Ar the beginning of the year Massena was at Santarem, in a position strong by nature, and strongly forti fied. Drouet had established his headquarters at Leyria, and communicated with him by a chain of posts. Another division, under Claparede, had entered Portugal. This general made it his first and especial business to destroy the force under Silveira, from whose activity and enterprize the French were suffering so severely. Silveira, little disposed to shrink from danger, thought himself strong enough to become the assailant, and attacked the enemy at Ponte de Almargem, unaware perhaps of their force : his militia were thrown into confusion, and he was repulsed with some loss. For nineteen days Claparede pursued him, without being able to gain any decisive advantage over troops, who were, both in number and discipline, far inferior to his own. The Portugueze retreated to Lamego, evacuated that city at the time when the French were entering it; and effected this with so much coolness and resolution, that, having no other means of transport, they carried off 140 soldiers, whom they found in the hospital there, on their backs, removed thirty-five cart loads of ammunition in the same manner, and brought away four Jan. 13. pieces of artillery. They then crossed the Douro, to cover the province between the rivers;

here they were enabled to make a stand, owing to the movements of General Bacellar on the enemy's left, and those of Colonel Wilson upon his rear, at Castro Diaro Claparede would willingly have pursued Silveira beyond the river, that he might obtain the resources of a province which had not been exhausted; but these active officers harassed him too much on his flanks and rear: he therefore retired, and took up a position at Guarda, with his advanced guard at Belmonte, to keep open the communication with the main army.

The British head quarters were at Cartaxo; Sir W. Beresford, General Hill, and General Fane's division of cavalry were on the left bank of the Tagus, from whence the preparations of the enemy for crossing the river could distinctly be seen. Massena had undertaken the conquest of Portugal, in full expectation of out-numbering any force which could be opposed to him, and still more certainly of outmanoeuvring them; for the French government well knew with what a misplaced and ruinous parsimony the military plans of Great Britain are usually carried on, and they neither calculated upon the skill of the British general, nor the resolution of the British government, nor the spirit and exertions of the Portugueze people. The cautious system which Lord Wellington had been compelled to observe, un.

der circumstances so painful to his feelings as those of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, confirmed Massena in this expectance; and though it was by an accident of war that Almeida had fallen into his hands, the speedy reduction of that important place had naturally increased the presumption of one who was accustomed to hear himself called the Child of Victory. That presumption had received a lesson at Busaco; and when he saw the lines of Torres Vedras, he was too well versed in the science of war not to know that such works, with such men and such a ge neral to defend them, were impregnable. Could Lord Wellington have spared a sufficient force to have occupied Santarem as well as Abrantes, or had the orders of the Portugueze government for removing all provisions been properly carried into effect in this part of the country, Massena must soon have been compelled to retreat. But being enabled to take a position which was not to be forced without a great er expence of life than his antagonist could afford, and finding resources on which an army capable of living upon little, and bearing great privations, might subsist for some months, he waited for assistance from the side of Andalusia. In no part of Spain had the Spaniards displayed so little energy as there. The people of Cadiz, contented with the security for which they were indebted to their situation, seemed not to be disposed to make any effort against their besiegers; Soult, therefore, might spare a sufficient force for besieging Badajoz the skill of the French engineers, and the means which they possessed, rendered the fall of that place certain, unless it were relieved by an army capable of meeting the besiegers in the field :but that force could only be drawn from the lines of Torres Vedras. If

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the numbers of the allied army were thus materially diminished, their position might be attacked; or if this were still thought too hazardous, the sage of the Tagus might probably be effected; and this would put the invader in possession of great part of Alentejo, and open a communication with Seville and Madrid. If, on the other hand, Badajoz were suffered to fall without an effort for its relief, the same advantages would be obtained by the advance of the victorious army, which might leave Elvas behind; the possession of Badajoz and the other less important forts being sufficient. Being master of both banks of the Tagus, want of supplies would be no longer to be apprehended; and if they could obtain possession of Almada, they might from thence bombard Lisbon.

