ject which could not be evaded, as the House, he said, had been challenged to consider the treaty upon political grounds, it having been avowedly negotiated for political purposes. In considering the question of Savoy, he avowed that the conduct of the French Government appeared to him in that matter to have been, so far as the English Government was concerned, sincere, frank, and straightforward, while the latter had been pursuing a policy which they knew must necessarily have led to the annexation of the provinces, yet in the end turning round and affecting surprise. He complained that the narrative of the transactions on this subject was imperfect, from the want of important information contained in private letters which did not appear. With a full knowledge of the intention of the Emperor of the French, no protest was made until a comparatively late period, and the House was now asked to assent to a commercial treaty on account of the critical condition of Europe, although it was so placed that it could exercise no control in the matter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he thought the House would be of opinion that the time for the full discussion of the matters referred to in the speech of Mr. Disraeli had not yet arrived. He should be ready, he observed, to rest the defence of the treaty on the various speeches already delivered, excepting the speech of Mr. Horsman, to which he replied, protesting against the tone and language in which he had described the character, policy, and conduct of the head of a neighbouring and friendly nation. After vindicating the general policy of the Government in relation to the affairs of

Italy, he considered the objections offered to the treaty. It had been said it was a bargain, and that we had sought equivalents and had not got them. He denied that the treaty was a bargain, for the essence of a bargain was that something was to be given which was worth retaining, and something was to be received in return. But nothing was given to France which was of value to us, and nothing was received from France, except a measure by which France conferred

a

benefit upon herself. Upon commercial grounds, the short recommendation of the treaty was, that at a very small loss of revenue we gained the advantage of a very great extension of our trade. We had long acted upon the principle that all differential duties were bad, and there was scarcely a duty abandoned by us that was not a differential duty. With regard to France, no measure was more likely to conciliate the people of that country. There was another important consideration. Nothing would be able to withstand the moral contagion of the example of England and France acting together on the principles of free trade, which, in his opinion, would extend far beyond the limits of the two countries. Mr. Gladstone proceeded to reply to specific objections to the articles of the treaty relating to shipping, contending that the treaty did much for British shipowners; and to coals, which article, he insisted, made no alteration in our rights and duties in regard to belligerents

it was simply a commercial question. He enlarged upon this part of the treaty as regarded the interests of France and England, slightly adverting to other objections, which, he said, would not

nations, as it would create in the minds of the French people the idea that French industry was sacrificed to England to promote political objects. The balance of the advantages was by no means in favour of this country, for, while French shipping was placed on the same footing as our own, ours was subjected to all its present disadvantages; and, while France obtained from us all she wanted to promote her own manufactures, she had actually forbidden the free export of the raw material of paper. It was with regret that he alluded to Savoy, but he thought that this treaty ought not to have been signed without a formal disclaimer having been previously obtained from France of her intention to annex Savoy and Nice. Such a signal mark of our confidence and support as the signing of this treaty ought not under present circumstances to have been given. It had inflicted a stain upon the honour of the country by promulgating an opinion abroad, that England had agreed to the annexation in order to promote her own material interests. In conclusion, he asked whether he had not shown sufficient reasons why their lordships should refuse to share with the Government the responsibility of sanctioning the treaty.

Lord Wodehouse defended the financial scheme of Mr. Gladstone, which, he contended, was neither ambitious nor fanciful. The Budgets of Sir R. Peel in 1842 and 1845 were fully as wide in their range as that of Mr. Gladstone. In 1845, Sir R. Peel converted a surplus into a deficiency, whereas the present Budget merely left things very much as they were. He regretted extremely that Lord Grey had introduced the question

of Savoy into the discussion. The annexation of Savoy had nothing whatever to do with the treaty, nor was there, as had been hinted, any collusion between the English and French Governments in connection with the annexation of Savoy. The treaty ought to be tested upon commercial principles, and to stand or fall by them alone.

Lord Malmesbury concurred with the opinion of Lord Grey, but said he was not opposed to commercial treaties, as seven years ago he himself, when a member of Lord Derby's Government, had entered into negotiations with France with a view to extend the commercial relations of the two countries. Those negotiations did not succeed, owing to the unwillingness of the French to make mutual concessions. It was said that this treaty was not a bargain; but, if it were not, what was it? The treaty was not only a commercial disadvantage to this country, but a political mistake. The treaty was a concession, not to this country, but to the Palmerston Government, in order that by conciliating the cotton party it might retain office. It was a treaty not between the French and English people, but between the Emperor of the French and Lord Palmerston. He corroborated this assertion by reading extracts from an article in the Journal des Débats of the 10th of March, and asked whether, if this was the view taken by the French people, it would tend to cement the friendship of the two nations. He condemned in strong terms the conduct of the Government in signing this treaty pending the question of the annexation of Savoy, and sincerely regretted to see the Emperor of the French departing

from that policy which he had proclaimed at the commencement of his reign, and entering on the course which had been so ruinous to the First Empire.

