Waima and "Sergent Malamine" Incidents [Cd. 673]. The following Convention between the United Kingdom and France referring to arbitration the settlement of differences in connection with the Waïma and "Sergent Malamine" incidents, was signed at Paris, April 3rd, 1901. Ratifications exchanged at Paris, July 17th, 1901:

The Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the French Republic, having agreed to settle by arbitration the "Sergent Malamine" and Waïma incidents, have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Edmund Monson, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the President of the French Republic; and

The President of the French Republic, his Excellency M. Th. Delcassé, Deputy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic;

Who, duly authorized for that purpose, have agreed upon the following Articles: Article I.-The Arbitrator shall give a final decision:

1. In regard to the amount of the indemnity for the British victims in the Waïma affair to be paid by the French Government.

2. In regard to the amount of the indemnity for the loss of the "Sergent Malamine" to be paid by the British Government; this amount shall neither be less than £5,000 nor more than £8,000.

Article II.-In order to enable the Arbitrator to pronounce his decision, each of the two Parties shall, within the space of two months from the exchange of the ratifications of the present Convention, furnish him with a Memorandum on the question which such Party, as plaintiff, submits to him. To this Memorandum shall be annexed all such documents as shall be considered necessary, a statement of facts and an assessment of damages, &c.

Article III.-After the lapse of the period fixed in Article II., each of the Parties shall have a further period of two months within which to furnish the Arbitrator, if it is considered necessary, with a reply to the allegations made by the other Party.

Article IV. After a third delay of two months, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to furnish the Arbitrator with a counterreply.

Article V.-The Arbitrator shall have the right to ask for such explanations from the Parties as he may deem necessary, and shall decide any questions not foreseen by the arbitral procedure, and any incidental points which may arise.

Article VI.-The costs of the Arbitration as fixed by the Arbitrator shall be equally divided between the Contracting Parties.

Article VIII. — The Arbitrator shall decide within a maximum delay of six months, to date from the handing in of the first Memoranda, or, as the case may be, of the replies or of the counter-replies.

Article IX.-The Memorandum, and, as the case may be, the reply and the counter-reply of each Party, as well as the documents annexed to them, printed and in French, shall be handed to the Arbitrator, and shall be at once communicated by him to the other Party.

Article X.-This Convention, on the completion of the legal formalities, shall be ratified by the two Governments, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Paris as soon as possible. In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have drawn up the present Convention and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the 3rd of April, 1901.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON (L.S.); (Signé) DELCASSÉ (L.S.)

Zanzibar and Pemba-Slavery Question [Cd. 593].-Sir Arthur H. Hardinge, on April 9th, 1900, transmitted the Reports of Mr. Last and Archdeacon Farler, the two Commissioners of Zanzibar and Pemba respectively, on the working of the Decree abolishing the legal status of slavery. The Reports were not published until May, 1901. Sir A. Hardinge, in a covering Despatch, said:

and that a marked increase is visible as compared with the previous corresponding period an increase which is likely to be sustained in each succeeding year.

There are only two or three points in connection with these Reports to which I would venture to draw attention.

The first is the gradual supercession of the Walis as administrators of the Decree. The original idea, which found expression in its text, was that it should be administered entirely by native agencies, that the European Commissioners should supervise and report on its working, and suggest improvements where these appeared necessary, but should not interfere directly as judges. The force of circumstances, however, rather than any actual pressure from without, has led the Walis more and

more to throw the administration of the Decree into European hands. They began by seeking advice, and constantly referring all cases as to which they felt doubt to Mr. Farler, Mr. Last, and Sir Lloyd Mathews.

The next step was, in Pember, for the Commissioner to be invited to sit as Judge with the Wali, who gradually left the whole business of his Court, in so far as it related to slavery questions, in his hands, and in Zanzibar, for the Walis' Courts to send up every claim for com. pensation to the capital, and thus practically to transfer its investigation and decision, including the examination of slaves, owners, and witnesses, to Mr. Alexander.

