuperable difficulty to the establishment of posts and the movements of supply convoys is the lack of water on the road, except during and just after the rainy season.

There is no water, for instance, except a rain-pool-which lasts but a short timefor a distance of forty-seven miles from here (Afmadu), and it is impossible to calculate on the rain in any particular year, though on the rare occasions of heavy rain, the road, which at times is two feet under water, is usually impass