Stiglitz is an amazing great writer for an economist. His explanations are clear and succinct. Subject matter depressing. ( )

So glad I finally took the time to read this book. It is a clear and concise look at the current economic disaster as well as what forces caused it and what we should have done to make the aftershocks of the big crash less devastating. Really fascinating and sadly apt stuff. I wish I went to the university he teaches at; I can tell that Stiglitz is probably one of those lecturers that demands rapt attention and for good reason. ( )

Not as readable as his earlier books. My eyes tended to glaze over at the technical stuff... ( )

A great look at the issues contributing to the recent financial crises and how we are all going to be affected moving forward. I found it interesting and thought provoking, pretty much exactly what you'd expect from a Nobel Prize winning author. ( )

Very lucid and insightful explanation of the recent financial crisis, and what is to be done to recover from it. ( )

This book along with "The Price of Civilization" by Jeffrey Sachs put our current economic situation in an excellent historical perspective. It lays out what has gone wrong with unregulated(or lightly regulated) capitalism and proposes some common sense solutions. It refutes many assertions made by conservatives about the causes of the 2008 meltdown(it was not the Community Reinvestment Act) and supports the premise that the last 30 years has created income inequality and the structure that led to the real estate bubble development and subsequent blow up. A good book that everyone should read. ( )

Well, here's a guy relatively close to the mainstream of economic thought (a Nobel Prize tends to indicate that one's thinking is not TOO outlandish...) who thinks that the conservatives have gone too far - and that much of what ails us could be fixed by a return to more redistributive policies. Readable, conversational enough to follow. ( )

After reading 'Freefall,' I've debated whether Stiglitiz is better and predictive economics or proscriptive economics. In a class nearly by himself, Stiglitz is (at leat in this book) able to cut through much of the hype, propaganda, and distraction of an economic world gone mad and provide options for real reform. Even if you don't agree with his underlying arguments, it is intellectually dangerous to ignore his analysis. ( )

Two complaints. (a) It was pretty much a rant, and (b) The “advance reading copy” needed another edit or two. Still a valuable read.

I’m glad I had read Michael Lewis’ version of the bank collapse (The Big Short) before this one, because Lewis provided background that Freefall lacked, from the perspective of the real persons involved. However, the two books are quite different in character and, I imagine, intended audience. Mr. Stiglitz is an economist and writes for a public that warms up to debates on economic policy.

Mr. Stiglitz writes in a clear, no-nonsense manner, as if he were at a podium giving learned off-the-cuff views. He has provided explanations of the shortcomings of systems, and why the guilty or greedy could do what they did to prompt the banking crisis. He explains how, in fact, they were perversely incented to pursue unwise actions.

The best part of the book was the final two chapters because here Mr. Stiglitz leaves the rant aside and focuses on the types of change in banking, finance and monetary policy that could heal and advance the U.S. and global economy – both the how and why. ( )

Economics Nobel Price winner Stiglitz writes about the state of the US and global economies in a refreshing and unbiased way. He describes the recent financial crisis and bank bailouts far more honestly than either Greenspan or Paulson did in their recent books. Of course, he had the benefit of more hindsight. ( )

This is one of those books that I think I want to read but usually don't finish. So when it was offered through the Early Reviewer program, I figured I'd be motivated to get through it for the review deadline. I started it with good intentions back in May, when I received it, but it's been a struggle to complete and, if not for today's review deadline, I would probably have put it aside for good awhile ago. It had a lifeless, academic quality to it at times and was hardly the "enthralling whodunit account of the current crisis" promised on the back of the book. That said, I am glad I read it.

I suppose it's naive to think one book is going to clarify everything that happened to cause the worst downturn since the Great Depression, what Stiglitz calls the Great Recession of 2008. There are just too many factors for me to keep straight about what exactly led to what. My main takeaway from this book is that the relentless push to deregulate the financial markets, that started to gain traction in the Reagan years, eventually did us in. Unfortunately, because of globalization, it did alot of other people in too. The world's love affair with the American form of capitalism may be over. As Stiglitz says, on page 219, "September 15, the date that Lehman Brothers collapsed, may be to market fundamentalism (the notion that unfettered markets, all by themselves, can ensure economic prosperity and growth) what the fall of the Berlin wall was to communism."

Stiglitz is a Nobel Prize winning, Keynesian economist who believes that "markets lie at the heart of every successful economy but that markets do not work well on their own . . . . Government needs to play a role." p. xii (At one point, he says that self-regulation is an oxymoron.)