This development was certainly not contemplated by the framers of the Decree, and from some points of view it is to be regretted; but although it has been purely spontaneous, and from within, it ought, I think, to remove the objections of those abolitionists who disliked from the first the idea of the measure being worked by presumably interested slave-owners, and pressed for more direct European control.

A second point which appears to be deserving of notice is the curious fluctuation described by Archdeacon Farler in the numbers of the slaves freed in the different quarters of the year. Your Lordship will observe that the number of applicants for letters of freedom was much greater in the dry than in the rainy seasons, and fell again during the periods of harvest. This should, I think, conclusively prove that the comparatively small number of such applicants, in relation to the total slave population, since the issue of the Decree, which has disappointed the abolitionists at home, is due to other causes than ignorance of its provisions, fear of claiming freedom, or deliberate hindrances placed in the way of claimants by obstructive or unsympathetic officials. If in the month of January slaves were freed at the rate of 300 a month, whilst only 100 a month claimed their freedom in April, this fact would seem to show that economic causes, altogether independent of external influence, must be regulating the transition from a labour system based on servitude to a labour system based on contract.

A third point which Mr. Last brings out very strongly in his Report, and which, though touched upon, has not, I think, received the same attention before, is the contempt, almost amounting to social ostracism, with which a large section of the slaves themselves regard those of their own class who obtain their freedom from European officials, in defiance of the Mahommedan law. The position of the slaves thus freed, who are known by the special name of "Mateka" in the eyes of their Mahommedan com

patriots, may be compared, especially in the case of concubines, with that of divorced persons in strict Catholic Societies who have obtained divorces from the civil Tribunals in violation of the laws of the Church. It is probable that this prejudice will decrease every year, just as in Europe the sentiment against divorce and the remarriage of divorced persons is diminishing as these practices become commoner; though it must be borne in mind that Mahommedan and, indeed, all Oriental Societies are far more conservative than Christian ones, and that our experience in India and Egypt has shown how slowly the introduction of European ideas and general intercourse with Europeans has affected the cherished customs and beliefs of the great mass of the native population. On the whole, 1 anticipate, if the Decree is allowed to work as it has worked in the past, that there will be a steady, but not a rapid or startling increase every year in number of persons who prefer the status of freedom, with all its risks and disadvantages, to the ignoble security of servitude, but that a very long period will elapse before it will be possible to say that a class of persons calling themselves by choice rather than compulsion slaves, and labouring in virtue of tenure as opposed to contract, has entirely ceased

to exist.

the

The document also contains the Reports of the Commissioners for 1900. Mr. Last (Zanzibar) reported that the greater number of slaves preferred to remain where and what they were; but artisans, mechanics, and others who had a calling of their own, saw the advantage to be gained by freedom on account of their own personal ability to earn a fair living :

The actual number of slaves freed in the Commissioner's Court during the past year is 1,126. Of these 580 are males and 546 females, as will be seen from the inclosed Appendix No. 1. Slaves came up for freedom in greater numbers during the first quarter of the year than they did during the remaining months. Some of the causes for this difference are already explained in this Report, and for the summer months of the year, this being the time of plenty, and the people being engaged on their own plots of land, they would not be so eager to seek for freedom.

Of the 1,126 slaves freed, 867, or 77 per cent., were born on the mainland of Africa, the remaining 259, or 23 per cent., were born in Zanzibar Island. Slaves born on the Island of Zanzibar are called "Wazalia." These 1,126 slaves were of 40 different African tribes, being chiefly taken from the following six tribes: Mhyao, Muyassa, Manyuema, Muyamwezi, Mgindo, and Mzaramu. These six

tribes supplied 885 slaves, or 73 per cent. of the number freed during the year. This tends to show that by far the greater part of the slaves brought into Zanzibar came from the Central Lakes regions-the numbers taken from the tribes living near the coast being comparatively few.

It is interesting to note how the native mind is attracted to town rather than to a country life. This is what might be expected, for the native in almost every part of Africa-certainly in East and Central Africa-prefer to live in welldefined towns or in considerable numbers together, rather than in huts scattered singly over the country. The native likes a noise and plenty of attractions; these can be had where there are numbers living together. Hence his liking to live in a town and his preference of Zanzibar as being the most attractive place.

