able for camel transport. A very good effect, I am inclined to think, and one which would be almost equivalent to holding Afmadu, would result from the establishment of a post of 300 men, 200 of whom should be camel corps, at Mfudu, a place forty miles distant from here on the Juba River. The post could easily be maintained by water, and this plan would admit of sudden descents being made on troublesome Somalis in the vicinity. If the post be placed a mile and a half from the river, there is no difficulty as regards the tsetse fly at Mfudu. The Ogadens are obliged to take their cattle to graze and water near Yonte in very dry seasons, so that the present Government post there should be maintained: 600 men will be required to garrison Jubaland, including 200 camel corps, if your Lordship approves the above arrangement-namely, the occupation of Mfudu on the Juba River, Kismayu, Yonte, and Gobwen. As Kumbi, the only water-pool of any size between this and Yonte, will probably not last more than a month, and it will, without doubt, be more difficult to move the force down to the coast after that time, I would venture to ask for an early decision.

The peculiar hardships of these operations have been borne by both officers and men in a most cheerful manner, but I would not fail to point out to your Lordship that the heat, unhealthiness, and discomforts of service in Jubaland will undoubtedly necessitate some extra advantages to the British officers detailed to serve there. I must admit that Jubaland is the most desolate wilderness I have personally ever met with, resembling greatly the Taru Desert, and I am of opinion that few, if any, of the officers at present serving here would, under existing circumstances, wish to remain as part of the garrison of the province.

In April Colonel Ternan took the column to Mfudu, and on the 18th of the month described the situation in Jubaland as follows:

Ogadens have not submitted to our terms; but they have received a severe blow, and since then have been quite quiet. If adequate garrison be maintained in Jubaland-that is, 200 camel corps and 400 infantry-they will probably give no trouble in future, and a steady administrative pressure can be maintained,

In a long Despatch Colonel Ternan offered the following remarks:

A steady, continuous pressure exercised on the Ogadens, caused by the presence permanently of an adequate garrison in Jubaland, will have, in my opinion, a much greater effect towards bringing the Ogadens into subjection than occasional

fitful dashes into their country by punitive expeditions, which are lucky if they ever see an Ogaden.

The expedition of 1898 may be said to have had no result. It certainly did not penetrate far into the country, but I very much doubt if the effect of the expedition under my command, which traversed the whole length of the country, will have any but very transitory results, unless backed up by an extension of our authority up the Juba River. It would be useless to endeavour to establish permanent posts off the line of the river.

It must be borne in mind that the Jubaland Ogadens do not live in towns,

or

even villages. They are purely nomadic, owning nothing except their cattle, which are scattered about the country. There is, consequently, no definite object to attack. With an infantry column the chances are greatly against any meeting with the enemy or their cattle at all, as the latter can move at a great pace, and can travel long distances.

It was more by chance than good management that the troops on this occasion came in contact with the Ogadens. If the latter like to keep out of the way they can. On this occasion they took an opportunity of attacking, which seemed exceptionally favourable to themselves. We were a small force, under 300 strong, encamped at a waterless spot, and the bush exactly suited the Ogaden tactics. A definite attack on any body of hostile Ogadens by troops seems out of the question. The choice of meeting or otherwise entirely rests with them; they won't stay to be attacked by infantry, and when they move they take their cattle with them. A camel corps would have a much greater chance of carrying out a successful surprise. Apart from the rapidity with which the camel corps can move over long distances, there is also the great advantage that a camel corps has in this country in that the great water question in their case practically disappears; but even to a camel corps some parts of the bush would be practically impenetrable. With a camel corps no baggage train is necessary.

Sir C. Eliot and Colonel Ternan met at Yonte. As a result Sir C. Eliot telegraphed that Yonte, Mfudu, Kismayu and Gobwen should be garrisoned each with 100 men (excepting Gobwen, 50), and that 100 camel corps of Indian Mahommedans should patrol the country. The Sultan of the Ogadens had promised to pay a fine of 5,000 cattle as indemnity for the murder of Mr. Jenner, whose actual murderer had been killed. Lord Lansdowne concurred as to the fine, but asked for Sir C. Eliot's views as to the occupation of Mfudu or any post in the interior of Jubaland. "Policy

of holding advanced posts seems very questionable, Jubaland being a place of so little value." Sir C. Eliot replied on April 29th:

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 27th April, Jubaland is not, in my opinion, worth the money expended on it; it consists chiefly of scrub and a sandy desert. The only fertile district-which is not, I believe, superior to the banks of the Tana River, is Gosha. I am strongly in favour of leaving the deserts alone for the present, and of devoting our attention to the accessible and profitable parts, unless His Majesty's Government are ready to expend much money on this Protectorate.

