 | R. Douglas Geivett, Gary R. Habermas - 1997 - 340 sivua
...which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that... | |
 | Don Garrett Associate Professor of Philosophy University of Utah - 1996 - 289 sivua
...these two kinds of experience [ie, that for a kind of human testimony and that for a law of nature] are contrary, we have nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder.... | |
 | David Hume, Richard H. Popkin - 1998 - 158 sivua
...which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that... | |
 | Roberto Cipriani - 296 sivua
...which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience...to do but to subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder.... | |
 | John Earman - 2000 - 236 sivua
...three paragraphs that follow it. When experience supporting a presumptive law collides with testimony we have nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other. and embrace an opinion. cither on one side or the other. with that assurance which arises from the remainder.... | |
 | David Hume - 2000 - 460 sivua
...with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove... | |
 | Stuart C. Brown - 2001 - 212 sivua
...that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, uHis subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we mav establish it as a maxim, that no human testimonv can have such force as to prove... | |
 | Michael F. Palmer - 2001 - 388 sivua
...which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that... | |
 | Michael F. Palmer - 2001 - 388 sivua
...which gives aurhority to human testimony; and it is the same expetience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do bur substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with... | |
 | Various - 2002 - 596 sivua
...which gives authority to human testimony, and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience...nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other with that assurance which arises from the remainder.... | |
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It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but to subtract the one from the other,... 
