P

cision received the sanction of his majesty. On Monday it was communicated to both Houses of Parliament and this day, Sirat the hour in which I have the honour yof addressing you the troops are on their march for embarkation.

"As to the merits of the new constitution of Portugal, I have neither the intention, nor the right, to offer any opinion. Personally, I may have formed one; but as an English minister, all I have to say is May God prosper this attempt at the establish>ment of constitutional liberty in Portugal! and may that nation sbe found as fit to enjoy and to cherish its new-born privileges, as Jat has often proved itself capable of discharging its duties amongst the nations of the world!'

I am neither the champion nor the critic of the Portuguese convstitution. But it is admitted on all hands to have proceeded from a legitimate source and to us, as Englishmen, it is recommended by the ready acceptance which it has met with from all orders of the Portuguese people. To that constitution it is impossible that Englishmen should not wish well. But it would not be for us to force it on the people of Portugal, if they were unwilling to receive bitor if any schism should exist amongst the Portuguese themselves, as to its fitness and congeniality to the wants and wishes of the nation. It is no business of ours to fight its battles. We go to Portugal in the discharge of a sacred obligation, contracted under ancient and modern treaties. When there, nothing shall be done by us to enforce the establishment of the constitution—but we must take care that nothing shall be done by others to prevent it from being

fairly carried into effect. Intermally, let the Portuguese settle their own affairs; but with respecte to external force, while Great Britain has an arm to raise, it must be raised against the efforts of any power that should attempt forcibly to control the choice, and fetter the independence, of Portugal. buf

"Has such been the intention of Spain? Whether the proceedings which have lately been practised or permitted in Spain, were acts of a government exercising the usual power of prudence and foresight, (without which a government is for the good of the people which live under it no government at all), or whether they were the acts of some secret illegitimate powert of some furious fanatical faction, over-riding the councils of the ostensible government, defying it in the capital, and disobeying it on the frontiers-I will not stop to inquire. It is indifferent to Portugal, smarting under her wrongs it is indifferent to England, who is called upon to avenge them-whether the present state of things be the result of the intrigues of a faction, over which, if the Spanish government has no control, it ought to assume one as soon as possible or of local authorities, over whom it has control, and for whose acts it must, therefore, be held responsible. It matters not, I say, from which of these sources the evil has arisen. either case, Portugal must be protected; and from England that protection is due.

H

In

"Great desertions took place from the Portuguese army into Spain, and some desertions took place from the Spanish army into Portugal. In the first instance, the Portuguese authorities were taken

by surprise; but, in every subsequent instance, where they had an opportunity of exercising a discretion, it is but just to say, that they uniformly discouraged the desertions of the Spanish soldiery. There exist between Spain and Portugal specific treaties, stipulating the mutual surrender of deserters. Portugal had, therefore, a right to claim of Spain that every Portuguese deserter should be forthwith sent back. I hardly know whether from its own impulse, or in consequence of our advice, the Portuguese government waved its right under those treaties; very wisely reflecting, that it would be highly inconvenient to be placed by the return of their deserters, in the difficult alternative of either granting a dangerous amnesty, or ordering numerous executions. The Portuguese government, therefore, I signified to Spain that it would be entirely satisfied if, instead of sur-rendering the deserters, Spain would restore their arms, horses, and equipments; and, separating the men from their officers, would remove both from the frontiers into the interior of Spain. Solemn engagements were entered into by the Spanish government to this effect first with Portugal, next with France, and afterwards with England. Those engagements, concluded one day, were violated the next. The deserters, instead of being disarmed and dispersed, were allowed to remain congregated together near the frontiers of Portugal; where they were enrolled, trained, and disciplined, for the expedition which they have since undertaken. It is plain that in these proceedings, there was perfidy somewhere. It rests with the Spanish government to show, that it was not with them-it rests

with the Spanish government to prove, that if its engagements have not been fulfilled-if its intentions have been eluded and unexecuted, the fault has not been with the government; and that it is ready to make every reparation in its power.