I am therefore in favour of holding only Kismayu and Yonte, and am quite willing to abandon Mfudu and all posts in the interior. This will mean, of course, letting the Somalis quarrel among themselves, and that no one must travel without sufficient escort in the interior. "There should be no difficulty in keeping up communication with Mfudu, if necessary, when we have a proper launch. We can probably open up relations with the Boran country, if we ever want to do so, quite as well from Kenia and Ukamba as from Jubaland.

I think, however, that some show of military force should for the next six months be maintained in Jubaland, since we have spent so much money and trouble upon it, in order to impress upon the Somalis the fact that we are not retiring, and that we can send troops to any place that we wish.

I think 300 troops, if properly handled, should suffice for the immediate future.

The final shape taken by the military arrangements is disclosed in the following telegram:

Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess of Lansdowne. -Mombasa, May 3, 1901.

Colonel Ternan and I have discussed your Lordship's telegram, and, subject to your approval, have decided as follows:-The entire Indian contingent, excepting the Aden Camel Corps of 50 men, but including the commissariat, field hospital, etc., will be sent away. Three hundred and fifty Soudanese from the East Africa Rifles will thus be left to us, of whom 100 will be formed into a camel corps and will receive instruction from the Aden Camel Corps, who must remain here until the local corps becomes efficient. We shall require saddlery and equipment for 100 camels, which, unless instructions to the contrary are received, will be ordered from Aden. The 250 Soudanese remaining will constitute a sufficient garrison for Yonte and Kismayu, and also for Mfudu for the present.

A demonstration by the camel corps will take place on the departure of the Indian troops, to prevent the Somalis from thinking that we are retiring. A small mobile corps will, in my opinion, be more efficient that all the Indian troops. Necessary transports have been ordered from India by the Senior Naval officer. Lord Lansdowne concurred in these proposals.

Northern Somaliland-Abyssinian Action.-On April 12th, 1899, Consul-General Sadler sent a despatch from Berbera regarding the doings of a Mullah who was collecting arms and men with the object of establishing his authority over the southeastern portion of the Northern Somaliland Protectorate, and ultimately of heading a religious expedition against the Abyssinians :

This Haji Muhammad Abdullah belongs to the Habr Suleiman Ogaden tribe; he married into the Dolbahanta Ali Gheri, amongst whom he now lives. His place of residence is Kob Fardod, a village inhabited by Mullahs, a day's march east of Kerritt, and distant about 170 miles from Berbera. He is a man in the prime of life, and in person is described as dark-coloured, tall, and thin, with a small goat's beard. He has made several pilgrimages to Mecca during the last three years. At Mecca he attached himself to the sect of Muhammad Salih, whose deputy he claims to be in Somaliland.

This sect was established in Berbera about twelve years ago. It preaches more regularity in the hour of prayer, stricter attention to the forms of religion, and the interdiction of Kat-a leaf the Arabs and coast Somalis are much addicted to chewing, on account of its strengthening and intoxicating properties. This teaching has not found much favour with the people of the town. It has been known for some time that Haji Muhammad Abdullah had acquired considerable influence over the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the remoter parts of the Protectorate, but hitherto it had always been thought that this influence had been exerted for good; he settled disputes amongst the tribes in his vicinity, kept them from raiding each other, and was generally thought to be on the side of law and order. Several communications had passed between him and the Vice-Consul (Berbera), all written in proper terms, and three months ago he sent a prisoner into Berbera, against whom a complaint had been laid of robbery and violence in the interior.

