 | Richard A. Barney - 1999 - 442 sivua
...this essential function because it is the instrument of judgment, whose operation Locke defines as "the putting Ideas together, or separating them from...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so" (4.14.4). Metaphor, by contrast, is the agent of wit or fancy, and Locke declaims its inferiority when... | |
 | Samuel Fleischacker - 1999 - 351 sivua
...connections between ideas — while judgment puts ideas together when their agreement or disagreement is, "as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears" (IV.xiv.4). The notions that judgment is informed by perception and reason but identical with neither,... | |
 | Beat Affentranger - 2000 - 194 sivua
...whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, JUDGMENT, which is the putting ideas...disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so.... 141 The certainty of the findings of the faculty of knowledge is "intuitive" and amenable to demonstration,... | |
 | Michael Losonsky - 2001 - 252 sivua
...intellectual attraction for truth. For example. Henry More (GO I: 24-5). The work involved in proper assent is "the putting Ideas together, or separating them...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so" (E 4.14.4). For Locke, judgments, strictly speaking, are not "thoughts . . . run a drift, without direction... | |
 | Wiep Van Bunge - 2003 - 288 sivua
...whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas. Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so ...A2 Le Clerc in a similar way defines science as ' ... knowledge taken from the introspection of... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - 2003 - 452 sivua
...perceive a necessary connection between them. But the mind has what Locke calls another 'faculty', namely, judgment, which is 'the putting ideas together or...disagreement is not perceived but presumed to be so. ... And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right judgment.'4 Judgment... | |
 | Paul Schuurman - 2004 - 218 sivua
...whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of ai ly Ideas. Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so ..." Le Clerc in a similar way defines science as 'knowledge taken from the introspection of the thing... | |
 | Jörg Schönert, Friedrich Vollhardt - 2005 - 494 sivua
...Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin 1980, S. 631. of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas. Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas...the Word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.«65 Der juristisch beschlagene Leibniz greift in seinen Kommentierungen Lockes Wendungen »presumed... | |
 | John Shand - 2005 - 250 sivua
...(IV. xiv. 2). When knowledge is not available we have to use our judgement, which Locke defines as "the putting Ideas together, or separating them from...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so" (IV xiv. 4). As we judge things to be more or less probable so the assent we are rationally entitled... | |
 | Lex Newman - 2007 - 18 sivua
...whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas. Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas...Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so ... (E IV.xiv.4: 653) Just as Locke introduced judgment by analogy with knowledge, so Locke introduces... | |
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Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. first, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of, the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together,... 