One of the big problems Stiglitz discusses is the creation of too-big-to-fail banks. "The repeal in 1999 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated investment and commercial banks, created ever larger banks that were too big to be allowed to fail. Knowing they were too big to fail provided incentives for excessive risk-taking." p. 15 Stiglitz is very blunt about what he thinks should be done about this. "There is an obvious solution to the too-big-to-fail banks: break them up. If they are too big to fail, they are too big to exist." p. 165 But without campaign contribution reform, he doesn't really see this happening. "Can we citizens expect to have regulations passed breaking up the too-big-to-fail . . . banks if the banks continue to be the too-big-to-ignore campaign contributors?" p. 208

Ultimately, this is a somewhat depressing book. Stiglitz only has "faltering hope" that we'll succeed in making the changes we need to in our financial system (i.e. passing meaningful regulations that will promote growth and stability and prevent a similar collapse in the future). As he says at the end of his Preface, "The ingenuity of man knows no bounds, and whatever system we design, there will be those who will figure out how to circumvent the regulations and rules put in place to protect us." p. xxv

In the end, this was a good book and one I'd like to refer to in the future but it has no index which I think is a big omission in a book of this kind. I'm giving it 3 stars. ( )

Some of the financial crisis books appearing about the crisis that began in late 2007 feature the firms and individuals that helped create or participated in the meltdown. There is a schadenfreude element that plays out describing the troubles. Stiglitz's book gives an overview of the Great Recession from an economic viewpoint. It doesn't focus on individuals or firms but takes a big picture look at the conditions that prevailed in the years leading up to problems.

Stiglitz argues that no economic foundations were overturned by the events that took place. Some 'denominations' of economics got their eyes blackened and have to reevaluate their tenets. He delves into the battles that struggle for supremacy in economic circles and how hard it is to move old theories into a new age with new conditions. Included are some of the problems between microeconomics theory and macroeconomic theory. They come to different conclusions. Similar to Newtonian physics and quantum physics. They don't mesh together neatly.

This is a worthwhile read if you are interested in the economic reasons for the crisis. If you are looking for narrative stories about the players (winners and losers) that unfolded during the crisis then this isn't such a book. Stiglitz presents his thoughts in a clear but nonscintillating manner which led to thought and even some disagreement on my part. ( )

Stiglitz, like Krugman, makes it easy to navigate and understand the complex economic theories and mechanisms that lead to the 2008 "freefall" of our global economic system. Definitely a proponent for serious regulation, as well as a well-balanced debate about the nature of markets, "free" markets especially, in relation to the cost of running those markets on society and the environment. Offers some poignant "woulda, shoulda, coulda's" along the way, some of which still make sense to employ in order to prevent the same kind of economic disaster from hitting again (which it will since we all can see that for the most part the financial world has returned to "business as usual").

Unlike many economists I have read, Stiglitz speaks of moral values in economics (ethics, as it were) and, in particular the moral inadequacies obvious with the double standard that has benefited the mega-banks (financial institutions) yet has forced the working people into destitution (in some cases). The key here is that homeowners should get an equal distribution of the "bailouts", which as he points out, will actually help the economy recover faster, and more solidly than handing enormous welfare checks to the already "too-big-to-manage" powerhouses.

Throughout the read my own theory was confirmed: Corporate institutions (or system) emulate a dying sun which expands into a red giant--eventually the gravity of it's own mass will exceed the rate of its expansion and the star (system) will collapse back onto itself. This is exactly what Stiglitz describes over and over for nearly every area of the financial system that failed. ( )

Straight-forward and informative, this book is certainly interesting but not at all inspiring. We're in a real mess. This book thoroughly explained how and why we steered it into the ditch. It offers some possible solutions too, but the assessment of the efforts to date is not that great. Necessary but hardly sufficient would probably sum up Stiglitz's view of the stimulus efforts and possible regulatory changes that are being discussed today.

Sometimes the truth may be bitter medicine but I think Stiglitz laid it out well here. ( )

A good exposition of events leading to the economic crisis at the end of the decade of the noughties. And a useful discussion, by a sensible economic policy adviser, of the issues involved. A free thinker at work. ( )

I really enjoyed reading this book, but I did have a couple of issues with it.

