slave into such involuntary service by contract? I have said that he cannot do it-I mean that he cannot, but in violation of the law of Nature, and of God. You cannot take his life, or wantonly injure his person; and what you cannot do yourself, even by indirection, you cannot employ another to do. If you cannot shoot him yourself, you can not force him into a situation to be shot, even by a public enemy. And though, from personal attachment, I doubt not, he might voluntarily spill his own blood in defence of his master, yet you cannot compel him to put his life in jeopardy either in your defence, or in defence of your country. And, if tempted by the wages of his la bor, or even by patriotism, to put him into the public service, against his will, by your own voluntary contract, and harm happen to him, with what justice can you ask indemnity for the loss you may sustain ? And when I speak of the slave going into such service against his will, I do not mean that he is forced into such service by stripes and chains. The slave, I believe, is generally a passive being, and in the habit of passive obedience lle goes where he is directed to go, and does what he is directed to do. And, it is fair to presume, that, in the present instance, the inclination of the slave was never consulted, and he was, therefore, in the service by compulsion. [H. OF R. ing to lose. Yes, I confess, one thing he has to lose, and only one-his life-but that a public enemy would disdain to have, if it could avoid the taking of it. And shall he be called upon to peril his life and members-which are all the law assumes to protect for him; the security of which alone form, in law, the characteristic difference between him and the lower animals; and which nature would leave him free to defend in the absence of all posi. tive law-shall he be called upon, I ask, to peril his life and members in the defence of a country, to which he owes neither allegiance nor gratitude! : Sir, I know of no circumstances of necessity which could ever induce me to sanction, by way of indemnity, the conduct of a military officer of this Government, in the impressment of a free white citizen into the public service for, in my judgment, the preservation of the first city in the Union might be dearly purchased, at the expense of the sacrifice of the meanest individual in it, if the blow which effected that sacrifice was struck also at the Constitution and the law. And yet, I would sooneraye, much sooner-sanction the impressment of a free white citizen, who is under common obligations with oth. ers to defend the country that protects him, than I would the impressment of a slave, who has no interest in your country in common with the citizen, and who has nothing to defend, but that, in the defence of which nature armed him, before Government and the law had existence. But the question has been asked, and in the form of impassioned exclamation, shall the Government, in the face of the Constitution, take private property for public use, and refuse to make just compensation? I answer, no. What, then, are we called upon to do? To pay for proAnd you ask, was not this slave the property of D'Aute-perty taken for the public use? No; but to sanction the rive? I answer, yes; but he was also a man, whom nei- conduct of an officer of this Government in the impressther his master, nor any military commander, nor even ment of a slave into the public service; which, consider. the Government itself, in the exercise of "transcenden- ing the character and condition of such slave, no circum. tal power," hal the least right to force into a place of ex-stances of necessity can ever justify; and which, for one, posure, in the face of a public enemy. And this having I will never consent to adopt and sanction as the act of this been done, no matter how, by impressment, if you please, Government. since that is insisted on-not of the Government, for that cannot be pretended-but of an officer of the Government, the pecuniary loss of the master is swallowed up in the outrage offered to the slave, in the wound inflicted on the Constitution and the law, which guarantee to every man security of life and limb. And you ask, will you refuse to make compensation for property taken for your use, because the act of the of ficer in taking it was illegal? I answer, no; not merely because the act was illegal. For, believing as I do, that all impressment of property is illegal, there are yet, probably, many losses arising from such acts, for which I would make ample compensation for the relief of the offi cer-but of one thing I would always first be satisfied, and that is, of the necessity which existed for the illegal act. And of the necessity of impressing a slave into the public service, I never could be satisfied-I never would be satisfied. What is a slave? An animal, born and bound to perpetual servitude-degraded indeed, but yet a man-with nothing on earth that he can call his own his very chil dren are the property of his master; the dew of Heaven never falls on his dwelling; the sun itself never arises on his home, or his country; even the hope of a better condition-and happily for him, perhaps, for, like a brief light, springing up in the bosom of the desponding, it sometimes serves only the more effectually to discover the darkness which envelopes it-even the hope of a better condition is buried up and extinguished in his utter degradation! What interest has such a being in the stupendous events that are passing in the world? What interest has he in your country? None. What cares he for a foreign and invading enemy? Nothing. A public enemy can take nothing from him--and, if the gentleman from Louisiana, [Mr. LIVINGSTON] who seems to be taking notes, wishes to take it down, I repeat it-a public enemy can take nothing from him, because he has nothVOL. IV.