Of those freed during the past year 411 males and 371 females, or 69 per cent., elected to live in Zanzibar town, and 169 males and 176 females, or 31 per cent., chose to go into the country. Generally it is the aged male and female slaves who, having spent all their life so far in the plantations, doing garden and similar work, prefer to return to it again rather than to make a fresh start in a new mode of life.

Regarding the state of the slaves after being freed, everything depends upon themselves. If they wish for employment, there is generally employment to be found, and one and all can earn a living wage; but amongst a number there is always some who object to work. These will suffer for their lack of energy, or else they will be a source of trouble to the Government and community through their endeavours to live by their wits.

The number of slaves freed in Pemba in 1900 was 230 males and 329 females, a total of 559. The Commissioner thinks the condition and prospects of Pemba are fairly satisfactory:—

The freed slaves can, by cultivating their own large plots, and earning money by extra work, obtain a very good living, food being remarkably cheap for them at the present time. In fact, they are well clothed, well fed, and, if constant merriment means happiness, they are happy and without a care. I consider their condition far superior in physical comfort to that of European labourers.

There is no doubt but that the Government has been amply justified in proceeding slowly and cautiously in the emancipation of the slaves. We now see the advantages of it in every way, for as the slaves are freed, with few exceptions, they settle steadily on the land, and will form a most valuable agricultural population in the future.

Had the Government listened to the excited and hysterical anti-slavery cries

of young and very inexperienced agents working in certain Missions, there is no doubt but that the future prospect for the island would have been dark indeed, and we should now be in the same depressed condition that the West Indies were after their sudden emancipation. Labour would have been utterly disorganised, and the land filled with vagrants and squatters leading idle and useless lives, while the plantations and industries of the country would have been ruined.

SOUTH AFRICA.

Documents Relating to the WarPolitical Situation-Lord Milner's Despatch [Cd. 420].-Under this heading will be found a continuation of the analysis of documents which appeared in the POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK for 1901. No further Papers were issued until April, 1901, when a batch of Correspondence was sent out [Cd. 420], ranging from March, 1900, to April 8th, 1901, concluding with a request from Lord (then Sir A.) Milner to be allowed leave of absence, and an authorisation to him to take such leave. The most important communication in the series is a general review of the situation by the High Commissioner, dated February 6th, 1901. It was no use denying, he said, that the last half-year had been one of retrogression. Seven months before Cape Colony was perfectly quiet at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority, and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly government and the pursuits of peace.

To-day the scene is completely altered. It would be superfluous to dwell on the increased losses to the country caused by the prolongation of the struggle, and by the form which it has recently assumed. The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through which they pass, not only taking all the food they can lay hands upon on the farms, grain, forage, horses, cattle, &c., but looting the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, sugar, &c., of all which they are in great need. Our forces,

on their side, are compelled to denude the country of everything movable, in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No doubt a considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not wholly lost, but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are now being established at many points along the railway lines. But even under these circumstances, the loss is great, through animals dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live upon when collected in large numbers at the camps.

Indeed, the loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard. I say this not at all as an advocate of such destruction. I am glad to think that the measure is now seldom, if ever, resorted to. At the same time, the destruction of even & considerable number of farms, having regard to the very rough and inexpensive character of the majority of these structures in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal, is a comparatively small item in the total damage caused by the war to the agricultural community.

To the losses incidental to the actual course of the campaign, there has recently been added destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character. I refer to the injury done to the head-gear, stamps, and other apparatus of some of the outlying mines by Boer raiders, whose sole object was injury. For this destruction there is, of course, no possible excuse. It has no reason or justification in connection with military operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of civilised warfare. It is to be hoped that the miscreants who were guilty of these acts may turn out to be, for the most part, not burghers of the Transvaal (except, possibly, some of the lowest class), but members of the Rand proletariat, belonging to various European nationalities, who, being intensely antiBritish to begin with, have now taken to the veldt, since they find that illicit liquor, gold thieving, and other similar profitable professions of the "good old times

are

no longer available as means of gaining a livelihood. Be that as it may, the loss inflicted by such outrages will fall on the Boer agriculturist no less than on the British and other European industrial and commercial classes. Directly or indirectly, all South Africa, including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the mines-and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal. To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after the ravages of war.

