shared by others, and he read the opinion of a distinguished civil functionary at Madras supporting those views, and condemning the financial policy of Mr. Wilson.

Sir C. Wood said he should abstain from following Mr. Seymour into the details into which he had entered, and from discussing any plan of taxation for India. The ground for the recall of Sir C. Trevelyan was quite independent of the merits of his scheme; it was simply his most improper act in publishing his minute. That minute was a most excellent and able document; but it was quite another question whether it should be published to the world. This was done, too, without the concurrence or knowledge, and even against the opinion, of the other members of the Madras Government, by Sir C. Trevelyan, who had avowed and justified the act. Much as he regretted the loss of so able a man, the Home Government would, in his opinion, be wanting in their duty, however painful to them, if they passed over such an act of insubordination, an act subversive of all authority, the mutiny of one Governor against another.

Mr. Bright said the question was one of a somewhat painful character, and he quite understood the difficulty in which Sir C. Wood was placed. He had considered the Budget of Mr. Wilson, and did not deny its ability; but the fault he found with it was that it proposed to balance income and expenditure by imposing new taxes. Sir C. Trevelyan was strongly of opinion that Mr. Wilson's scheme was not a wise one for his Government, and that it was not necessary to raise new taxes, but that the balance might

be effected by reducing expenditure, and he wrote a most able minute, which showed him to be more of a statesman than the authors of the Calcutta scheme. But the question was as to the course taken by him in publishing his minute. This course was most unusual and contrary to official etiquette, and he could not join Mr. Seymour in condemning Sir C. Wood. The withdrawal of Sir C. Trevelyan from Madras would, however, be deeply regretted; though not a judicious subordinate, he had proved himself a wise Governor, and he (Mr. Bright) hoped Sir C. Wood would study his minute with care, as it would enable him to modify and greatly improve the project of legislation proposed at Calcutta. In the discussion which succeeded,

Lord Palmerston said he concurred in the general tribute to the ability and honesty of Sir C. Trevelyan, and his determination to do his duty without regard to consequences. But this was an occasion on which all personal considerations must yield to a sense of duty in those who were responsible for the conduct of public affairs. In the case of such an act of insubordination, such a violation of official duty, attended with so much hazard, the Government had no option, and he could not understand how a man so versed in official duty, and so well aware of the consequences of such an act, could have been blind to its character.

Shortly before the termination of the Session, on the 13th of August, the general subject of Indian finance came under discussion in the House of Commons on the oc casion of the Secretary of State

for India, Sir C. Wood, making the usual annual statement respecting the revenue and expenditure of that branch of the Empire. He commenced by noticing the departure of Mr. James Wilson and the recall of Sir Charles Trevelyan; and referred to the papers on the table, which were so full and clear that he would only give a short summary of them. The proposals of the Supreme Government had excited great criticism and opposition; and led to controversial correspondence with the other Govern ments of India. Referring to Sir Charles Trevelyan, he spoke of the recall as the most painful duty of his public life; he had seen Sir Charles that morning, and had received from him an assurance of assistance. He could not refrain from expressing the loss this country and India had sustained in the death of Lord Elphinstone; no man had greater experience of Indian administration under ordinary circumstances, and when the mutiny broke out he was equal to the emergency. There was a despatch from the Government of Bombay upon the table: in addition to the voluminous correspondence there were the ordinary finance accounts of India with an

explanatory despatch; beyond that, a comparative account of the estimates of revenue and expenditure for the last five years. There were some differences between the finance accounts and the comparative statement, but the latter was compiled from more recent information, and contained items which were not in the other accounts. Before going into the finance account, he referred to the deficits of the two previous years. He had been sometimes accused of taking