Inquiries were at once set on foot to ascertain what the rumours and reports concerning this individual meant, on what they were founded, and what his

possible intentions might be. The result, and his own communications made within the last few days to the ViceConsul, leave no room to doubt but that he is now organising a religious movement antagonistic to the Administration.

Consul-General Sadler's conclusion was that the best course seemed to be to leave the Mullah alone for the present, "letting the movement subside of itself if it will." It did not subside. King Menelek considered the advisability of sending an Abyssinian expedition against the Mullah, and arrangements were discussed for sending an Indian force to dislodge him from Burao. But the danger passed by for a time. In November, however, the accounts from the Dolbahanta country were extremely unsatisfactory, and Abyssinian troops entered the Ogaden region. In March, 1900, there was fighting between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces, or tribes in sympathy with them,and though,according to the Abyssinian version, the Mullah was badly defeated, the movement of the latter grew in strength. The position in October, 1900, may be judged roughly from the following paragraphs from a Despatch by Consul-General Sadler, dated October 26th :

It is reported that in the attack by the Mullah on the Habr Awal living in Abyssinian territory near Jiga Jiga last month 220 of the Habr Awal, including women and children, were killed and 63 karias were looted; 130 of the Mullah's people were said to have been killed. Not content with looting, the Mullah resorted to atrocities, burning the karias, throwing children into the flames, and cutting off the breasts of women. With such acts

as these before us, it is not to be wondered at that the tribes have lost patience, and have prepared to act on their own accord. The situation will show that it is impossible to dispense with the half-battalion of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment till we have other means of protecting our territory. It is matter of common report that had it not been for the presence of this force in the Protectorate, and a strong post at Hargaisa, that place would have been attacked and sacked.

Some months ago the Emperor Menelek asked for our co-operation in quashing the Mullah. Her Majesty's Government were then averse from entering into any further military entanglements, in view of the necessity for the employment of forces elsewhere. I have always been loath to make any suggestions which would entail our committing ourselves to military operations in the Ogaden, but if the conditions are now more favourable for entertaining Menelek's proposal, I think it is worth serious consideration whether it would not

be better to take steps in conjunction with Abyssinia to suppress the Mullah's movement in the Ogaden at once rather than continue the present situation. So long as the Mullah is allowed to retain undisturbed possession of the Ogaden, our tribes are subject to constant raids and loot, our trade with the Ogaden is at a standstill, the maintenance of peace and order inside the Protectorate is daily becoming more difficult, and we are compelled to keep troops to guard against a possible invasion of our territory.

In my despatch of the 5th August last I reported that the situation in the Protectorate, owing to the Mullah's movement, had become intolerable, and might become critical. The situation has continued such ever since.

If we cannot take steps to move actively against the Mullah, we shall either have to resort to expensive measures to protect our tribes and frontier, or else have recourse to the dangerous experiment of issuing a large number of fire-arms to our tribes to assist them to protect themselves. Neither of these measures would strike at the root of the evil, and in the meanwhile disorder would be rife in the southern portions of the Protectorate, and our trade with the countries south of our border would remain completely suspended.

On November 16th Lord Lansdowne authorised the levy of 1,000 Somalis (increased later to 1,500), and suggested the measures to be concerted between the Abyssinians and the British forces. LieutenantColonel Harrington informed the Foreign Office from Harrar on November 29th:

There is no doubt in my mind that the Abyssinians have no intention of taking any action single-handed against the Mullah. The situation in the Protectorate is becoming intolerable, and delay tends to increase the Mullah's following to such an extent that a costly expedition may be eventually needed, whereas at present a small Somali levy, with the assistance of the friendly tribes, should suffice to put an end to the troubles due to the Mullah. Failing combined action with the Abyssinians, should the Mullah's raids into our Protectorate be repeated, and his interference with the Ogaden trade continue, we shall be obliged to insist on the Abyssinians suppressing him, he being in their territory, a course which might lead to results much more serious than any expedition against the Mullah would be.