4

"I have said that these promises were made to France and to Great Britain, as well as to Portugal. I should do a great injustice to France if I were not to add, that the representations of that government upon this point, with the cabinet of Madrid, have been as urgent, and, alas! as fruitless, as those of Great Britain. Upon the first irruption into the Portuguese territory, the French government testified its displeasure by instantly recalling its ambassador; and it further directed its chargé d'affaires to signify to his Catholic majesty, that Spain was not to look for any support from France against the consequences of this aggression upon Portugal. I am bound, I repeat, in justice to the French government, to state, that it has exerted itself to the utmost, in urging Spain to retrace the steps which she has so unfortunately taken. It is not for me to say whether any more efficient course might have been adopted to give effect to their exhortations: but as to the sincerity and good faith of the exertions made by the government of France, to press Spain to the execution of her engagements, I have not the shadow of a doubt;

and I confidently reckon upon their continuance.

"There are reasons which entirely satisfy my judgment that nothing short of a point of national faith or national honour, would justify at the present moment, any voJuntary approximation to the possi

bility of war. Let me be under stood, however, distinctly, as not meaning to say that I dread war in a good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this country ever to engage !), from a distrust of the strength of the country to commence it, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it, indeed,but upon far other grounds: I dread it from an apprehension of the tremendous consequences which might arise from any hostilities in which we might now be engaged. Some years ago, in the discussion of the negotiations respecting the French war against Spain, I stated that the position of this country in the present state of the world, was one of neutrality, not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles; and that it was by neutrality alone that we could maintain that balance, the preservation of which, I be lieved to be essential to the welfare of mankind. I then said, that I feared that the next war which should be kindled in Europe, would be a war not so much of armies, as of opinions. Not four years have elapsed, and behold my apprehension realised! It is, to be sure, within narrow limits that this war of opinion is at present confined: but it is a war of opinion, that Spain (whether as government or as nation) is now waging against Portugal; it is a war which has commenced in hatred of the new institutions of Portugal. How long is it reasonable to expect that Portugal will abstain from retaliation? If into that war this country shall be compelled to enter, we shall enter into it, with a sincere and anxious desire to mitigate rather than exasperate, and to mingle only in the conflict of arms, not in the more fatal conflict of

opinions. But I much fear that this country (however earnestly she may endeavour to avoid it) could not, in such case, avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any nation with which she might come in conflict. It is the contemplation of this new power, in any future war, which excites my most anxious ap prehension. It is one thing to have a giant's strength, but it would be another to use it like a giant. The consciousness of such strength is, undoubtedly, a source of confidence and security; but in the situation in which this country stands, our business is, not to seek opportunities of displaying it, but to content ourselves with letting the professors of violent and exaggerated doctrines on both sides feel, that it is not their interest to convert an umpire into an adversary. The situation of England, amidst the struggle of political opinions which agitates more or less sensibly dif ferent countries of the world, may be compared to that of the ruler of the winds, as described by the poet:

-Celsâ sedet Æolus arce, Sceptra tenens; mollitque animos et temperat iras;

Ni faciat, maria ac terras cælumque profundum

Quippe ferant rapidi secum, verrantque

per auras.'

The consequence of letting loose the passions at present chained and confined, would be to produce a scene of desolation which no man can contemplate without horror; and I should not sleep easy on my couch, if I were conscious that I had contributed to precipitate it by. a single moment. This is the reason a reason very different from fear the reverse of a consciousness of disability-why I dread the recurrence of hostilities in any

'part of Europe; why I would bear much, and forbear long; why I would put up with almost any thing that did not touch national faith and national honour rather than let slip the furies of war, the leash of which we hold in our handsnot knowing whom they may reach, or how far their ravages may be carried. Such is the love of peace which the British govern ment acknowledges; and such the necessity for peace which the circumstances of the world inculcate. Let us fly to the aid of Portugal, by whomsoever attacked; because it is our duty to do so: and let us cease our interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal, not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions but to defend and to preserve the independence of an ally. We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall not come."

Mr. Canning sat down much exhausted, amid loud cheers from all sides of the House.

The Speaker read the Address, which was received with great ap plause, and put the question that it be adopted.