Fortunately the damage done to the mines has not been large, relatively, to the vast total amount of the fixed capital

sunk in them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard against purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, because it is, so to speak, "all length and no breadth❞—one long thin line, stretching across the country from east to west for many miles. Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only possible successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids hitherto made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the single mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is estimated that the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the most important. These facts may afford some indication of the ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out. However serious in some respects may have been the military consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it.

The events of the last six or seven months will involve a greater amount of repair and a longer period of recuperation, especially for agriculture, than anybody could have anticipated when the war commenced. Yet, for all that, having regard to the fact that both the Rand and Kimberley are virtually undamaged, and that the main engines of prosperity, when once set going again, will not take very long to get into working order, the economic consequences of the war, though grave, do not appear by any means appalling. The country population will need a good deal of help, first to preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the great industry of the country will need some little time before it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with great recuperative powers, it will not take many years before the economic ravages of the war are effaced.

What is more serious to my mind than the mere material destruction of the last six months is the moral effect of the recrudescence of the war. I am thinking especially of the Orange River Colony, and of that portion of the Transvaal which fell so easily into our hands after the relief of Mafeking, that is to say, the country lying between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the border of Bechuanaland. Throughout this large area the feeling in the middle of last year was

undoubtedly pacific. The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in the new régime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was better than I have ever known it. The rebellious element had blown off steam in an abortive insurrection, and was glad to settle down again.

If it had been possible for us to screen those portions of the conquered territory, which were fast returning to peaceful pursuits, from the incursions of the enemy still in the field, a great deal of what is now most deplorable in the condition of South Africa would never have been experienced. The vast extent of the country, the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long advance, first to Pretoria and then to Komati Poort, resulted in the country already occupied being left open to raids, constantly growing in audacity, and fed by small successes, on the part of a few bold and skilful guerilla leaders who had nailed their colours to the mast.

The reappearance of these disturbers of the peace, first in the south-east of the Orange River Colony, then in the southwest of the Transvaal, and finally in every portion of the conquered territory, placed those of the inhabitants who wanted to settle down in a position of great difficulty. Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had undertaken to resist the pressure of their old companions in arms when these reappeared among them, appealing to their patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from the temptation to commit it.

The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same severity with which, I believe, any other nation would have treated them. Entitled, as we were, by the universally recognised rules of war, to shoot the men who, having once been

prisoners in our hands, and having been released on a distinct pledge to abstain from further part in the war, had once more taken up arms against us, we never in a single instance availed ourselves of that right. But as our columns swept through the revolted country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even with treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no doubt in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men who had actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was augmented by the evacuation, necessary, for military reasons, of & number of places such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had actually established a reasonably satisfactory Civil Administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the general demoralization, and to afford places of refuge for those willing to submit, by establishing camps, along the railway lines, to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their stock, for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts. Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us. But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at any of the numerous commandoes roaming about the country, a good many of their less willing members will find their way to one or other of these camps, in order to avoid further fighting.

As the guerilla warfare swept back over the whole of the Western Transvaal, and practically the whole of the Orange River Colony, its effect upon the Cape Colony also became very marked. There was a time, about the middle of last year, when the bulk of the Dutch population in the Cape Colony, even those who had been most bitter against us at the outset, seemed disposed to accept the fait accompli, and were prepared to acquiesce in the union of all South Africa under the British flag. Some of them even began to see certain advantages in such a consummation. The irreconcilable line taken in the Cape Parliament, during its recent Session from July to October, was a desperate effort to counteract this tendency. But I doubt whether it would have succeeded to the moderate extent to which it has, had it not been for the recrudescence of the war on the borders of the Colony, and the embittered character which it assumed. Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the

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