April was decided upon as the best season for the operations, and the command was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. On January 29th, 1901, Lord Cromer telegraphed from Cairo:

I received last night the following tele

non

gram from Colonel Harrington, dated the 23rd instant :-"I have arranged with King Menelek that for the purposes of the expedition to be made against the Mullah, the frontier shall be regarded as existent; our force will thus be able to follow him wherever he goes. An Abyssinian officer will be appointed to accompany our force, and we are invited to detail an officer to accompany theirs. Further details are left to be arranged by Swayne and the Head of the Abyssinian force when they meet. It is desirable that Swayne should arrive as soon as possible, as delay on our part is liable to misconstruction."

Major the Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy was attached to the Abyssinian force. By March 15th the Abyssinians had driven the Mullah into the Dolbahante country (within the British Protectorate). On April 5th Colonel Swayne took his column of Somali levies to Burao. The documents conclude with the following telegram from Consul-General Sadler to the Foreign Office:—

Both

Latest reports from Swayne are:"Expedition reached Sanala, one day south-east of Eldab, on 1st June, having captured 3,500 of enemy's live-stock. He left on 2nd with main body against Mullah's camp at Yahel, leaving 300 men under Macneill to guard zariba at Sanala. Since then Sharp reports from Burao on 9th that two attacks made on Macneill's zariba by 500 horse and 1,500 foot. attacks repulsed. At 9 A.M. on 3rd, determined attack by largely increased force made by Mullah on Macneill. This was finally repelled with loss to enemy of from 400 to 500; 141 dead left outside zariba. Our casualties 10 of levy killed, 9 wounded. Up to the 4th nothing further happened at Sanala. Messengers report Mullah cleared; where not known. Swayne has got between Mullah and his camp, news of decisive action should soon be received."

As

number of natives in the country :-East Loangwa District, 60,000; West Loangwa District, 10,000; North Loangwa District, 16,000; Tanganyika District, 34,000; Mweru District, 90,000; Awemba District, 30,000; Luapula District, 15,000; Kafue District, 15,000; Zumbo District, 30,000; total, 300,000.

There are no European settlements as yet of any importance. Fort Jameson, the administration capital, has a population of some 40 Europeans, and is the headquarters of the African TransContinental Telegraph Company and the North Charterland Exploration Company. A substantial and pretty little township has arisen, and is rapidly increasing. Fife and Abercorn, on the Tanganyika Plateau, have each a European population of from 10 to 15 persons, and still smaller settlements are found at Kituta and Sumbu, on Lake Tanganyika, at Chienji, on Lake Mweru, and at Kasama, in the Awemba country.

The general route to North-Eastern Rhodesia is by the Zambesi and Shire Rivers and Lake Nyassa. A good route, via Tete, has recently been opened, with the intention of serving the southern portion of the territory. In addition to the navigable lakes, the Luapula River is navigable from Bangweolo to Johnston Falls, and from Johnston Falls to Lake Mweru; the Chambesi for some 80 miles from Bangweolo; the Upper Zambesi, for the whole stretch that borders on NorthEastern Rhodesia, and the Loangwa, at varying and uncertain parts of its lower waters. Except on the Luapula, where the Mweru craft ply when required, there are no river vessels other than canoes, and no great use has hitherto been made of these waterways. On Lake Tanganyika there are, in addition to a number of boats and barges and to one sailing vessel belonging to the London Missionary Society, several steamers owned as follows: the German Government, one; the African Lakes Corporation, one; the Katanga Company, one; the Tanganyika Concessions Company, one (building). On Lake Mweru there are three steel sailing boats, one steam launch, the property of the Africa Lakes Corporation, and one small steamer, building for the Katanga Company.

Carriers' paths exist in nearly every part of the country, being made by merely widening the ordinary native footpath. Wagon roads run from Nyala to Abercorn, across the Tanganyika Plateau, 160 miles; from Fort Jameson to Chimwala's, on the Portuguese border, 90 miles; from Fort Jameson westwards to Msoro, 60 miles, and eastwards to the Protectorate boundary, 20 miles. Various other trunk roads are in course of construction.

Mails are received and despatched through the postal service of the British Central Africa Protectorate, at Karonga,

Kota-kota, and Domira Bay, on Lake Nyassa. There is a comprehensive internal postal system.

