and consisted of the Coastguard, the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers, and the reserve of last summer. It had been suggested that if he wished to raise 30,000 men he must remove the restrictions imposed and admit all comers; but he had come to the determination of restricting enrolment in the Royal Naval Volunteers to able seamen alone, as he hoped by that course to make the force more efficient and more popular. He did not think the suggestion of forming a reserve out of those seamen who had served ten years a wise one, as it would deprive the Navy of the services of those very men whom it could least spare, and at a time when their services were most valuable. He then adverted to the question of training and drill for the volunteers, and, expressing his assent to the necessity of good training and drill, said it was impossible, for various reasons which he stated, to give the men more than the allotted twenty-two days for drill. The present enrolment of volunteers was only about forty or fifty men a week, but he hoped that this number would be much increased when the suspicions engendered by the great liberality of Parliament were dissipated, and when seamen became thoroughly impressed with the knowledge that they would never be called out except in cases of absolute emergency.

Lord Ellenborough did not entertain great expectations of the value of the naval reserves sought to be established. The real reserve for the Navy was the body of seamen unemployed at all periods of the year. He congratulated the country on the successive efforts made by the Admiralty to improve the condition of the sailor, and

thought the liberality of Parliament in this respect was most wise and worthy of the nation.

The subject then dropped.

Later in the session, about the beginning of May, a fuller and more comprehensive discussion as to the strength and condition of our navy and its competency in the event of invasion for defensive purposes, was originated by Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords. That veteran statesman, in one of those weighty addresses which produce a great impression both on his immediate auditors and upon public opinion, entered on this important subject with the view of arousing the attention of the Government and of the country to the urgency of meeting the increasing naval armaments of France by a corresponding addition to the strength and efficiency of our own navy. Lord Lyndhurst prefaced the question, which he addressed to the Ministers of the Crown as to the present condition and probable future progress of our marine force, by remarking upon the ignorance which existed in England on the state of the navy, and he proceeded to point out the enormous efforts made by France to create a navy since 1849, when a Commis. sion for the re-organization of the French navy was issued. success attending these efforts had been so great that France was now in possession of an admirable steam navy. The avowed object of that Commission and that navy was to attack this country; and one of the questions considered by it was, how a French navy, with a considerable military force on board, might invade England. What had been done in the mean time by the Government of this country? Alarmed by the grow

ing naval power of France, the Government had been at length aroused, and had at a great expense succeeded in forming a navy equal, but not more than equal, to that of France. We had last year twentynine sail of the line, and France had the same number, but the French were superior in frigates. We might now, perhaps, exceed the French naval steam force by a few ships; but, if we were superior, it was only in a small degree. But equality in numbers with the French navy was in reality inequality, because, while their navy was concentrated, ours was scattered in order to protect our distant possessions. To be equal with France we ought to have double the number of steam-vessels of France, especially as the alleged superiority of our seamen was now considerably modified by the alterations in navigation. But the question arose, How were these ships to be manned? The French navy was supplied by the "conscription maritime," so as to occasion no difficulty in despatching a ship at once to sea; in addition to which, the French Government encouraged by bounties the large northern fisheries, from which in case of war they would at once be able to draw a supply of 40,000 men. The force required by this country was a Channel fleet equal to that of France, a Home fleet in case of disaster, a Mediterranean fleet, and a fleet of observation. But we were incapable of manning such fleets, and this inability was perfectly understood by France. Lord Lyndhurst traced the various difficulties which had been always experienced in this country, and the expedients resorted to, down to the attempts to man the Baltic fleet-a measure of

such difficulty that foreign sailors and landsmen had to be taken on board. These difficulties still existed, as he believed that nothing had been done since that time to remedy the evil. What, then, was to be done? That was not for him, but for the Admiralty, to decide; but he would remind the Government, that under the new system of warfare a blow could be struck in a moment, and to strike the first blow would be almost decisive of the war. Adverting to the recommendations of the Royal Commission which had sat upon the subject of the navy, he examined those recommendations in detail, and highly blamed the Government for not having carried them out in a more prompt and effective manner.