-93 Can it, then, vary the question of indemnity, whether the loss of the master, by the injuries to the person of his slave, was partial or total? Whether amounting to the whole value of his interest in the life of the slave, or only part of it? I think not: for I think the principle is the same in both cases. The hazard to which the mas ter's interest in his slave was put, was exposure of the person of the slave to a public enemy. This exposure was illegal, in any point of view, if effected compulsorily as to the slave, whether by impressment or by contract with his master. And I cannot, for the life of me, therefore, see any difference in principle between indemnity for a partial loss of interest in the slave, occasioned by the destruction of an eye, and indemnity for a total loss of interest, had the same shot which put out the eye, passed through the brain, and ended his existence. It is, then, because the slave, though property, is a hu man being-because the master has no power over his life and members, beyond their employment, under cir cumstances of probable safety because neither the Government nor its officers have the power to impress any animal having the quality of man-because human life is not to be estimated in damages-because this Government should never give its sanction to an illegal impressment, and especially the impressment of a slave; or to an illegal contract, and especially one that should touch the life of a human being-because this Government cannot chaffer in human life or human limbs, without danger of staining its hands with human blood-it is for these rea sons that I cannot vote for this bill. One word in conclusion, I intended, when I set out, to avoid, as far as possible, every thing which might be offensive either in principle or in expression. If I have not done so, I regret it exceedingly. solemnly appeal to God, that I would not knowingly and willingly utter a sentiment or a syllable that I believed would tend to unsettle any one correct principle upon which property in slaves is holden in this country. I would not, if I could, alarm one honest fear for the security of this species of property. Least of all would 1-Oh no, no, I would notwithout necessity, breathe too roughly upon that spirit of mutual confidence and affection which I believe to be the bond of our political union, in the fear that bond might be weakened by it. [FEB. 7, 1828. its full meaning, and without any qualification, as much Mr. BRENT rose, and said, that he felt himself forced into the discussion, from the situation in which he stood as a Representative from a slave-holding State. He regretted that this subject had again been introduced in a manner to call forth a debate. He did hope that, after the great length of time which it had already occupied, the question would have been taken, and no farther discussion indulged in. But the extraordinary doctrines advanced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. MINER] and the reasons given by another gentleman, [Mr. BARNARD] from New York, compelled him, in the discharge of his duty, to answer these gentlemen; and, in doing so, he should detain the House but a very short time. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. MINER] im plored us "not to urge this question," and assured us that it was not "his intention to interfere with the rights of the slave-holding States." Who urged this question ? Was it any gentleman from the South? Sir, this language is calculated to urge the gentlemen from the Southern States to indulge in that course so much deprecated by that gentleman. He tells us that he does not intend "to interfere with the rights of the slave-holding States," and, at the same moment, he asserts-what no man has ever done before him-that "the Government of the U. States has a right to enlist our slaves, and to make soldiers of them, the same as if they were free white citizens, and without giving the master any compensation for their services." The gentleman [Mr. MINER] asserts this, and then calls upon us not to be excited, and declares that he does not wish "to interfere with our rights to our slaves." I cannot listen to such doctrines and such inconsistency in gentlemen, without expressing my abhorrence of them, if no more. I am pleased to think that the gentleman stands alone in his opinions up. on this subject. I do not believe that another individual in the nation would advocate such a doctrine. Is the gentleman aware to what such opinions would