too gloomy a view of Indian finance he had stated last August what he estimated would be the deficit of the years ending April, 1858-59: he was wrong both in receipt and expenditure; the revenue was larger; the expenditure was larger; but the two had so far kept pace together as to make the deficit what he had stated. He had estimated the deficit of 1859 at 14,707,0001., it was only 14,187,000l. For the year ending April, 1860, the deficit was put at 9,281,000l.; but it was really 9,981,000l., payments thrown over one year to another preventing accurate estimates; but whilst his estimate was 23,988,000l., the actual amount was 24,168,000l., or a difference of only 180,000l. This close agreement was accidental, but he claimed credit for not exaggerating the state of affairs. The expenditure in 1859-60 was 45,890,000l.; income, 37,796,000l.; deficit, 8,094,000l. To that was to be added guaranteed interest upon railroads, 887,000l.; total deficit, 8,981,000l. The expenditure for the year 1860-61 was estimated at 43,958,000l., and the income at 37,762,000l., leaving a deficit of 6,196,000l.; or adding the interest on railroads (this year increased by 400,000l.) amounting to 1,276,000l. a total deficit of 7,472,000l. No one, he observed, could be sanguine enough to suppose that this deficiency could be met by a reduction of the military expenditure: there had, however, been a reduction in the last two years of this branch of the expenditure to the amount of 6,000,000l. After reviewing the principal items of charge which had augmented since the year 1856-57, the model year, before

the mutiny, he stated that, comparing the estimated amount of revenue with that of charge for the year 1861-62, the estimated deficiency would be 6,611,000. The question was how this deficiency was to be met, and, after a careful examiration, he had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to effect this by a reduction of expenditure. The Government of India had resolved to meet the exigency by a system of increased taxation, including an income-tax, and, although the result of this experiment might be contemplated with some anxiety, there was no alternative, and he thought the Home Government and Parliament ought to give its best support to the Government of India. The next question was the probable produce of the new taxes. Not much could be expect ed to be obtained in the present year; but, in 1861-62, it was es timated that they would yield 8,500,0007.; deducting this from €,011,0007, there would still be a deficiency of 3,111,000l. This, he believed, would be eventually met by a reduction of expenditure, so that at the end of the year 1861-62, the expenditure and the revenue would be equalized. He proposed to provide for the immediate deficiency without having recourse to borrowing money, by means of the balances in the Treasury, and from the payments on account of railroads in India, which would amount to 7,000,000l. this year, of which 5,000,000. would be disbursed in India; and he moved the Resolution empowering him to raise a sum not exceeding 3,000,000l. by way of precaution only. He then entered into details regarding a paper currency, railroads, public works and

improvements in India, revenue settlements, the new arrangements made in Oude and the Punjaub, the treatment of the talookdars, and other matters of a social and economical nature, concluding with a confident anticipa tion that in time the improvement of the country and the augmentation of its resources would make our rule of India the means of conferring a lasting benefit upon the people.

Mr. H. Seymour considered the statement of Sir C. Wood most unsatisfactory, contending that the Government had not exerted their endeavours to keep down the expenditure to the lowest point. He discussed at much length, and in a tone of severe criticism, the financial statement of Sir Charles, the topics introduced into his speech, as well as its omissions of such subjects as the civil service, law reform, and the sale of land, accompanying his strictures with suggestions of his own. He condemned the proceedings of Sir C. Wood in relation to Sir C. Trevelyan, and complained generally of his mode of carrying on the business of India.

Mr. W. Ewart was of opinion that the military expenditure of India might be reduced by diminishing the army and creating an efficient police.

Mr. Gregson approved the course pursued by the Indian Government of meeting the deficiency by new taxes, and he believed that by degrees the revenue and expenditure might thus be brought to a level.

Sir H. Willoughby, on the other hand, thought the prospects of Indian finance were very alarming. One of the great dangers, observed, was the doubtful

he

foundation upon which the financial statement rested, as Mr. Wilson had discovered. Much depended upon the composition of the army. There was danger, in his opinion, of losing India by obnoxious taxes.

Mr. Roebuck complained of the principle upon which compensation for losses in the mutiny had been made.

Sir De Lacy Evans could not understand with what object an immense military establishment was kept up in India now that the mutiny was suppressed-until this force was reduced to a smaller compass, there could be no relief to the finances.

Mr. Vansittart did not anticipate much difficulty in the collection of the income-tax.

Mr. Crawford threw out suggestions for a modification of the system of railway guarantees.