Their report had been made in February, 1859, and was one which demanded the most speedy attention, but he believed that not a single man had been raised until the 1st of January last, and, instead of the 30,000 men recommended by the Commissioners, only 800 men, according to Lord C. Paget, had been raised in three months, so that it would take ten years at that rate to raise the 30,000 men. The causes of failure, he believed, had been various, but among them he considered that the complication of the regulations and the smallness of the bounty might be looked upon as chief. Why, the 6l. bounty for the whole 30,000 men would only amount to 180,000l. out of 12,000,000l. of naval estimates! This saving of money in men and spending it on machinery and material was like making a watch and leaving out the mainspring. It was a penny-wise and pound foolish economy. The conclusion he came to was, that our naval affairs were in a deplorable

condition, and the question suggested itself whether this was due to the Board of Admiralty; the constitution, continual changes, and non-naval chiefs, of which he severely criticised. Alluding to the present tendency of our financial policy, to abolish indirect taxation and to diminish the Army and Navy Estimates, he pointed out the folly of following such a course, and asked if it were wise to reduce our navy, while the French navy was being increased year by year, purely upon the supposition of always maintaining the friendship of the Emperor of the French, and of establishing by commercial means a peaceful feeling between France and this country. He concluded by animadverting in strong terms on the meddling measure of Lord John Russell, which was setting class against class at a time when it was urgently necessary that all classes should be united.

The Duke of Somerset, (First Lord of the Admiralty,) admitted that the subject was of great public importance, and, in consequence, he was the more eager to refute the impression made by Lord Lyndhurst's speech that the present Government had reduced the naval force of the country. During the last eight months more men had been employed in the dockyards, exclusive of the factories, than had ever been employed at any previous period in the history of this country. We had now, exclusive of blockships and sailing vessels, 50 ships-of-the-line afloat, 30 frigates, 17 corvettes, 88 sloops, many of large power; 26 small vessels, 24 gun vessels of a peculiar class, and 350 gunboats. The French had 53 ships-of-the-line, and had six or eight more build. ing, 38 frigates and 12 building,

With re

and about 140 sloops. gard to our naval reserve the coastguard now numbered 6862 men, and, although it had been suggested to add at once 12,000 more, he thought it would be a great mistake to fill up by new men a service which sailors of the navy regarded as their own ultimate destination. The naval coast volunteers numbered 7000, and they were in the highest efficiency. As to the Royal Naval Reserve, only 1000 men had been at present enrolled; but as yet the scheme had hardly come into operation. The actual naval reserve at the present moment was 14,850 men, whose services were immediately available in any danger. In regard to the regulations which Lord Lyndhurst had ridiculed, he explained that they applied to different classes, but that all which affected the common seaman were printed upon a single sheet of paper. It was true that the numbers enrolled in the Royal Navy Reserve were not so many as might be desired; still he believed that a spirit was rising among the men highly favourable to the service, and this spirit would be still more favourable when they once understood that they were not to be sent out of the country on every petty war, but only to be called upon in case any great European war should arise. There was one point which he would touch upon, and which was of great importance in considering the question of naval reserves-he meant training boys for the navy. This had been done by the present Government, and had been attended with the greatest success. He briefly alluded to the remarks of Lord Lyndhurst on the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, and pointed out, in

reply, that failures had generally been the result of the appointment of naval men to the post of First Lord of the Admiralty. He deprecated anything like party spirit in discussing such a national question as the efficiency of the navy, and hoped that, however they might differ upon other questions, they would be united on this.

Lord Hardwicke expressed his regret that so long an interval had elapsed before active measures were taken for carrying into effect the recommendations of the Royal Commission as to the formation of the Naval Reserve; at the same time he was glad to find, from the exceedingly clear, frank, and candid speech of the Duke of Somerset, that the Government had become impressed with the necessity of activity. He concluded his speech with some remarks upon the necessity of impressment in manning the navy in cases of great need.

Lord Colchester said that, although he perfectly admitted the capabilities of civilians to fill the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, he thought it would be as well that the impression should not go forth to the navy that naval men were unfit for that post. He concluded by impressing on their lordships the necessity of having a measure passed to empower Government to impress seamen in case of an European war.