Massena, however, looked to the result of these well-concerted opera tions with far less confidence than was expressed by the despondents in England. They gave him 'gratuitously an additional army of 23,000 men, which was to join him under Bessieres, and called Sebastiani also from Malaga to co-operate in the united attack. "The whole effort," said they, “ will be directed against Lord Wellington; the whole force is collecting and marching to the different points of attack with the knowledge of the allies, but without any means of attacking them separately, or of warding off the blow, The battle must be fought at the time and in the way we have always presumed to foretell," these happy prognosticators added, "and he must be a man of firm nerves who can contemplate the probable issue of the fight with composure."' "The crisis in Portugal," said another of these sage politicians," may now be expected daily; and then let the calumniators of

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Sir John Moore do justice to the memoof that injured officer, who was absolutely goaded to commit his errors, and then abused for being defeated: he had not interest enough to have his errors christened exploits, and his flight victory."* But the language of virulent and malicious misrepresentation was never carried farther than by another writer of the same faction. It had been advanced, he said, among other reasons for imposing restrictions upon the prince regent, that if left uncontrolled, he might totally change the system of warfare, abandon Portugal to its fate, and undo all that Lord Talavera had done. "Alas,"† continued this demagogue, "the prince can never undo what that famous oriental chief has done in Portugal. His royal highness, possess what powers and prerogatives he may, cannot put Massena where he was in July last; nor can he restore any thing that has been destroyed in Portugal, nor to us any portion of the many millions of pounds that have been expended in that war, and the raising of which in England must have so largely added to the distresses of the people and to the number of paupers. None of this can he do. We have it under their own hands; we have it in the official dispatches and proclamations, that some of the fairest parts of Portugal have been by our army (for what purpose no matter) laid waste. Reader, pray think little of that sort of thing, called laying a country waste. Think a little of the necessary consequences of burning, cutting up fields of green corn for horses and mules; of killing flocks and herds; of slaughtering the young in the mother's belly; of thus cutting off the means of restoration. Think a little of the effect of burning corn-fields, mills, homesteads, and manufactories. Think a little of the ef

* Examiner.

fect of first gutting and then burning work-shops, and warehouses, and cellars, and dwellings. Think of the effects of these upon a people; pray think a little of these things; and, when you have so thought, tell me what we have done in Portugal to compensate the people for their sufferings. Tell me what the people of Portugal must think of Talavera's campaign."

Thus did this demagogue labour to persuade the people that it was England who caused the sufferings of Portugal; that it was the English whom the Portugueze were to hate and curse as the authors of their calamities. "Let us not," said he, " forget the situation of the people of Portugal; let us not forget the situation of those, whom to deliver was the professed object of Talavera's wars. The end is not yet come, to be sure; but, who is there mad enough to expect that we shall be able to put the French out of the peninsula, either by arms or by negociation? Where is the man, in his senses, who believes, or will say that he believes, that we shall be able to accomplish this? Suppose peace were to become the subject of discussion. Does any one believe that Napoleon would enter into negociations about Spain and Portugal? Does any one believe that we must not leave them to their fate? This is bringing the matter to the test. And, if the reader is persuaded that we should not, in a negociation for peace, be able to stipulate for the independence of the peninsula, the question is settled, and the result of the war is, in reality, ascer tained."

The result of the war was happily not to be determined by the reasonings of a party out of place, nor by the wishes of a wicked faction. Lord Wellington had laid his plans

+ Cobbett.

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with perfect foresight, and waited tiently for the issue. The accidents of war had been greatly against him; by the explosion at Almeida the enemy had been spared the great loss of lives, and of time, to them of more importance, which its reduction must otherwise have cost; and reinforcements from England were delayed for many weeks by an unusual prevalence of westerly winds. To these was added the sudden death of Romana, which drew after it more injurious consequences. The honours to which he was so highly entitled were paid him by July 23. the Portugueze government and the British army; his bowels were buried close to the High Altar at Belem, the burial place of the kings of Portugal in the most splendid age of their history; his heart and body were sent to Majorca, his native place; and a monument was decreed to him by his grateful country. Romana was not a great general, nor would any experience have availed to make him so; for, like many of his countrymen, he was under the fatal delusion of supposing that discipline was of little importance. But he had rendered essential service to Spain. After Sir John Moore's retreat, he kept his army together under the most difficult circumstances; and when he was re-appointed to the command after Andalusia was over-run, his popularity and exertions were greatly instrumental in raising a force, by which Badajoz was preserved, and great part of Extremadura recovered. His name, his tried and approved patriotism, and the talents which he possessed, gave confidence to those who followed him; and he repeatedly annoyed the enemy and obstructed their measures, without ever exposing himself to any considerable loss. He died at a time when his services were more than ever needful, and when, according to all human foresight, they would soon have been crowned with signal and important success. For he

was preparing to march toward Badajoz, to oppose the operations of Soult. His movements would have been concerted with Lord Wellington, and those fatal blunders would not have been committed which occasioned so many calamities.