Mr. T. G. Baring replied to Mr. Seymour's speech, and said, with respect to the military expenditure, that the Indian Government were fully convinced of the necessity of reducing the army, and were taking every practicable means for that object, but it must take some time to accomplish.

Mr. Ayrton objected to the course of giving what was asked by the Government of India without examination-a course of unlimited credit that would produce unmitigated extravagance. He urged the abolition of what he termed the "mock Parliament," the Legislative Council of India, and the separate presidential Go

vernments.

After a short general reply from Sir C. Wood, the Resolutions proposed by him were agreed to.

Among the many important measures to which this active Ses

sion gave birth, the Act for the re-organization of the Indian Army deserves a prominent place. The incorporation of this force with the Imperial Army was one of the consequences of that transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Queen's administration, which had recently taken place. This revolution, as it may be justly termed, arose out of the mutiny, which, though most disastrous in itself, was not wholly unfortunate in its consequences, since it gave occasion for those changes in the financial administration and military system of India, which the exigencies of that vastly-increased empire urgently demanded. The change in the constitution of the Anglo-Indian Army which the Government were now impelled to make, was one on which opinions were at the time much divided; many persons whose Indian experience entitled their views to great weight dissented strongly from the measure; in particular, the newlyconstituted Indian Council of the Secretary of State were almost unanimously opposed to their chief and to his colleagues in the Cabinet on this question. Their opinion, however, could not prevail against the decision of a higher authority and the step which the Queen's advisers deemed it necessary to take received full confirmation from Parliament.

On the 12th of June Sir C. Wood moved for leave to bring in a Bill to alter the regulation of Her Majesty's local European forces in India. He explained the nature of the force in question. The East India Company, he observed, had maintained three armies, one at each Presidency, part of which consisted of Europeans enlisted in this country

for local service in India, the proportion of which to the Royal troops, paid by the Company, was latterly as two to one. After the Sepoy mutiny was over, discontent arose in the local troops, and many of them were discharged and sent home. The question, and the only question, was whether a separate European force should be still maintained for the special service of India, or whether the whole of the European force employed in India should form part of the Queen's army, disposable for general service. Upon no question which he had been called upon to consider, he observed, had he entertained more serious and longer doubts; he had at length come to the conclusion that it was not expedient to have a local force in India, which, in present circumstances, would require, not the continuance of an existing force, but the raising of a new large local force. He proceeded to state the reasons and arguments which had led to that conclusion, and the pleas which it was incumbent upon those to make out who advocated the maintenance of two separate forces, raised from the same class, yet placed in different circumstances, and subject to distinct authorities. He read the opinions of persons in high positions, some having been once in favour of a local army, who had changed their views in consequence of the misconduct of the late local force,-an occurrence which he thought ought to operate as a warning, the danger of combination being less in a moveable force than in one located in India. He discussed the objections to the proposal, one of which was financial-namely, the greater expense of Queen's troops; but, he remarked, besides that the

most efficient force was the cheapest, that the excess of cost was not so great as to weigh in the question. There was only one consideration, indeed, which was a serious one, requiring to be well weighed, and it had led him for some time to entertain doubts of the expediency of amalgamating the armies,-that was, the argument that it would be difficult to obtain a supply of officers for Indian service. He enumerated some of the attractions that would be opened to the Indian service by a scheme of amalgamation, and came to the conclusion that the line would supply an adequate number of officers. In conclusion, he urged that both for Indian and imperial reasons it was essential that our military power, upon which our chief reliance must be placed, should be maintained in a state of discipline and efficiency, and that object would be best attained by one uniform force.

Lord Stanley, after disclaiming party or personal motives, and frankly acknowledging the difficulties presented by Indian questions, and the intricacy and perplexity of this question in particular, observed that, knowing the opinions of high authorities upon this subject, he should think it an act of political cowardice if he hesitated to express his own sentiments and to claim for those of others a fair and full consideration. Having noticed briefly the objection to the maintenance of two European armies in India-that it was a theoretical anomaly-he remarked that the difficulty of dealing with this question was greatly increased by the absence of any distinct plan to be substituted for the existing scheme. In considering what should be the constitu