in their heads; and, worst of all, to irritate and disgust the Greek government by their arrogant assumption of juvenile superiority. The wishes and intentions of such men may have been laudable, but, in general, the want of prudence, of discretion, sometimes of honesty, in the directors of such schemes, was deplorable."

The interposition of the Christian cabinets, if ready to be backed by force, would probably have been effectual with Turkey, pressed as she was by Russia; but it would have been difficult to have discovered any principle of justice, on which such an interference could have been defended. The sovereignty of Turkey over Greece was just as legitimate as that of Venice had once been over Candial and the Morea, or that of Russia over Georgia; it was perfectly consonant to the public law of Europe, and had been acknowledged without interruption, by all its powers. The tyranny or injustice of the Ottoman Porte towards its Greek subjects, could not be made the ground of interference, without setting it up as a principle that every sovereign had a right to take care that his neighbour exercised his authority according to his notions of humanity and principle. France or England had no more right, in point of principle, to quarrel with the Sultan for leading into captivity the dishonoured matrons of Missolonghi, than for tying up in sacks, and throwing into the sea of Marmora, the matrons of Constantinople who talked of forbid den things. Neither could any help be derived from the fact, that the Greeks were Christians, and their oppressors Mahommedans, VOL. LXVIII.

however powerfully it might act as a bond of sympathy. In so far as oppression can justify foreign interference, it matters not whether that oppression be exercised 'over orthodox believers or over heretics: to twist the bow-string round the neck of an innocent' mussulman, is as great an enormity as to twist it round the neck of an innocent Christian; and it has never been a rule of European policy, that nations of different religions ought not to be subject to the same sovereign. On what principle could Russia ask that Christian Greece should be withdrawn from under the yoke of Turkey, on which Turkey, in return, might not have insisted that the Mahommedan provinces of Daghistan and Shirvan should be liberated from the suprémacy of Christian Russia? Any interference, therefore, in the shape of a demand, seemed to be out of the question: advice and good offices to both parties, were all that the Christian cabinets could offer. Russia, in the note in which she explained to the ministers of foreign powers at the Porte the reasons why she insisted by threats of using force, on the acceptance of her ultimatum regarding the principalities on the left bank of the Danube, assured them, that this resolution had no connection with the state of things in Greece: that, notwithstanding her natural inclination and the universal wish of the nation to save from extermination its remaining fellow-Christians, she would not depart from her previous engagements, to act only in concert with the other powers; and that the instructions sent to M. Minziacky had no relation to those affairs. The note concluded

[2 B]

their pay; and the executive exerted itself in procuring provisions and ammunition for the fortresses, and the troops, which were still on foot; sending numbers of females and children into the islands, that in the event of asiege, the magazines might not be burdened with a croud of useless mouths. The inactivity of Ibrahim, who was reposing his army at Modon, and watching over the safety of Tripolizza, allowed it to carry on its military preparations undisturbed; and it found leisure to employ its authority in attempting, sometimes successfully, to allay the dissentions which were perpetually on the eve of breaking out among the chiefs. The president of the executive commission himself, with two of its members, and the archbishop of Arta vicepresident of the committee of the National Assembly, hastened to Corinth, where petty and private jealousies of long standing between the general and vice-general of the province were now openly as suming the form of a civil war; the factions having successfully recruited, even in the neighbouring provinces, men, who, if they drew the sword at all, ought to have been opposing the common enemy. These deputies, backed by the presence of Colocotroni, who was thus withdrawn from the Morea at so critical a period, succeeded in restoring for a time, at least, apparent harmony.

t

The appeal which the National Assembly had made to Europe was partially answered in one way, but could not be answered in another; their treasury might be assisted, and their troops armed, by private contributions; but the interference of governments, was a task of the