lead us? Is he prepared for the consequences which would result from such sentiments? If he has reflected upon those consequences, and blindly rushes on, I envy not his feelings. But how does he form his opinion, and from what source does he derive his reasons? He has referred us to the Constitution of the United States-and for what? To show that, in speaking of slaves, they were called persons in some parts of the Constitution; and he then says surely persons are not property. Ah, sir! where does he find this distinction? Had he shown us that persons could not be property by the words of the Constitution, he might maintain, with some plausibility, the ground he has taken. The very reverse of the gentle. The same gentleman asks, why is it that similar claims man's idea is the fact. Slaves are property because they have been rejected ever since the foundation of the Go. are persons: for no slavery can exist but of persons. Ivernment? If such be the case, I have never been able to will ask the gentleman where he can find any thing in meet with such cases in any researches which I have made. the Constitution or laws, which forbids the making of The cases referred to by gentlemen some days ago in persons property. I challenge the production of any such debate, are not similar to the present in any one feature. prohibition, derived from any code of laws in the world, This is the first time that such a case has ever been prewhere slavery ever existed. I will ask what is proper-sented to Congress, and acted upon. At the last session ty? It is what the law declares to be such. The gentleman admitted, in the course of his argument, that slaves were property, but qualified property. There is no such distinction made in the laws of this or any other country. He cannot point to any such distinction; it exists alone in the imagination. I beg gentlemen to read the Constitution and the laws of our country on this subject, and they will find that slaves have always been recognized as property under our Government, in of Congress a similar case was presented in the name of L'Arche, but not definitively acted upon, but so far as it was, the expression of an opinion was favorable. When gentlemen refer to precedents they ought to compare them with the case under consideration, and not to take for granted that which does not exist. It has also been observed, that, in rejecting this bill, "no national question is settled." I think differently, as the question is now presented. Had gentlemen content ed themselves with the facts in the case, and examined it alone upon its merits, without going aside for the purpose of asserting to the world that our slaves could be taken from us by the Government, and employed in the army, without compensation to the master, it might have been decided without settling any national question; but, as it is, with these declarations to go forth to the nation, as reasons for opposing the bill, I say that a national question, of great importance to this Union, is embraced in the discussion which has taken place-nay, one that is of vital existence to the Southern States. How is it possible for the honorable gentleman [Mr. MrNER] to say, that "no national question is to be settled?" Mr. Speaker, it is a question which interests the whole Union; and whenever it is advocated upon the principles of that gentleman, it will be found to be one that will endanger every thing we hold dear under our happy Government. I do not believe that we will ever experience any injury from such doctrines: for I think I do justice, not only to the honorable colleagues of the gen. tleman from Pennsylvania, but to every honorable gentleman upon this floor from the non-slave holding States, when I declare, that I consider the gentleman [Mr. Mr. NER] as the only advocate of such dangerous doctrines. All other gentlemen from the Northern or non-slave holding States have admitted that our slaves were property, and have only contended that they either were not such property as ought to be impressed, or that, in this case, the evidence did not support the claim. Some have also contended that the master ought not to contract for the service of his slave in the army, so as to require compensation, because the slave has life, and no master can expose the life of his slave for pecuniary compensation, and if he does, he ought not to be paid, for the act was cruel and inhuman. In this respect, they say, slave property differs from other kind of personal property. These, and similar arguments, have been advanced against the present claim, but not one gentle. man has yet asserted that "slaves are not property." All admit it; and so does the gentleman from Pennsylvania; but he qualifies his admission, and concludes by advancing the extraordinary doctrine I have noticed. Happily for the Southern States-happily for the Union, he stands alone the advocate of such principles. Before I take my seat, I will ask the indulgence of the House for a short time, to make a few observations in reply to the gentleman from New York [Mr. BARNARD.] From the manner in which that gentleman spoke, 1 feel persuaded he delivered the real convictions of his