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had been recommended to do by General Müffling, upon the generosity of the Czar. But the Duke of Wellington took a very different view of this Treaty. He judged it, pot with reference to Turkey or the Turks, but with reference to the promises and engagements of Russia to the other Powers of Europe, to Great Britain, and personally to himself. It stung the Duke to think that the Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 should trace its descent by the process of evolution from the Protocol of April 1826 ; and his remarks on the subject are extremely keen and important.

Whilst the progress of the campaign still hung in the balance, and it was doubtful whether Diebitsch could be stopped, the Duke wrote to Lord Aberdeen :

' It appears to me that Diebitsch ought to halt and negotiate if it be true that the Emperor wishes for peace. If he is not sincere in that wish, the relative military position of the parties leaves Constantinople, in my opinion, at Diebitsch's mercy. There is nothing to oppose him in front. His rear is to the Black Sea, of which he commands the navigation; and his communications with Burghas, &c., are secure. Even if the Grand Vizier, Hussein Pasha, and others could do anything from Schumla, they would not hurt General Diebitsch.

• I think that the King of Prussia as well as the King of France are pledged to enforce peace upon the terms which General Müffling and General Guilleminot have encouraged the Porte to offer, if the Emperor or General Diebitsch should decline to accept them ; if there should be an opportunity for their interference and for such enforcement. But there will be no such opportunity. The whole case depends upon the construction he will give to the instructions which he will have received ; if he should have received any. If General Diebitsch should have halted and should treat, the whole case is safe. If he should not have halted, and should have got possession of Constantinople, and have brought Heyden's fleet into the Dardanelles, there is an end to the Greek affair, and to the Turkish empire in Europe; and there will be no ground for Prussian or French interference on the score of either of the Emperor's promises, or of any former transaction. The world must then be reconstructed; and there is no doubt that the best ground for a satisfactory reconstruction would be a cordial co-operation between England and France, that is to say, if the French Government has a will of its own.

Upon such a subject it is not for me to give an opinion suddenly. My opinion is that the Power which has Constantinople, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, ought to possess the mouth of the Danube; and that the sovereign of these two ought not to have the Crimea and the Russian empire. We must reconstruct a Greek empire, and give it Prince Frederick of Orange, or Prince Charles of Prussia; and no Power of Europe ought to take anything for himself excepting the Emperor of Russia a sum for his expenses.

General Müffling, the Prussian emissary, certainly believed



that Diebitsch's instructions were to march on Constantinople without a pause, and he claims for himself some credit (in a letter to the Duke of the 30th Sept., p. 191) for the result. For he argues (and the observation deserves to be remembered) that the allied fleets in the Mediterranean could not have stopped the march of the Russian army, or come to the relief of Constantinople, because Diebitsch at Adrianople was nearer to the Dardanelles than to the capital, and had only to fall down upon the forts of the Dardanelles on the land side to isolate Constantinople from the forces of Europe. The occupation of the Thracian Chersonesus is a primary condition, sine qua non,

to the defence of Constantinople by the western or maritime Powers.

A little later, when the terms of the Treaty of Peace could hardly be known in London, the Duke wrote in a still more desponding strain, as if he thought the final catastrophe inevitable and had made up his mind to face it. To the Earl of Aberdeen.

*London, October 4, 1829. My dear Lord Aberdeen,—I return your paper. It would be absurd to think of bolstering up the Turkish Power in Europe. It is gone, in fact; and the tranquillity of the world, or what is the same thing the confidence of the world in the permanence of tranquillity, along with it. I am not quite certain that what will exist will not be worse than the immediate annihilation of the Turkish Power.

• It does not appear to me to be possible to make out of the Greek affair any

substitute for the Turkish Power; or anything of which use could be made hereafter, in case of its entire annihilation and extinction. All I wish is to get out of the Greek affair without the loss of honour, and without inconvenient risk to the safety of the Ionian Islands.

The choice of the Prince is very important, if we are to have a Prince; but that choice will not rest with us. It will be carried against our views and interests, and we must adopt other measures to secure these interests.

' After all, you must not be quite certain of Prince Philip.* I know him; and I believe him to be as little friendly to this country as any other Prince on the Continent. "Believe me, &c.,

"WELLINGTON. A week later, however, on the 18th October, the Duke wrote an elaborate Memorandum on the terms of the Treaty, which he conceived to be all but fatal to the sovereignty of the Porte in the Principalities and in its own waters. The conclusion of this important paper may be said to have a direct

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* Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg.

bearing on the present state of affairs and the future relations of all the European Powers to Turkey. After discussing the provisions of the Treaty in detail, he goes on :

* These views are quite inconsistent with the Emperor's professions and promises, and with the security of other Powers; most particularly of Austria, to whom the occupation of the Principalities for eleven years, after the professions made, are not only a serious injury but an insult. This injury and insult are aggravated by the prospect, afforded by recent transactions and by this peace, that the Ottoman Power must crumble to pieces, and that the Principalities must remain in the hands of Russia, and with them and with Silistria alone, the command of the navigation of the Danube and of the Black Sea.

• These are the considerations arising out of recent transactions and the Treaty of Peace.

• In discussing the effects of this Treaty of Peace I see that I have omitted to state the influence which it is calculated to give to the Emperor of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Porte of all denominations.

• The whole of Armenia, Persian as well as Turkish, is now the dominion of his Imperial Majesty. The Servians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Greeks of the Morea, and the Islands, &c., will have been delivered from the Turkish domination; and it cannot be doubted that the measures completed by this Treaty of Peace must encourage other nations of Christians to endeavour to attain the same advantages by similar means.