Soult and Mortier had moved from Seville towards the end of December. Ballasteros, with his ill-equipped but indefatigable troops, was driven out of the field; and Mendizabal, who, with 6000 foot, and 2500 Portugueze and Spanish cavalry, part of them well disciplined, had advanced to Llerena, and forced Girard to retreat from thence, was now himself compelled to fall back upon Almendralejo and Merida, and finally upon Badajoz, throwing 3000 men into Olivença, a place which had been of importance in the Acclamation and Succession Wars; but which, in the present state of things, it would have been wiser to dismantle than to defend. Soult did not fail to take advantage of this imprudence. He sent Girard against it with the artillery of the advanced-guard. The trenches

were opened on the 12th of January. The commander, Don Manual Herk, communicated with Mendizabal on the 21st, assuring him of his determination and ability to hold out; but a division of besieging artillery had arrived, and was placed in the battery that night, and the following morning, as soon as it opened, Herk surrendered at discretion, to the astonishment of the soldiers, whom he thus delivered into hopeless captivity, when they had suffered little or no loss,. Jan. 22. and were able and willing to have stood in the breach. The French then immediately invested Badajoz.

The city of Badajoz, the population of which is estimated at about 14,000, stands on the left bank of the Guadiana, about a league from the Caya, a little river, which on this part of the frontiers is the boundary line between

Spain and Portugal. Elvas is in sight, at the distance of twelve miles, standing on higher ground, and enjoying the advantage of a healthier as well as stronger situation; for the low lands along the Guadiana have their regular seasons of sickness. Elvas has been made, by the skill of Count La Lippe, one of the strongest fortifications in Europe. Badajoz is what the French call a place of the third order; it has no advantages of natural strength, like its old rival, but it had been well fortified, and was protected by two strong forts; the castle of St Christoval on the west, and that of Las Pardaleras on the east. The acquisition of this place was of the utmost importance to the enemy; if Massena could subsist himself till it fell, from thence they would be enabled to co-operate with him, open his communication with Andalusia and Madrid, act against Abrantes, and against Lisbon itself, unless the lines, which Lord Wellington was making from the Tagus opposite Lisbon to Setubal, were as well defended and fortified as those of Torres Vedras. Alentejo also would afford copious supplies, the western part of the province being a rich corn. country.

On the first apprehension that Massena would attempt to cross the Tagus, or that Soult would enter Alentejo to join him, the same orders for clearing and evacuating the country had been issued here as in the other provinces; and the inhabitants, who had experienced the atrocity of their invaders under the robber Loison in 1808, were required, on the entrance of the enemy, to retire into the fortified places, the peninsula of Setubal, or Lisbon. Romana and Lord Wellington had formed their plans for the defence of this important frontier; the troops of the former were on their march thi ther at the time of his death, and British forces were to follow as soon as

the reinforcements, which were expected about the end of the month, should arrive. Mendizabal, who succeeded Romana, sent to bid them halt on the road; he listened however to Lord Wellington's advice, and ordered them to advance, and meeting them at Elvas on the sixth of February, took the command. Had Herk held out as he ought to have done, this army, by an accelerated movement, might have saved Olivença. The Portugueze cavalry, under General Madden, drove the French beyond the Gebora, and thus established a communication with Badajoz ; but these gallant troops were unsupported, and were therefore compelled to abandon the advantages they had gained, and re-cross the stream: the whole force then entered the city. The next day a sortie was made, at first with good success; but reinforcements reached the enemy in time for them to recover the battery which had been won, and the Spaniards, after behaving with remarkable gallantry, retreated with the loss of 85 officers, and 500 men killed and wounded among the latter was Don Carlos d’Espana, an officer of distinguished merit. On the 9th the troops came out of the city, once more obliged the French cavalry to retire across the Gebora, and took up a position on the heights of St Christoval, between that river, the Caya, and the Guadiana, with the intent of keeping open the communication between Badajoz and the country on the right bank. From this position Mendizabal communicated with Elvas and Campo Mayor, and here he imagined himself in perfect security.

Feb. 7.

Aware of the utter negligence of the Spanish general, Mortier, who commanded at the siege, would instantly have attacked him, if the Gebora and Guadiana had not at this time overflowed their banks. Not losing,