penalty' in the Note. Lord Lansdowne having taken one step for the sake of unity by getting rid of the words, in the belief that the substituted phrase provided for the thing he wanted, found himself compelled, if harmony was to be preserved, to take a further step and allow the most guilty of the nobles to escape. Li Hung Chang manipulated the Concert through M. de Giers, the Russian Minister, proposing life imprisonment for Prince Tuan, suicide for Prince Chang, decapitation for Yu-Hsien, degradation and heavy punishment afterwards for Tung-fu-Hsiang, and banishment to military posts for Duke Lan and others. Lord Lansdowne then tried to get the death sentence at least placed on record for all of them. But the other Powers named would not hear of it, and declined altogether to demand the death of Prince Tuan and Duke Lan. After that Lord Lansdowne had 'no further remarks to make' concerning these two persons. Eventually China agreed that Prince Tuan was to be imprisoned' for life in Eastern Turkestan, and that Duke Lan was to bear the like punishment. The upshot of the haggling for heads was that Prince Tuan-the principal author of the Boxer movement, of the edicts against foreigners which led to the massacres, and notably those in Shansi, of the siege of the Legations, and of the murder of Baron Ketteler-and his almost equally guilty partner, the Duke Lan, escaped the full consequences of their crimes.

"It would be futile to unravel the negotiations for the punishment of certain provincial authorities, some of whom personally directed the massacres in their districts. Generally, it may be said that the Concert was less desirous of exacting the death penalty than was Lord Lansdowne and Germany-Russia from motives of policy and the United States from those of 'humanity.' The Foreign Secretary found himself checkmated by disinclination on the part of those from whom strong support might have been expected. It cannot be pretended that the measure of punishment awarded to the guilty Princes and officials is anything but ludicrously inadequate; but that is neither the fault of Lord Lansdowne nor of the Emperor William. The former was in much the same position as that in which Lord Salisbury found himself when he endeavoured to obtain the punishment of those who caused the massacres in Armenia and in Constantinople; all that was done to punish the Sultan was to refuse to decorate the Embassies on his birthday. But where Lord Salisbury failed, his successor, in conditions roughly analogous, can scarcely be criticised for not having succeeded. Lord Lansdowne, at least, exhibited a keen consciousness of the necessity of such punishment as would, so far as human judgment could see, be adequate for the prevention of colossal crimes such as had been committed; but the cynicism, timidity, or 'humanity' of the Powers other than Germany proved too much for him.

"In resisting Russian aggression in Manchuria Lord Lansdowne appears to have felt that he was under no obligation to shape his course in conformity with the principle that at almost any cost the Concert must be kept

together. His action shows courage, decision, inflexibility of purpose. He pressed his arguments to their logical conclusion-and he won. Once again has Russia beaten a diplomatic retreat when firmly confronted. The success is an important one, for Lord Lansdowne achieved it amid conditions which made the risk of a collision with Russia, and the cataclysmic events which might follow such a disaster, doubly dangerous for Great Britain if her military and financial commitments in South Africa are taken into account. It is difficult to see how war could have been avoided if Russia had not given way. An outline of the facts concerning the Russo-Chinese Agreement as to Manchuria is necessary-a brief sketch sufficient only to show the gravity of the crisis and the spirit in which Lord Lansdowne acted. The reader will remember that Russia gave most formal and profuse assurances that she sought no ulterior objects in China, and had no other aim than that of maintaining the Concert, of preserving the integrity of China, and of restoring the Central Government at Peking. Whether these protestations deluded the Foreign Office or not, the fact is incontestable that it was from Dr. Morrison, the Times' Correspondent at Peking, and not from his own agents, that Lord Lansdowne learned that Russian practice did not accord with Russian pledges. In the press of the negotiations with the Peace Plenipotentiaries as to punishments and an indemnity—at the very time when the solidarity of the Concert against the criminous Chinese Government should have been maintained-Russia was secretly negotiating with China an agreement which would have given her important preferential rights against us in Manchuria. Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir C. Scott, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to make unofficial inquiries on the subject of the Times' telegram. These came to nothing, and Sir C. Scott threw cold water on Dr. Morrison's message. But this did not satisfy Lord Lansdowne. Being apprehensive that questions would be asked when Parliament met, he instructed Sir C. Scott, on January 22nd last, to ascertain from Count Lamsdorff, whilst avoiding any appearance of demanding an explanation of the Russian proceedings,' what answer should be made. Count Lamsdorff took his courage in both hands. It was quite untrue,' he told Sir C. Scott, that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in concluding, with China,' a Convention giving Russia new rights in Manchuria. The rumour to the contrary must have arisen from the measures taken by the Russian generals, in conjunction with the local civil authorities, against the recurrence of disturbances, and for the protection of the Port Arthur Railway. The Emperor had no intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances permitted.