On the positive side, Stiglitz gives a comprehensive overview of the meltdown in our financial sector that has caused our current recession. He touches upon failed government policies, poor risk analysis in the financial sector, incentives that were misaligned with societal goals and sheer stupidity (or disingenuousness) on the part of many. It flows smoothly with occasional flashes of humor—not an adjective I would normally think to apply to an economics book—though it's not particularly organized around a central thesis. I like the fact that he has the courage to call it like he sees it and actively blame people, rather than dance around the issues.

On the negative side, it's a little hard to sort economic argument from political and personal leanings. Stiglitz spends some time explaining the flaws in the arguments of those who don't agree with him. However, he doesn't spend an equivalent amount of time supporting his own assertions. The problems with the repeal of Glass-Steagall occupy pages; the assertions that part of the solution is to focus on environmental issues and leveling wealth inequalities do not. Are there economic reasons for these or are they merely personal desires? It's hard to tell from the book.

In balance, it seems a good introduction to the problem and what to do. If you're on the Left, you'll probably like his arguments (though he does bash Obama a bit). If you're on the Right, you'll probably dislike them (except for the fact that he bashes Obama a bit). It doesn't matter...what this book does is raise the questions in a unambiguous and opinionated manner. In effect he says, "Here's how I feel about things. If you disagree, bring it on. But don't BS us with 'Gosh, there's no real problem.' or 'This is totally unexpected.'"

It has made me want to read more on this topic, particularly from an opposing viewpoint. ( )

I agree with much of what is in this book, but I frequently found myself in disagreement with bits and pieces here and there. I'd try to just let things ride, and go on with reading the text, but eventually I'd get a headache. I put the book down several times and read something else. I read the new book by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, (I'm sure mostly by the latter,) for instance, "Crisis Economics," and breezed right through it; and then returned to Stiglitz's book with a fresh mind, only to have the headaches miraculously return.

Little things bothered me: for instance, Stiglitz at one point says that home ownership is not only the American Dream, but is universal. I have European friends who would strongly disagree. My neighbor spends half the year in France. She exaggerates a bit, but I remember her once telling me that 'only the poor people in France want a house. Anyone with any sense wants an apartment in Paris.' And she would rattle off the reasons. Other friends have told me essentially the same thing. I have owned two houses, and once my children were on their own I said to myself: 'This is crazy," and I moved back to an apartment in the city.

I spoke to another friend who had been in the banking business, approving home-mortgages back in the 1990's, and I told him that Stiglitz said "the banks didn't need any push for egalitarian housing to engage in excessive risk-taking." I thought this would make my friend angry, but he laughed and said that in a way Stiglitz was right. He said that he wouldn't exactly call it a "push" though ... it was more like a gun aimed between his eyes. The Feds had reached the conclusion that banks weren't lending to a sufficient number of minority home-buyers, so they threatened to bring litigation against the banks. He said that this kind of litigation isn't something that could be handled by the regular bank attorneys, and if the banks resisted the Feds it would cost millions, and bring bad PR etc. So the banks eased the financial requirements to obtain mortgages. And he said surprisingly that it felt good! For years he had sat around day after day turning down applicant after applicant because they couldn't come up with a 30% down-payment or whatever, and almost overnight he could now approve mortgages. People left his office happy! It was a new and exhillarating feeling. He found he actually liked going to work in the morning. In the back of his mind, of course, he thought "this is all going to come crashing down," but then he also thought, "Hey, maybe this will work! Maybe we've been too strict all along!" and he did enjoy co-operating with the government. What eventually did disturb him was that when things began to go wrong, the Feds began calling bankers "predatory lenders." We were just doing what they wanted us to do, he'd say. Well, we should have expected as much. In 1938 when Fannie Mae was created the government advised the banks to "redline," although the exact word wasn't used. The banks were given maps with areas colored red, white, blue, and green or whatever, and were told not to lend to the folks in the "red" area (minority communities, of course,) because of uncreditworthiness. Then when redlining caused a scandal the government blamed the banks. Same ol' same ol'. (see Niall Ferguson's chapter on real estate in "The Ascent of Money.")

I was also involved in housing at the time, although in a different arena, and I had pretty much the same perception of what was going on. Stiglitz doesn't see that any of the blame in the beginning should fall on the government. He does criticize the government for mishandling things later on. I agree with many of his recommendations for curing the situation, and I think that most of the blame eventually falls to the big Investment Banking firms who along with Fannie and Freddie, sliced and diced the mortgages and sold them to unwary retirement plans, foreign banks, etc.