Lord De Grey and Ripon defended the treaty as calculated to extend our commercial relations, and affording fresh securities for peace.

Earl Stanhope took an opposite view of the tendencies of the treaty, which had already excited the hostility of the protected interests in France with which it interfered.

Lord Overstone entertained very grave doubts as to the expediency of entering into any such treaty, as such engagements were full of danger and difficulty. In such matters each country would consult its own advantage better by pursuing its own inte rests, acting independently, and progressively reforming its tariff without binding itself to this or that party. In regard to the export of coal, he thought it not a question of depriving foreign countries of that article, but of the propriety of depriving ourselves of the fiscal benefit of an export duty. The demand for and consumption of coal was increasing annually, and, as it was an article limited in amount, and with no power of reproduction, the export of such a commodity was not a point upon which they were to have no opinion, but was, to say the least of it, an open question. He could not conceal the opinion he entertained that this treaty, instead of making us friends, was calculated to create ill-will and suspicion of having been mutually overreached, between the two nations. Reviewing the conduct

of Mr. Cobden as a negotiator, he pointed out instances of inattention to the interests of this country visible in the treaty, and then proceeded to lay down with great clearness the principles of free-trade, which were not, he contended, antagonistic to a system of duties, and he concluded by expressing his regret that he could not vote for the Address.

The Duke of Argyll defended Mr. Cobden and the Government from the charges brought against them by Lord Overstone, and explained, in reply to Lord Grey, that the remission of indirect taxes would not increase the present deficit, but merely leave it in the same condition as before. The increase in the Income-tax was not due to these remissions, but to the increased expenditure for naval and military armaments; and the increase of the Incometax was rendered necessary by the naval policy of their predecessors. His noble friend complained that the measures of the Government tended to alter the proportions between direct and indirect taxation, but this assertion was at variance with the results of taxation, for the Customs duties alone, in spite of the reduction of 11,000,000l. since Sir R. Peel's time, had increased by 2,000,000l. Sir R. Peel had not confined himself to reductions, but he made very large abolitions, many of them analogous to those of the treaty. As for an export duty on coal, it had been already tried, and had not materially interfered with the coal trade of the country. That article in the treaty on coal was a guarantee that France was inclining to peaceful objects, and if France was to

become to a great extent dependent upon us for coal it would be an additional guarantee for peace. He concluded by adverting to the triumphant manner in which this matter had been carried in the House of Commons, which was, he considered, a very strong argument in its favour.

Lord Derby was in doubt as to the precise points upon which they were asked to give an opinion. If their assent did not bind them to the approval of the Budget, why were they asked to vote an Address? So far as the purely commercial parts of the treaty were concerned, he was disposed to agree with Lord Grey, who considered that the consent of Parliament would be sufficiently given by passing the measures requisite to carry it out. To carry out the 11th Article, however, an Act of Parliament would be necessary. The Address, therefore, could not have the slightest effect upon either part of the treaty. But supposing the treaty to be a good one, was the present the proper time for adopting it, when a deficit of 9,000,000l. had to be provided for? He should be only too glad if the deficit were no greater, but he thought that the expenditure was under-rated and the income over-estimated. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, having remitted taxes to the amount of 3,000,000l., in order to reimburse the public purse, was compelled to reimpose the war duties on tea and sugar, to raise the Income-tax to 10d. in the pound, and to collect 900,000l. by small duties on commerce. How was this deficiency to be met? Why, by anticipating the revenue, the result of which would

Sir

be a deficiency of 11,000,000l. at least for the next year, to provide for which the only means was increasing the Income-tax. He denied the similarity of the course taken by the present Government and by Sir R. Peel in 1842. R. Peel had taken off taxes in the belief that it would occasion such an increase of indirect taxation as to enable him to take off the Income-tax, but no such hope was held out by the present Government. The tendency of the course pursued in the Budget was ultimately to abolish all indirect taxation, and to establish a large permanent Income-tax in time of peace. Supposing the treaty, however, to be beneficial, it was certainly purchased by a great sacrifice of revenue at a most inopportune time. The treaty was characterized by haste and want of consideration. How could it be reconciled, if the commodities of the two countries were on a fair and equal footing inter se, that French silks were admitted free of duty into England, while English silks imported to France paid a 30 per cent. ad valorem duty? There were no stipulations in the treaty that articles which were admitted into France at present at less than 30 per cent. should not be raised to that amount upon the ratification of this treaty. Another phase of the question was the political one. He would not say that the treaty should not have been signed unless the Emperor Napoleon promised to forego the annexation of Savoy, but he would say that in the present state of affairs in Europe, it did appear that this treaty had been thrown as a sop to England, and intended to convey the idea to Europe that