utmost delicacy and difficulty. In every christian state, the melancholy fate of the devoted garrison and inhabitants of Missolonghi excited only one feeling of deep commiseration; in every capital, and even in some courts, contributions were collected to relieve the erouds who were perishing in nakedness and want, and to re-purchase captives. At Berlin the king himself set the example. The king of Bavaria transmitted from himself and his family a sum of upwards of 3,0001. in addition to a sum of nearly 2,000% which he had already given towards the redemption of women and children who had been carried into slavery from Missolonghi. The self-constituted Greek committees, too, who, as yet, had exhibited only incontestible proofs of vanity, bravado, and mismanagement, in creased their exertions to export for the service of Greece certain persons who assumed the appella+ tion of Phil-Hellenes, small enough in number to be utterly con temptible as allies, and in the use of arms, if arms could be ob tained, far less practised and ex perienced than the Greeks them selves. Forty-five of these persons were shipped from Marseilles in the month of July with much parade, and theatrical affectation of sentiment, "to fight for liberty and the cross," as it was called→→→→ that is, to make windy apostrophes in the gulph of Salamis, or on the plain of Marathon; to frame constitutions for people who could not think; and establish the liberty of the press, as the all in all of human happiness, in a nation that could not read; to prate of Miltiades and lord Byron, without having one ray of common sense

in their heads; and, worst of all, to irritate and disgust the Greek government by their arrogant assumption of juvenile superiority. The wishes and intentions of such men may have been laudable, but, in general, the want of prudence, of discretion, sometimes of honesty, in the directors of such schemes, was deplorable."

The interposition of the Christian cabinets, if ready to be backed by force, would probably have been effectual with Turkey, pressed as she was by Russia; but it would have been difficult to have discovered any principle of justice, on which such an interference could have been defended. The sovereignty of Turkey over Greece was just as legitimate as that of Venice had once been over Candia and the Morea, or that of Russia over Georgia; it was perfectly consonant to the public law of Europe, and had been acknowledged without interruption, by all its powers. The tyranny or injustice of the Ottoman Porte towards its Greek subjects, could not be made the ground of interference, without setting it up as a principle that every sovereign had a right to take care that his neighbour éxercised his authority according to his notions of humanity and principle. France or England had no more right, in point of principle, to quarrel with the Sultan for leading into captivity the dishonoured matrons of Missolonghi, than for tying up in sacks, and throwing into the sea of Marmora, the matrons of Constantinople who talked of forbid den things. Neither could any help be derived from the fact, that the Greeks were Christians, and their oppressors Mahommedans, VOL. LXVIII.

however powerfully it might act as a bond of sympathy. In so far as oppression can justify foreign interference, it matters not whether that oppression be exercised 'over orthodox believers or over heretics: to twist the bow-string round the neck of an innocent mussulman, is as great an enormity as to twist it round the neck of an innocent Christian; and it has never been a rule of European policy, that nations of different religions ought not to be subject to the same sovereign. On what principle could Russia ask that Christian Greece should be withdrawn from under the yoke of Turkey, on which Turkey, in return, might not have insisted that the Mahommedan provinces of Daghistan and Shirvan should be liberated from the supremacy of Christian Russia? Any interference, therefore, in the shape of a demand, seemed to be out of the question: advice and good offices to both parties, were all that the Christian cabinets could offer. Russia, in the note in which she explained to the ministers of foreign powers at the Porte the reasons why she insisted by threats of using force, on the acceptance of her ultimatum regarding the principalities on the left bank of the Danube, assured them, that this resolution had no connection with the state of things in Greece: that, notwithstanding her natural inclination and the universal wish of the nation to save from extermination its remaining fellow-Christians, she would not depart from her previous engagements, to act only in concert with the other powers; and that the instructions sent to M. Minziacky had no relation to those affairs. The note concluded

[2 B]

with a hope, that the joint efforts of the ministers of the allied powers at Constantinople would succeed in putting an end to the dreadful scenes in Greece, and bring about an arrangement which might reconcile policy and humanity. A mission of the duke of Wellington to St. Petersburgh in the Spring of the year, was thought to have reference principally to the settlement of the contest; but, if the negotiation went any further than fixing general rules by which the cabinets were to be guided, and ascertaining their mutual intentions, it produced, in the mean time, no practical effect. Any conditions, again, to which the Greeks seemed willing to consent, were evidently such as Turkey would never accede to. According to a document delivered by general Roche to the Greek committee in Paris, and purporting to emanate from the National Assembly, the British minister at Constantinople was authorized to treat of peace on condition, that no Turk should reside, or possess property, in Greece; that all the Grecian fortresses should be occupied by Greek garrisons; that the Greeks should have a sufficient military and naval force for the maintenance of tranquillity, and the protection of commerce; that they 'should enjoy the right of coining money, and that the amount of tribute to be paid by them should be fixed; that the Sultan finally should have no influence over the Greek clergy, or in the internal organization of the country. If it was only the dread of a Russian invasion, when he was helpless, that induced the Sultan to concede the much more limited privileges of the Servians, it is easy to con

ceive with what temper he would have listened, in the moment of victory, to pretensions so high...