The African Trans-Continental Telegraph runs from Umtali in Southern Rhodesia to Tete, from Tete to Blantyre and Zomba, and through the British Central Africa Protectorate to Karonga, at the north end of Lake Nyassa, and thence across the Tanganyika Plateau to Lake Tanganyika, and northwards into German East Africa. There is also a branch line from Lake Nyassa to Fort Jameson. Telegraph offices are established in North-Eastern Rhodesia at Fort Jameson, Nyala, Fife, Abercorn, and Kituta.

Fort Jameson is the headquarters of the administration, which is carried on by the British South Africa Company in accordance with the terms of the Charter and the provisions of "The North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899," through an administrator, assisted by magistrates, civil commissioners, and native commissioners. For administrative purposes North Eastern Rhodesia is divided into nine fiscal and magisterial districts, which are in turn sub-divided into native divisions.

Rhodesia (Southern) Expenditure and Revenue [Cd. 667].-This document contains financial statements since 1899. It shows that for the year ending March 31st, 1899, the expenditure was £786,873 2s. 5d., and that the British South Africa Company advanced a sum of £500,144 15s. 9d. to meet deficit. For the year ending March 31st, 1900, the expenditure was £729,922 3s. 10d., and the British South Africa Company's advance to meet deficit £363,543 9s. 10d. The estimate for the year ending March 31st, 1901, showed a grand total of expenditure £5,127, a final total of £781,217. the estimated revenue was £426,800. £776,190, and a supplementary estimate of expenditure for the year ending March 31st, 1902, showed a grand total of £738,582, and of revenue £469,000-a deficit of £269,582.

And

The

Sierra Leone and Protectorate [Cd. 431].-The Report of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. J. C. Gore, for 1900, shows a revenue of £168,668, and an expenditure of £156,421. The receipts for the Protectorate amounted to £33,468, of which the House or Hut tax contributed £30,046. The imports for 1900 were of the value of £558,271, and exports £362,741. The moral of the Report is that the natives in the Protectorate are settling down to the payment of the Hut tax, and that the colony is recovering from the revolt due to that cause [see POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK, 1900].

Sierra Leone and Ascension Telegraphs [254].-An Agreement was made on June 22nd, 1901, between His Majesty's Government and the Eastern Telegraph Company which is sufficiently declared in the following Treasury Minute:-

My Lords have before them an Agreement, dated the 22nd June, 1901, with the Eastern Telegraph Company for the construction, laying, maintenance and working of a submarine cable between Sierra Leone and Ascension.

Telegraphic communication by the West Coast route between this country and South Africa has hitherto been carried on by cables running from Porthcurno in Cornwall to Lisbon, Madeira, St. Vincent (Cape Verde Islands), Bathurst, Sierra Leone, Accra, Loanda and other places on the West Coast of Africa, to Cape Town. The growth of traffic with South Africa rendered a more direct route desirable, and in the course of last year the Eastern Telegraph Company laid a new line from Porthcurno to Cape Town, touching only at Madeira, St. Vincent, Ascension and St. Helena. While negotiations were taking place with the Company respecting the grant of landing licences for this cable, and the rates to be charged for the transmission of messages over it, My Lords were pressed upon strategic grounds to arrange for the establishment of direct communication with the important naval station of Sierra Leone, and they accordingly introduced this matter into the negotiations, with the result that the Company ultimately agreed to establish the desired communication by a spur line between Ascension and Sierra Leone for a subsidy of £4,500 per annum for 20 years.

This arrangement is embodied in the Agreement now before them. The Agreement provides for the working of the cable by British staff, the landing of its shore ends within the fortresses of Sierra Leone and Ascension if required, and the connection of the existing cables at Sierra Leone and Ascension. Three months are to be allowed for repairs, with power to the Treasury to extend the period upon good cause shown. Maximum rates are fixed for messages passing over the line.

My Lords approve of the terms of the Agreement.

Uganda Protectorate - Sir H. H. Johnston's Report [Cd. 671].-Sir H. H. Johnston, His Majesty's Special Commissioner on the Protectorate of Uganda, sent to the Foreign Office on July 11th, 1901, his Special Report on the Uganda Protectorate. After a brief historical sketch of Ugandaan ancient kingdom of considerable stability, which has been ruled for several hundred years by a single dynasty-Sir H. H. Johnston reviews the rebellion and the