The Duke of Somerset, in reply to Lord Stanley of Alderly, stated that the marines would be increased by the addition of 1000 men during the present year. It had been proposed to increase the marines still more, but it was deemed inexpedient to make the total increase all at once. The 6000 men on shore recommended

by the Royal Commission to be held ready for embarkation in case of emergency were already enlisted. In regard to impressment, he thought it would be only under circumstances of the direst emergency that the Government would be justified in recommending such a course to Her Majesty.

The Lord Chancellor briefly stated that there was no doubt that, although the custom had fallen into disuse, the law in regard to impressment was as much in force as ever.

The discussion here terminated. Much impression was, however, produced on the public mind by the proceedings of this evening.

On the same day, in the House of Commons, Sir C. Napier moved an address to Her Majesty, expressing the regret of the House that, instead of a reserve of 70,000 men, contemplated by the Manning Commission, there existed only 6362 coastguardmen, 1900 district ship's companies, 1400 revenue men, and 600 cruisers' men, and 5000 or 6000 coast volunteers not to be depended upon; and praying Her Majesty to give directions that the coastguard should be completed to 12,000 seamen, as recommended by the Commission, ready to be placed in efficient ships at the several ports, instead of the present block ships; thus constituting a reserve of ten sail of the line, ready for any emergency; that the number of naval volunteers, now under 1000, should be completed as soon as possible; and the other recommendations of the Commission complied with. In the course of a long speech he threw out many hints for improvements of the navy, and for rendering it popular, accusing the Admiralty, among

other shortcomings, of tardiness in adopting his suggestions.

The motion was seconded by Sir J. Elphinstone.

Lord C. Paget, premising that, in his opinion, the bringing matters of detail connected with the navy so frequently before the House was unadvisable, and not for the advantage of the service, asked the House not to agree to the motion, noticing the invidious manner in which the coast volunteers were spoken of in it, and maintaining that they were to be "depended upon." He went over the principal topics in the motion and in the speech of Sir C. Napier, whose figures, he said, were inaccurate, observing that the enrolment of the naval volunteers, in spite of various obstacles, was proceeding satisfactorily, and that all the important recommendations of the Manning Commission had been carried out as far as practicable. One of the most important related to boys for the navy, and the number which in 1857 was 1898, in 1859 was 5147, and now the number of boys educating for the navy was 8535, who would become first-rate seamen; and this was considered to be an ample supply. Lord Clarence entered into various details bearing on the present condition of the navy, and complained of the motion as implying a direct censure upon the Admiralty, who were doing their best for the public

service.

Sir J. Pakington was glad that the motion had been made, as it was important to know what exertions the Admiralty were making to obtain a sufficient reserve force for the navy; and as it had elicited an answer which he had heard with great satisfaction, he hoped

it was the intention of the Admiralty to carry out all the recommendations of the Royal Com mission.

The discussion was continued by Sir M. Seymour, Mr. Corry, Sir G. Pechell, Admiral Walcott, and other members. Eventually the motion was withdrawn.

About a fortnight later, on the 14th of June, the subject of the Naval Reserve again engaged the attention of Parliament. The question was now raised by Mr. Lindsay, who had been a member of the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy, and had presented a separate Report on some points on which he had not agreed in the conclusions of his colleagues. Mr. Lindsay began by adverting to the fact, that our reserves were, at that time, considerably below the number recommended by the Commission. All agreed, he observed, as to the necessity of maintaining our fleets in an efficient state, and of course at as small an expense as possible; but we were expending in time of peace 15,000,000l. per annum on our navy, yet we were not prepared, because we had not a sufficient reserve of seamen. We were consequently obliged to keep our large ships cruising about, to the alarm of France; a pressure was thereby brought to bear upon that country which reacted upon this. Even if we had suflicient reserves we had not sufficient officers to command them; and he recommended the employment of officers of the merchant service in this branch of the navy. He moved that," with a view to greater efficiency in war and less expenditure in peace, more prompt and effective measures should be adopted to