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That was the Russian tale on February 6th. Lord Lansdowne acted as though he did not believe it, warning China against making any agreement of a territorial or financial character with any Power, and persuading Germany, the United States and Japan to give a like admonition. His next

b

step was to submit to Count Lamsdorff the text of the Agreement, which had been obligingly communicated by the Viceroy at Hankow, who disliked it. Count Lamsdorff would neither discuss this text nor supply a copy of his own. He took up the position that the question of Manchuria was quite apart from the questions being negotiated with China by the Powers in Concert. Meanwhile the Chinese Government took alarm at the warnings and pleaded for mediation as against Russia, on the ground that the Agreement vitiated Chinese Sovereignty in Manchuria. To Count Lamsdorff's mind this presented itself as a contemptible manœuvre by China to sow dissensions among the Powers; but Russia set about modifying the Agreement, and stipulated for signature by China on a certain date. The Emperor of China appealed by Edict to Lord Lansdowne either to help him out of the dilemma or obtain an extension of time, 'otherwise we, being in a great difficulty, will be unable to oppose Russia further.' Lord Lansdowne repeated the warning to China against separate Agreements, and Sir C. Scott plied Count Lamsdorff with reasons showing that even the modified Agreement was inconsistent with our Treaty rights. At length (on April 5th), as China would not sign, the Russian Government communicated a Memorandum withdrawing the Agreement. The tone of injured dignity in the second of the two paragraphs of this Memorandum is delightful:

'It appears from information which has been received that under present circumstances an Agreement of this nature, instead of serving as manifest proof of the amicable sentiments of Russia towards China, might occasion grave difficulties for the latter. Therefore the Imperial Ministry not only do not insist with the Chinese Government on the conclusion of the arrangement, but even refuse to enter upon further negotiations on the subject, and, with unswerving adherence to the programme which they have pursued from the beginning, will await with calm the development of events.'

"Great must have been the relief of Lord Lansdowne and of the Cabinet at receiving this communication, for, simultaneously with the progress of this dispute another had been running its course. Here, also, the Foreign Secretary had taken a strong line, and here again he won a diplomatic victory. Detail shall be spared the reader as far as possible. First the Council of Admirals, and afterwards Count von Waldersee, placed Russia in control of the Imperial Railway of North China, a line built by English capital, worked by a staff under Mr. Kinder (the manœuvres by which Russia sought to oust Mr. Kinder in 1898 will be remembered), and the property and earnings of which were the security for the loan of £2,300,000 for the Newchwang extension, the sum having been raised in England on the faith of a Foreign Office guarantee that China should be held to the conditions of the loan contract. Once in possession the Russian military authorities behaved as though the line was entirely theirs, keeping out Mr. Kinder and his staff, moving stores whither they willed, and painting the rolling stock or some of it at least the colour of that on the Siberian Railway. The earlier phases of the dispute were dealt with by Lord Salisbury, who made formal protest

and asked that the railway should be restored, subject to such military control as Count von Waldersee saw fit to exercise. The position of affairs when Lord Lansdowne took them in hand was that Count Lamsdorff appeared to be very ill-informed of the conduct of his military subordinates, and was mentally incapable of seeing that British interests had been endangered or that Russian action was, as Lord Salisbury had claimed, at variance with the declarations of the Russian Government that they did not seek territorial acquisitions in China-a variance on which proof need not be adduced here. The Count, however, was good enough to say that the road to Shanhaikwan would be handed over when the Russian troops retired from Pechili, but that the extra-mural section-the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang extension, the battle ground of a long and dangerous dispute believed to have been closed by the Anglo-Russian Railway or Spheres of Interest Agreement-would not be restored until all outlays for repairs and working had been repaid to Russia. It was, in fact, to be held in pawn for an indefinite time, and the Agreement to be regarded as a dead letter, Russia being in a preferential position as against the owners of the line and those Powers which had also spent money on the re-construction. Lord Lansdowne rejected this preposterous claim. After a long wrangle, in which he was put to infinite trouble in dealing with Russian delays and obstructiveness, due either to honest stupidity in St. Petersburg or to wilful perversion of facts, he succeeded in gaining his point.