It was of importance to Greece to avoid, at least, any quarrel with the European powers, in which the unblushing and unre strained system of piracy pursued under her flag in the Levant, threatened to involve her. Almost every island in the Archipelago had become a nest of robbers. While the government could with difficulty man the national fleet, flotillas of mystics, and other piratical craft, swarmed from Candia to Negropont, and violated the flag of every nation that sailed the Mediterranean. The crews of the captured vessels were frequently treated with barbarous cruelty; the cargoes were openly carried for sale generally to Syra, and often regularly imported into Smyrna, the very market for which they had been shipped in the home port. There were squadrons of British, French, American, and Austrian men of war cruising in the Levant, but sometimes the hardihood of the pirates set them at defiance. When pursued, they ran their light and small vessels into some narrow and shallow creek, where a ship of war could approach them only by sending out her boats. If she did so, they fought from behind rocks with all the courage of despair. If taken, it was only to be run up at the yard arm; if they allowed their vessel to be captured or burned, they were left to starve; to be shot, therefore, fighting to the last, with a chance of escape, was better than either of these alternatives. The government of Greece was much too feeble to be able to put down these daring free

booters, who, in general, islanders themselves, found abundant friends in the inhabitants of the Archipelago. By a decree, however, is sued in June, it declared that it would consider as piratical all vessels which, not forming part of the Greek fleet, should cruise on the seas as privateers; secondly, all those vessels which, though belonging to the national fleet, should not be provided, besides their papers of military service, with regular letters of marque, signed by the government, or admiral; thirdly, all those small privateering vessels, which went under the denomination of mistichs, pirames, and clephtines. The local authorities stationed on the isl nds on the coast of Grecce, and the Greek ships of war, carrying regular commissions, were required to seize all such vessels, and, in case of resistance, to chase, sink, or burn them..

The building of pirames, clephtines, and other similar vessels calculated for piratical cruising, was expressly forbidden. If the builders of these interdicted barks did not forthwith abandon the intended construction of them, or undertook the building of any new ones, they were to be punished with fine and imprisonment. The public authorities of the islands on the coast, on which such barks were built, were also to be punished with a pecuniary penalty, if they did not prevent the construction of them. This decree was principally valuable as fixing certain plain characters which should be indicative of piracy, and thus freeing the naval squadrons of foreign powers from the difficulty which they often encountered of ascertaining the pirate from the Greek ship of war.

1

But by far the greatest difficulty which the commission of government had to encounter, and the greatest obstacle to remedying the losses they had sustained in western Greece, arose from the total ruin of the finances. Neither discipline, nor constancy, could be expected from troops who were ill-clothed, ill-fed, and not paid at all. Possessed of no resources in themselves, the Greeks had already contracted debts which they were unable to pay, and yet these debts had been contracted, and the money raised by them expended, without one. solitary real advantage having been hitherto purchased by them. On the return of lord Cochrane from establishing independence in Peru,he was willing,for an adequate pecuniary reward, to devote himself to the same cause in Greece: and, if a proper naval force could be put under his command, every thing was to be expected from his skill, his gallantry, and his love of enterprise. Certain gentlemen in London, styling themselves the Greck Committee, with the knowledge and consent of the Greek deputies, Messrs. Orlando and Luriottis, had entered into an arrangement with his lordship, by which a fleet was to be created, and placed under his command. It was to consist, not merely of the usual ships of war, but likewise of a number of steam-boats, not hitherto used in the Levant; and two large frigates were to be built in the United States. The only thing wanting for the execution of this plan was funds, precisely the want which it was most difficult to supply. Early in 1825, a loan to the extent of 2,000,000l. was negociated in [2 B 2]