Perhaps I was too close to the action back then to see things clearly now. After all, Stiglitz has a Nobel Prize, and the last time I checked I didn't have anything in particular.

One last thing: The book does not have an Index! It really needs an Index. There are voluminous notes in the back of the book but I didn't find these particularly helpful. ( )

The financial crisis and recession of 2008 has spurred a number of books; Stiglitz' concern in this work is to locate the bust in the context of his broader, ongoing critique of globalization and the international economic system. Stiglitz argues not just that poor policy and greed generated the crisis in the United States, but that the response of the Bush and Obama Administrations were seriously flawed; that the U.S. is largely responsible for the global economic slump; and that the international financial system's response to the global slump was also flawed. It's not necessary to read all the chapters of the book in order; I found chapters eight (outlining Stiglitz' proposals for reforming the global economy going forward) and nine (a critique of academic economics as a discipline) the most stimulating. A reader who already has a basic grasp of how the crisis came about and how the U.S. and other governments have responded may find it helpful to jump directly to these chapters. ( )

This isn't so much a book as it is a barely-edited draft of a book, which is a shame because there is information and, especially, analysis in it that just aren't available elsewhere.

The first three chapters appear to provide background information but don't. Terms are undefined ("securitization", for instance), great importance is given to historical events ("The Reagan/Thatcher revolution") with no explanation of why or even of what happened. There is little coherence within or between paragraphs, so that it's difficult to know if there's a point (I suspected sometimes I was experiencing ten fingers typing on autopilot while their owner thought about something else) and if so, what it is.

Chapters 4 through 7 are, however, excellant. The writing's still not great but is much better and here in the meat of the book Stiglitz give a thoughtful and expert analysis of "The Mortgage Scam", the initial efforts to prevent economic collapse (tellingly titled "The Great American Robbery") and the state of governance and regulation in the financial world. He not only describes what actions were taken, but also alternative, often better, actions that could have been taken. He bases his analysis on a set of principles acquired in his years in policy positions, analyzing and dealing with economic crises outside the U.S, presenting the principles and carefully using them to explain why one action might be better than other.

In the rest of the book, 4 chapters, Stiglitz lays out how he thinks things should change--in U.S. financial sector regulation, in global economic institutions, and in Economics as a science. The entire section is mostly moot since the Senate just recently passed their version of a "financial overhaul" bill and substantive changes are unlikely, and, although I'm not an economist, I doubt many people who are have much interest in taking up his challenge to mend their ways. Also, off and on, much of this section addresses "The idealogues of the Right and the economists who gave them succor" (page 273) which wears me out, even though I don't really disagree with the attitude.

The book is worth reading--the central 4 chapters anyway, but I'd caution the reader to get some background first. I recommend [The Looting of America] as short, simple and well-written, though there may certainly be others that are better. ( )

Free LibraryThing Early Reviewer book. Another pretty good summary of “what happened,” though you might need to remember Economics 101 to follow some of the discussion. Stiglitz takes a more global perspective, bringing in trade and development issues as he talks about what happened in the US and how the Obama administration didn’t go nearly far enough in the stimulus or in proposing regulations to deal with the corrupt system that got us here. It’s a familiar, blood-pressure-raising story: some banks are so big that, like planets, they distort the gravitational fields around them, meaning that fair and free competition is impossible, even more so when the government intervenes at their behest so that risk is socialized but reward privatized. Stiglitz has some proposals, and he tries to be optimistic, but it’s hard. ( )

The Nobel-prize winning Stiglitz adds this easy read, in a pre-publication edition, to his list of three previous titles. The former Clinton administration policy wonk addresses American economic policy and how these policies have been exported to the world. The U.S., in particular Bush, is to blame for the financial crisis and now the U.S. owes the world. Obama is to be faulted for following Bush and for not doing enough. It is a cautionary tale of good intentions gone bad.

This is one of the worst books by a major thinker that I have ever read. He states (p. 286) that rights do not come from God, they do, at least in America, but Stiglitz states that rights are a part of the social contract. In American Constitutional theory, rights come from God but they are guaranteed by Republican government.

Largely understandable discussion of the dishonest tactics of the financial community, including: generation of many needless transactions to inflate fees; encouraging the not well-to-do to assume dangerous levels of debt; indifference to long term fiscal considerations; rigging the books, and a host of other crimes. He decries the government's (both Bush and Obama) largesse towards the financial heavies, protecting the latter from the consequences of their irresponsibility.