"A singular feature of this controversy, which can be studied in detail by anyone who will take the trouble to master the Blue Book (China, No. 7, 1901), is that Count Lamsdorff was most lavish in professions of friendship towards this country, and of assertions of Russia's intentions to adhere loyally to her engagements and professions, but was most dilatory in action and somewhat deficient in ability to grasp the simple facts of the case— diplomatic qualities so conspicuous in his predecessors, the late Prince Lobanoff and Count Mouravieff, under whom he served. I may hazard a guess, reading between the lines of the Blue Book, that on this, as on certain preceding occasions, the Czar himself put an end to the difficulty by insisting that the views of the English Foreign Office should be fairly met. For, soon after the Czar recovered from his illness, and in consequence of communications between Count Lamsdorff and his Sovereign, a Convention was drawn up under which the line as far as Shanhaikwan was handed over to the British military authorities. 'Practically,' said Sir Alfred Gaselee, the Agreement places the entire control of the railway, so far as Chi-li is concerned, in British hands, while our rights beyond the Great Wall remain in exactly the same position as heretofore.' So far so good. Our rights remain; but the extra-mural section is, at the moment of writing, still in Russian hands, and Lord Lansdowne's victory cannot be regarded as complete until the line is released.

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The facts of the Tientsin Siding dispute are familiar because of their

sensational nature. With Russian and British sentries within a few feet of each other, and Russian soldiers cutting trenches in such a way as to enfilade our men, it seemed that at last an Anglo-Russian difference would lead to the use of rifle and bayonet. The question of the validity of the ownership of the land by the British firm, or that of the Russian concession in Tientsin, need not here be discussed. The point germane to this article is that Lord Lansdowne did not shrink from the issue presented to him by the Russian military authorities. Keep the ground you hold, but do not use force except to repel aggression,' was, in effect, his instruction to the military. Meanwhile he sought to put Count von Waldersee in motion. But, in the nick of time, before the local Russian commander had been able to make the position of the British sentries quite untenable, Count Lamsdorff took alarm at the situation, and ended it by a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of the troops, without prejudice to the questions of right involved. This suggestion Lord Lansdowne promptly accepted, and the immediate danger of a collision passed."

Three points remain to be stated before leaving the subject of the present China Papers: first, that the policy of Great Britain is still what it has been since the present Administration came into power in 1895, viz., one of opposition to any partition of, and the maintenance of Treaty rights and commercial interests throughout, the Chinese Empire. Secondly, that the United States pursues a like policy. Thirdly, that while the other Powers are nominally in accord with it, as shown by the pledges set out in the POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK for 1901, and that while the policy applies to the whole of China, Germany, notwithstanding the Agreement of October 16th, 1900, has expressly declared that "the fate of Manchuria is a matter of absolute indifference" to her. It should be noted that the Agreement does not specifically exclude Manchuria from its scope. It deals with "China," "the Chinese Dominions," "the Chinese Empire;" and if these words do not include the Provinces of Manchuria it is a little difficult to see what definite meaning is to be attached to them. The only limitation in the Document is that the Signatory Powers pledge themselves to uphold the principles of territorial inviolability and the maintenance of rights and interests under existing Treaties "for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence." It follows, therefore, that if Germany chooses to say, as she has said in effect, that she has no political influence, meaning that she will not use what she has, to avert a Russian Protectorate over Manchuria-that "the fate of Manchuria is a matter of absolute indifference to her "-then the Anglo-German Agreement is of no service in the prevention of Russian efforts to establish virtual sovereignty. The value that seemed originally to belong to that Instrument has been largely diminished by Count von Bulow's declaration in the Reichstag. German indifference with regard to Manchuria is, however, to some extent counterbalanced by the active interest of the United States, whose policy is