mind; and although I cannot assent to his reasonings or conclusions, it is but just to say, that his remarks, and the mild and eloquent manner in which he expressed them, entitle him to the respect of every member in this House. As to the ability with which he spoke, the great and pleasing attention with which he was listened to, is the strongest proof. I am glad to find that he does not agree with the gentleman (Mr. MINER] fron Pennsylvania, and that he has taken, in the course of his remarks, an opportunity to express his dissent to the doctrines of that gentleman. (H. or R. and such property, too, as comes within the meaning of that amendment in the Constitution, which says, 66 nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," they ought not to be paid for, be cause their slavery does not divest them of the charac ters of men; and being men, the master cannot ask for pay for their services rendered to the Government. This really is a refined distinction, and one that I can scarcely comprehend. It may be creditable to the humane and benevolent feelings of the gentleman, but certainly is contrary to the law and the Constitution, and the admissions he made. The one is inconsistent and irreconcileable with the other. [Here Mr. BARNARD asked and obtained leave of Mr. BRENT to explain. He had not said that slaves were property in an unqualified sense, but that they were always property, and always men, and that they were em. braced in the fifth amendment of the Constitution only so far as they were property.] Mr. BRENT Continued. I do not see that the explana tion of my honorable friend corrects what I stated in any respect. I think he goes further than I thought he did. He now says, and admits, that slaves are always property, and always men. How can we understand this admission in any other way than in that which gives it a meaning: If slaves be always property, and as he admits that they are embraced in the fifth amendment, so far as they are property, and that amendment declares, that no “property shall be taken for public use, without just compensation," most certainly, if the slave, in this case, was "taken for public use," the Government is bound, in the words of the Constitution, from the admis sion of the gentleman, to make D'Auterive "just com. pensation." But, says the gentleman, although the slave was property, in the meaning of the Constitution, he was still "a man," and as such, the word "property" in the Constitution must be qualified. Where is such construc tion to the Constitution to be found? Does the Consti tution contain any such qualification? It does not; it embraces all kinds of property. The words of the Constitution are," nor shall private property be taken," &c. These words embrace every description of property, whether that property consists of men, or of horses, or any thing else. There is no distinction, no qualification; and in admitting what the gentleman did, that slaves are property, he has admitted all we ask; and his opposition to the bill, for the reason assigned, rather partakes of a distinction too refined to weigh down the positive decla rations of the Constitution, and his own admissions as to its effects, and as to the laws which make property of slaves. I hope my friend from New York (Mr. BARNARD] will not apply any remark made by me as intended to wound his feelings. I trust he is satisfied that no gentleman upon this floor has a higher respect for him than I have. But he must allow me, in the most friendly manner, to remark, that I think he has been very unfortunate in the positions he has taken. He says, "that property is a word of familiar import, and when pronounced, it is ge nerally understood what is meant-as, if you ask a child In the beginning of the remarks of the gentleman [Mr. what is property? his reply would be, My book, or toy, BARNARD] from New York, he admits that "slaves are or such things as are familiar to all :" and he concludes property, within the meaning of the fifth amendment to from this, that the meaning of property is to be confin. the Constitution of the United States;" and, also, that|ed to such things as are familiar to our early senses. "slaves are property, because the law makes them so." Speaker, I admit the correctness of this as a general re Having made these two admissions, I supposed he would mark; and, according to this definition of property, I yield the question, and admit that, as property, slaves contend that slaves are so to be regarded-as much so ought to be paid for, inasmuch as the fifth amendment to as the book, toy, &c. The familiar import of a word is the Constitution declares, "nor shall private property understood in different ways in different countries. In be taken for public use, without just compensation." the non-slave holding States, where the child knows no. Such, indeed, appears to me to be the inevitable conse- thing of slavery, or has scarcely heard its name, the an quence of his admissions; but it is strangely contended swer to an inquiry, as to what constituted property, would by the gentleman, that, although slaves are property, be as the gentleman has stated; but, in a slave-holding Mr. |