Sir Robert Wilson supported the address; at the same time adding, that, in his opinion, Great Britain was bound to require of France, that she should march her troops out of Spain, as a first step to the defence of Portugal. She had entered Spain merely to release the king, and to restore peace, and that object had long ago been ac> complished.

Mr. Hume rose amid loud murmurs, and opposed the Address, principally on the ground that this country was not in a situation

to enter upon, and long maintain, a war on a great scale. It was highly inconsistent in Mr. Canning, who was the advocate of peace in 1823, to precipitate the country into a war now, without either affording sufficient time for deliberation, or establishing a case of unavoidable necessity to enter into it. The hon. member moved an amendment, "that the House be called over this day week."

Mr. Wood, member for Preston, seconded the amendment.

Mr. Baring did not see how the ministers could have adopted any other course than that for which they now asked the sanction of the House. He could not help regretting that government had looked so passively on the invasion of Spain in 1823. If, at that time, the same resolution had been shewn in the case of Spain, as was at this time in the case of Portugal, Europe would have been saved from that calamity into which, at some time or other, he firmly believed that an invasion would draw it. He could not view the possession of Spain by France, continued year after year, without feeling that it was extremely dangerous to this country. To what degree the war, once commenced, might spread, in point of expense and extent, there was no saying beforehand. But, keeping in mind the taxes which had been repealed since the conclusion of the war, he denied that the pressure at this time could be such as to render us incapable of bearing the burthens war might bring upon us.

Mr. Bankes, senior, was of opinion that the House should be assured that the war was quite indispensable, before they rushed into it. He was not satisfied that such was the case. The disturb

1

ances in Portugal were of a political character, and connected with its internal arrangements. He did not shrink from war because he despaired of the resources of the country, and, therefore, he would not support the amendment, but neither could he vote for the original motion.

Mr. Brougham supported the Address. Adverting to the ground on which the amendment was principally supported, he said, "The hon. members (Messrs. Hume and Wood) must recollect, and the House and the country must bear in mind, that the question is not at present, whether, even at the expense of your character for good faith, you will consent to bear hereafter among mankind a stained reputation, and a forfeited honour. The question is not whether you will do so, and by so doing avert a war. I should say no, even if this choice were within your reach; but the question is whether, for a little season of miserable, insecure, precarious, dishonourable, unbearable truce.I cannot call it peace, for it has nothing of the honour and the comfort which make the Iname of peace proverbially sweet

say, the question is, whether for this wretched, precarious, disgusting, and intolerable postponement of hostilities, you will be content thereafter to have recourse to war, when war can no longer be avoided, and when its horrors will fall upon you-degraded and ruined in character in the eyes of all the nations of Europe, and, what is ten thousand times worse, degraded and ruined in your own. I say, Sir, degraded and ruined in reputation, and what may appear worse to those to whose minds such topics do not find so easy an access, the war will fall with tenfold weight

upon our resources; for a small sum spent now in due time, may be the means of saving us an expenditure of ten times that amount, with interest-aye, and compound interest accumulated upon it. In the principles, now adopted and avowed by the organs of our government, we have a strong and impregnable bulwark, which will enable us not only to support our burthens, and, should the day of trial come upon us, to meet the combined world in arms, but which will afford the strongest practical security against future danger; and render it eminently improbable that we shall ever have that combined world to contend with, so long as those principles are maintained. Our burthens may remain, but our government know that when the voice of the people is in their favour, they have a lever, if not within their hands, within their grasp."

1

Mr. Bright contended, that no act of aggression against Portugal had been avowed by Spain, and that consequently no casus foederis existed. The occupation of Portugal by five thousand men would amount to nothing more than an armed neutrality. Now, by the terms of the treaty, we were bound to assist Portugal only in the event of actual hostilities having been commenced, and then we were bound to attack Spain with all our might.

Mr. Canning's reply was even more eloquent than his opening speech.r

"The hon. gentleman" (Mr. Bright) he said, "who spoke last, in his extreme love for peace, proposes expedients, which would render war inevitable. He would avoid interference at this moment, when Spain may be yet hesitating as to