• The other Powers of Europe and all parties in Europe must view this Treaty of Peace in the same light as we do. They may not have such reasons as we have to look with jealousy and anxiety at its consequences; but they must all consider it in the same light as the deathblow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of its power. Some may look to advantage from the partition of the spoil, as France and possibly Austria ; others may consider the general war, which will be the consequence of the dissolution of the Turkish empire, as affording a chance of new combinations and a fresh partition of territory, as the Liberal party in France and elsewhere, and possibly Prussia. But the attention, the hopes, and expectations of all will be excited, and there is no chance of any Power disarming.

• There is no doubt that it would have been more fortunate and better for the world is the Treaty of Peace had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish empire had been dissolved. The natural course would then have been for the great Powers of Europe to concur in discussing the disposition to be made of the wreck of the Turkish monarchy, including those important parts of it which the Emperor of Russia has taken to himself. It is difficult now to have such a discussion.

If France or Prussia were disposed to take any steps in concert with this country to prevent the evils which must be the consequence of this Treaty of Peace, they would before this time have approached us.

France will not move without England, and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia. The object of our measures, whatever they are, should be to obtain an engagement, or at all events a clear understanding among the five Powers, that in case of the dissolution of the Turkish monarchy the disposition of the dominions hitherto under its government should be concerted and determined upon by the five Powers in Conference. It is obvious that in the existing state of the Turkish Power such an agreement cannot form the subject of a treaty or convention. The hypothesis on which such agreement would be founded would cause the evil immediately, against the consequences of which it would be intended eventually to guard.

* The object must be approached then hy another mode, probably a guarantee with an engagement between the Powers that they will consider as a subject for general discussion and concert any measures to be hereafter taken respecting the Turkish empire. I am aware of the objections to a guarantee, particularly in this country and as applied to a country which, as in this case, we have not defended and have allowed to be conquered and overturned. But a concert growing out of a guarantee appears to me the measure the best calculated as well to calm the anxiety, the fears, and expectations which must be the result of this transaction as to satisfy this country that the best that could be done has been done for its interests. This measure, however, will not prevent the necessity for our making a remonstrance to the Emperor upon what has passed.

• This remonstrance, strong in facts yet moderate and respectful in language, should be so drawn as to be producible if necessary; but it should not be produced or ever come to light if we should be able to attain our object, that of obtaining a concert upon the future fate of the Turkish dominions. It might lead to this desired concert by drawing from the Emperor a proposition that it should take place; or by inducing other Powers to propose it upon seeing the statement of our opinion upon what has passed and our views of the future. If a concert should take place, our answer to the public would be that we are assured that the crumbling to pieces of the Turkish government would not create a war, and would not occasion such an accession of dominion and power to any State as would alter the general balance of possession and give reasonable cause of apprehension to others.


These are, we believe, as nearly as possible the principles which regulate, at this moment, the policy of the great Powers of Europe; and though the dissolution of Turkey has not made such rapid progress as was anticipated fifty years ago, the remedy proposed is the same.

In justice to the Emperor Nicholas it must be said that he released the Porte from some of the harshest conditions of the agreement, and reduced the indemnity; but the Duke of Wel


lington condemned the Treaty not for its effect on the Turks, but for its consequences to ourselves and the other Powers of Europe.

* This government admits that if the Treaty of Peace is to be considered only in relation to the status quo of the belligerents at the period it was negotiated and signed, it is moderate. The Grand Seignior, his family, his government, his capital, his arsenals, and everything belonging to him, were at that moment in the power of the Emperor of Russia. But that is not the view in which we think the Treaty ought to be considered. We think that it ought to be considered in relation to the Emperor's previous professions and promises; particularly by this government, which professed its intention of not delivering its opinion, till the peace should be concluded; which was kept in the dark upon the terms intended to be dictated, till those terms were actually concluded and signed; and to which hopes have been held out of an inclination to modify those terms.

"After such a war it is not easy to discover the terms of peace, which would leave the Porte in a state to exercise with independence the powers of its government. But this I must say, that if the negotiators of the Treaty of Peace—instead of keeping steadily in view his Imperial Majesty's professions and promises ; his professions to maintain the independence of the Porte; his promises not to add to his dominions; and his Imperial Majesty's relations with his Allies, particularly England and France, whose governments have expressed an anxious interest to maintain the independent existence of the government of the Porte—had desired to destroy that government by the demands of Russia, by the weakness in which they have left it to resist these demands, and by the surrender of the independent exercise of powers, without which no government can exist in a state of independence, they would have dictated exactly the Treaty which has been concluded.

• There is one point, however, upon which our interests in the Mediterranean particularly require that this government should have explanation. That is, the right of the Porte to regulate the resort of ships of war to its own waters. This is a point upon which all the Powers of the Mediterranean must feel an interest; and we must know whether the Porte is, or is not, independent of Russia in the exercise of the powers of government in relation to it.'

Amongst the curious episodes with which this volume abounds none are more amusing than those which relate to the King and other members of the Royal Family. The Duke, who knew them well, and would have fought for the Crown, like an old Cavalier, had it hung on a bush, has certainly not spared the illustrious personage who happened to wear it. In the middle of August 1829, just as Diebitsch was crossing the Balkan and Polignac opening his ill-omened campaign against the liberties of France, George IV., suffer




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