Sivut kuvina

to the state, and the payments made by the United States were deducted from the principal sums, exclusive of the interest; thereby stopping future interest on so much of the principal as had been reimbursed by the payment.

I deem it proper, moreover, to observe, that both under the act of the 5th of August, 1790, and that of the 12th of February, 1793, authorizing the settlement of the ac

counts between the United Statesand the individual states, arising out of the war of the revolution, the interest on these accounts was computed in conformity with the practice already adverted to, and from which the bill now returned is a departure.

With these reasons and considerations, I return the bill to the senate.

Andrew Jackson.

Veto of the Light House Bill.

To the House of Representatives.

In addition to the general views I have heretofore expressed to congress on the subject of internal improvement, it is my duty to advert to it again in stating my objections to the bill entitled "an act for the improvement of certain harbours and the navigation of certain rivers," which was not received a sufficient time before the close of the last session to enable me to examine it before the adjournment.

Having maturely considered that bill within the time allowed me by the constitution, and being convinced that some of its provisions conflict with the rule adopted for my guide on this subject of legislation, I have been compelled to withhold from it my signature, and it has therefore failed to become a law.

To facilitate as far as I can the intelligent action of congress upon the subjects embraced in this bill, I transmit herewith a report from the engineer department, distinguishing, as far as the information in its possession would enable it, between those appropriations which do, and those which do not, conflict with the rules by which my conduct, in this

respect, has hitherto been governed* By that report it will be seen that there is a class of appropriations in the bill for the improvement of streams that are not navigable, that are not channels of commerce, and that do not pertain to the harbours or ports of entry designated by any law, or have ascertained any connexion with the usual establishments for the security of commerce, external or internal.

It is obvious that such appropriations involve the sanction of a principle that concedes to the general government an unlimited power over the subject ofinternal improvement?, and that I could not, therefore, approve a bill containing them, without receding from the positions taken in my veto of the Maysville road bill, and afterwards in my annual message of December 7th, 1830.

It is to be regretted that the rules by which the classifiation of the improvements in this bill has been made by the engineer department, are not more definite and certain, and that embarrassment may not always be avoided by the observance of them; but, as neither my own reflection, nor the lights derived from other sources, have furnished me with a better guide, I shall continue to apply my best exertions to their application and enforcement. In thus employing my best faculties to exercise the powers with which I am invested, to avoid evils, and to effect the great, est attainable good for our common country, I feel that 1 may trust to your cordial co-operation; and the experience of the past leaves me no room to doubt the liberal indulgence and favourable consideration of those for whom we act.

The grounds upon which I have given my assent to appropriations for the construction of light houses, beacons, buoys, public piers, and the removal of sand bars, sawyers, and

other temporary, or partial impediments in our navigable rivers and harbours, and with which many of the provisions of this bill correspond, have been so fully stated, that I trust a repetition of them is unnecessary. Had there been incorporated in the bill no provisons for works of a different description, depending on principles which extend the power of making appropriations to every object which the discretion of the government may select, and losing sight of the distinctions between national and local character which I had stated would be my future guide on the subject, I should have cheerfully signed the bill.

Andrew Jackson.
December 6th, 1832.


By Andrew Jackson, President of the United States.

Whereas a convention assembled in the state of South Carolina have passed an ordinance, by which they declare, "that the several acts and parts of acts of the congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and more especially" two acts, for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, "are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens of that state or its officers:

and by the said ordinance it is fur; ther declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the state, or of the United States, to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same state, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance:

And whereas, by the said ordinance it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of said state, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the supreme court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any person attempting to take such appeal shall be punished as for a centempt of court.

And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they will consider the passage of any act by congress abolishing or closing the ports of the said state, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the federal government to coerce the state, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the union; and that the people of the said state will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connexion with the people of the otherstates, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent states may of right do:

And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the union; that union which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence; that sacred union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy constitution, has N

brought us, by the favour of heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equaled in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honour and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the convention.

Strict duty would |require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be, invested, for preserving the peace of the union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with state authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that any thing will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.

The ordinance is founded not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainty unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position that any one state may not only de. clare an act of congress void, but prohibit its execution; that they may do this consistently with the constitution; that the true construction of that instrument permits a state to retain its place in the union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that, to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the constitution; but it is evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For as by the theory there is no appeal, the reason alleged by the state, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by congress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a state more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by congress—one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the states. There is no appeal from the state decision in theory; and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against the application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favour. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous when our social compact in express terms declares, that the laws of the United States, its constitution, and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and, for greater caution, adds, "that

the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." And it may be asserted without the fear ofrefution, that no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look, for a moment, to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected any where; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that an unconstutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the state itself; for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.

If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the eastern states, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately, none of those states discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honour, if the states, who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its pro. secution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that state will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice.

If the doctrine of state veto upon the laws of the union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation, had it been proposed to form a feature in our government.

In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were formed for common defence, and before the Declaration of Independence, we were known in our aggregate character as The United Colonies Of America. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several states, by which they agreed that they would, collectively, form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that union, is found an article which declares that "every state shall abide by the determinations of congress on all questions which by that confederation should be submitted to them."

Under the confederation, then, no state could legally annul a decision of

the congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue. But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy constitution was formed; but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is, "to form a mart perfect union." Now, is it possible that, even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the constitution and laws of the United States over those of the states, it can be conceived, that an instrument made for the purpose of "forming a more perfect union" than that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom ofour country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a state, or of a prevailing faction in a state? Every man of a plain unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to de. stroy it.

« EdellinenJatka »